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Preface
The United States Congress is one of the world’s most pow-
erful legislatures. It is a complex, but often fascinating, insti-
tution. It is a place of contrasts, where most of the day-to-day
work is mundane and unremarkable but can occasionally
provide moments of great drama. To read the history of
Congress is to learn about both the great and infamous names
and moments of American politics.
The aim of this book is to provide an introduction to
the US Congress. It makes no claims to formulate any new
theories or models of Congressional action. What it attempts
to do is explain the role of Congress and its internal proce-
dures. Particular issues and examples are highlighted to try
and give the reader an understanding of some of the com-
plexities and nuances of the legislative process in the United
States.
One of the difficulties in writing a text such as this is that
politics does not ever stand still. Events constantly threaten to
usurp the information written here. Indeed, this fact was
behind the inception of this book. The 1994 election gave the
Republican Party control of Congress for the first time in forty
years and ushered in a period of rapid change. Textbooks
written before 1994, through no fault of their own, were in
danger of becoming outdated. Consequently, much of the
material in this text focuses on events since that time.
I would like to thank all those who have helped to bring
this project to fruition: Professor Chris Bailey for sparking my
interest in the US Congress; all the staff and students in the
Department of Politics and International Relations at the
University of Reading for their support; Alan Cromartie for
assistance with John Locke; all members of the American
Politics Group of the Political Science Association; Jon
Herbert for his help with my Reagan queries; the anonymous
reviewers whose comments proved valuable in shaping the
final product; all at Manchester University Press for their hard
work; and, finally, to my partner Clare for her unfailing
support.
x Preface
1Origins and development 
of Congress
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives. (The Constitution of the
United States of America, Article 1, Section 1)
The origins of the Constitution
In 1787, when the Founding Fathers of the United States of
America crafted the Constitution – a Constitution which still
endures today – they chose for the very first article, not the
institution of the President or the Supreme Court, but the US
Congress. The Constitution gave Congress the power to make
laws for the federal government, the ability to check the
actions of the President and the responsibility of representing
the American people.
Constitutions are never written in a vacuum. They reflect
the beliefs, goals and ambitions of their authors, and in many
cases, the values of society. In this way the American
Constitution is no exception. What is exceptional about the
document, which British Prime Minister William Gladstone
once described as ‘the most wonderful work ever struck off at
a given time by the brain and purpose of man’, is that over
200 years after its conception it still forms the basis of the
government of the United States. Consequently, to be able to
understand the principles on which the US Congress was
founded, one must first understand the politics which sur-
rounded the formation of the United States of America.
The founding of British colonies in what was known as the
‘new world’ is only one part of the history of the Americas,
but it is central to the history of the United States. It was from
the British colonies that, in 1776, a new nation was born.
The first British colonists arrived in what is now Virginia
in 1585. Life was difficult in the new world and many of the
early colonies succumbed to disease, famine and attack by
indigenous ‘Indian’ tribes. The first colony to overcome these
difficulties and survive was established in Jamestown,
Virginia in 1607. Their success was due to two factors: sur-
viving the first winter with the aid of friendly Native
Americans and an ability to grow tobacco. The colonists had
discovered a mix of Caribbean and mainland American
tobacco leaves which was appealing to the European palate
and trade with the ‘old world’ had become both possible and
profitable. By 1732, thirteen colonies had been established up
and down the eastern seaboard of North America. These col-
onies began to thrive through trade and soon found a degree
of autonomy from the British Government (throughout this
time Britain had been more concerned with the aftermath of
its own civil war than with the affairs of the colonists in the
West). Colonial assemblies were established in America and
these began to check the power of the resident royal govern-
ors, often taking control of aspects of taxation and expendi-
ture. Gradually, the principles of self-government were
becoming established in the minds of the colonists.
As the eighteenth century progressed, the British Crown
and Parliament once again began to look to the West. The col-
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onies had proved to be a success and Britain wanted to
expand their control of the continent. Their attempts at west-
ward expansion, however, meant conflict with French forces
who had established a powerful position in North America.
The ‘French Indian War’ lasted from 1754 to 1763, until
defeat for the French forces left the British in control of a large
area of what is now Canada and the United States. The cost
of the war and the resources needed to control their newly
expanded western empire put a strain on British finances and
led Parliament to look for new ways to raise revenue. Having
decided that the colonies should pay more for their own
defence, the British Parliament passed a series of Acts which
levied taxes on colonial trade. Two taxes caused particular
resentment among the colonists. The Sugar Act of 1764
banned the import of rum, placed a duty on molasses
imported from non-English areas and introduced taxes on
wines, silks, coffee and other luxury items. A year later, the
Stamp Act taxed all newspapers, pamphlets, licenses, leases
and other legal documents, a measure which affected anyone
who did business. Other initiatives introduced by the British
included a ban on credit notes and a requirement that the col-
onies provide royal troops with provisions and barracks.
The British actions had threatened the ability of the colo-
nies to trade freely and, given the historical importance of
trade to the colonies’ existence, caused a great deal of resent-
ment. Central to the complaint was the fact that the colonies
had no representation in Parliament – the body that had insti-
gated the taxes which had provoked the conflict. A call for ‘no
taxation without representation’ lay at the heart of their grie-
vances. Over the next ten years protests over British taxation
and coercion grew, occasionally breaking into violence.
Matters came to a head in Lexington, Massachusetts in 1775
Origins and development of Congress 3
when a raid by British troops on colonial militias led to full-
scale fighting and the start of the American Revolution.
A formal Declaration of Independence was issued on 4
July 1776. Largely written by Thomas Jefferson of Virginia,
the Declaration set out the grounds on which the colonies
claimed their right to throw off British rule. They charged that
the history of King George III’s rule was
a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in
direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over
these States . . . In every stage of these Oppressions We have
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our
repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated
injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act
which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free
people.
Behind the Declaration were the ideas of eighteenth-century
philosophers and writers such as Thomas Paine and John
Locke, which were prevalent among the aristocracy of the
time. Particularly influential was Locke’s social contract
theory (see Box 1.1). These ideas would go on to play a large
part in the writing of the Constitution.
The War of Independence formally ended in 1783 with the
signing of the Treaty of Paris in which the British Crown
acknowledged the independence, freedom and sovereignty of
the thirteen former colonies. With victory assured, the thir-
teen states were faced with the task of devising a system of
government. Having just defeated what they viewed as a des-
potic power, the leaders of the new states had no intention of
replacing the British Crown with their own monarch or creat-
ing a central government with the power to deny any state its
rights ever again. However, it was recognised that some form
of central administration was inevitable if the new indepen-
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dent states were to succeed. The result was the Articles of
Confederation, drawn up in 1776, adopted in 1777, and
which came into effect in 1781.
Articles of Confederation
Driven by an unwillingness by the states to relinquish their
independence to a strong central power for fear of abuses, the
Articles of Confederation created a central government with
very little power. There was to be no president or head of state
and no judiciary. The only national body was a unicameral
(having only one chamber) Congress, made up of delegates
Origins and development of Congress 5
Box 1.1 John Locke and the social contract
Seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke was one of the key
architects of the social contract theory. Locke argued that govern-
ments were formed with the consent of its citizens. The people
agreed to obey the government (thus surrendering some of their
freedom to act as they choose) on the understanding that govern-
ment would use its power to protect their natural rights of ‘lives,
liberties and estates’. The power of the individual to enforce the
‘laws of nature’ by administering punishments on those who
broke them (up to and including the death penalty) was surren-
dered to the government. On the other side of the contract, if the
government broke its promise and failed to respect the basic
rights of the citizenry, it lost its own legitimacy and could be over-
thrown by the people.
It was partly on this basis that the Declaration of Independence
stated that the British Crown had, through abusing the rights of the
American colonists, forfeited its right to govern. It was then the duty
of the American people to rise up against their British rulers and to
institute their own government. This task was completed with
American victory in the War of Independence.
from the thirteen states. The Congress was responsible for
conducting foreign affairs, declaring war and peace, main-
taining an army and navy and a variety of other lesser func-
tions. But the Articles denied Congress the power to collect
taxes, regulate interstate commerce or enforce laws.
The new system proved unworkable. Suffering financially
from the effect of the war, the economies of the states were in
trouble, with farmers hit particularly hard. Trade disputes
grew between various states, exacerbated by the fact that no
standard national currency had been established. Protests
sprung up across America, with some descending into vio-
lence. The tensions between states was not calmed by the fact
that nine states had organised their own armies, and in some
cases, navies as well.
It was soon recognised that a stronger national govern-
ment had become necessary to ensure the peaceful survival of
the states. To this end the leaders of the states met at the
Federal Convention in the Philadelphia State House in May
1787. The initial purpose was to amend the Articles of
Confederation, but before long the leaders had agreed that an
entirely new system was needed. On 17 September 1787, after
sixteen weeks of deliberation, thirty-nine of the forty-two del-
egates put their signature to the new Constitution of the
United States of America. Two years later the document had
been ratified by the required number of states and the first
Congress of the United States of America convened in New
York City.
The Constitution of the United States
Although the Constitution established a central government
with far more authority than the one created under the
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Articles of Confederation, this did not mean the states had
overcome their fear of despotism. The system of government
laid out in the Constitution was deliberately designed to
prevent any abuse of the rights of the states. It did this by
creating a federal system based on the principle of separation
of powers
Federalism
There was never a question that the new United States of
America would be anything other than federal. A federal state
maintains more than one level of government, with each
having their own rights and independence. Unlike in Britain,
where the government in London is pre-eminent, and can
create, alter or abolish local governments as it sees fit, the new
US Constitution maintained the autonomy of the individual
states. They created a central, or federal, government with
certain powers and responsibilities out of necessity. As the
failure of the Articles of Confederation showed, there were
certain jobs, necessary for the success of the new nation, that
could not be carried out by the state governments alone.
However, under the new Constitution, the state governments
were intended to be the primary level of government, with
responsibility for their own affairs and those of their citizens.
The federal government was to be restricted to those areas
which fell outside of the individual state: regulating trade
between states, establishing a national currency, conducting
foreign affairs and controlling the national military forces.
This ideal where each level of government had its own distinct
areas of influence which did not cross was known as dual fed-
eralism. As we will see, such a pure form of federalism was
going to be short lived, but for the early years of the United
States it was the state governments which held the power.
Origins and development of Congress 7
Separation of powers
The Founding Fathers were aware that, whatever their inten-
tions, without some form of safeguard, the powers given to
the federal government could be abused. To counter such an
eventuality, a system of checks and balances within the federal
government itself was established. Rather than invest one
body or person with full responsibility for the running of the
government, the powers were separated out between three
distinct and separate bodies: the executive, the legislature and
the judiciary. In principle, no decision could be taken without
the possibility that it could be checked by one of the other
bodies.
Congress in the Constitution
Just as the Constitution established a system whereby each
branch of government would be checked by another, a bicam-
eral legislature was chosen so Congress could in effect act as
a check upon itself. For any law to be passed the consent of
both chambers would be needed. These two chambers which
make up the US Congress were, and are, the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
House of Representatives
One of the central complaints against the former British rulers
was that Parliament taxed the people of the colonies but
allowed them no representation in the body where such deci-
sions were made. In order to avoid repeating such a wrong in
the new United States, the citizens of the states were granted
representation in the House of Representatives. Representa-
tives were to be directly elected by popular vote every two
years. This short time between elections was to ensure
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that Representatives would remain sensitive to the wishes
of their electorate, or face a swift removal. The number of
Representatives returned from each state was determined by
the size of the state’s population.
While the creation of a directly elected chamber in the
national legislature was a radical development for the late
eighteenth century, this was no modern-style democracy.
Voting rights were limited to white male adults, and in some
states a property qualification was also added. Furthermore,
the House of Representatives would also have to work
together, and in some cases compete, with the other chamber
of Congress, the US Senate.
Senate
The creation of the Senate can be viewed as a response to two
of the Founding Fathers’ concerns. The first was that if left
unchecked, the popular House may make rash and unwise
decisions. While the people deserved representation, there
was a concern that the masses could be swayed into support-
ing candidates or policies which were not necessarily in the
best interests of the United States. There was a danger that
such regular elections may lead to the House pursuing short-
term policies. Secondly, there was a fear that with the number
of Representatives from each state determined by population,
a few larger states could ride roughshod over the wishes of the
rest of the House.
To meet these concerns the Senate was designed to be the
chamber which represented the states. Each state was given
equal representation, returning two Senators, each represent-
ing the whole state, regardless of size of population. While the
House, with its regular elections, was intended to be respon-
sive to the current concerns of the population, Senators were
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to serve for six-year terms. The length of tenure was designed
to allow the Senate to take a longer term view when making
their decisions. In addition to this, under the original
Constitution, Senators were not subject to election by the
voters of each state; rather they were to be appointed by the
legislature of their respective states. Free from having to
please the masses and with their extended terms of office, the
Founding Fathers hoped that the Senate would act as a more
sober body, checking any unwise or impetuous proposals
which emerged from the House. This situation lasted until
1913 when the Constitution was amended to provide for the
direct election of Senators.
Congressional powers and responsibilities
Legislation
The primary power and responsibility of Congress is that of
legislation. Congress has the sole legislative power; no other
body in the United States can make federal legislation (state
legislatures can, of course, make legislation for their own
state). Bills can only be introduced into Congress by a Repre-
sentative or Senator, although for the most part a bill can orig-
inate in either chamber. For any bill to become law it must
pass a majority vote of both the House and Senate.
While Congress possesses sole legislative power, it is subject
to the checks and balances written into the Constitution. Once
a bill has passed Congress, it must then be sent to the President
for his1 approval. The President has ten days (excluding
Sundays) to exercise one of three options. He can sign the bill
into law, he can do nothing allowing (after the ten days) the
bill to pass into law without his approval, or he can veto the
bill which returns the legislation to Congress preventing it
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becoming law. However, because Congress is the final author-
ity when it comes to legislation, a presidential veto does not
end matters. Congress has the power to override a veto if (and
it is often a big if) a two-thirds majority can be obtained in a
vote in both the House and Senate. If this majority is achieved,
the bill will become law despite the objections of the President.
Oversight
As part of the system of checks and balances, Congress has the
power and responsibility to police many of the actions of the
executive. While both chambers have a role to play here, it is
the Senate which was given the bulk of the responsibility. All
presidential appointments, whether they be to the courts,
ambassadorships or to the cabinet must be approved by the
Senate. Treaties signed by the President only come into effect
once ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. While the
President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Con-
gress controls the funds needed to run the forces and only the
House of Representatives can declare war. As we shall see later,
some of these checks proved to be more effective than others.
Congress constantly monitors the behaviour of the execu-
tive branch, something which will be examined further in
chapter 7. For extreme cases, the Constitution awarded Con-
gress with the ultimate power – the power to remove the
President from office. The House of Representatives was
given the power of impeachment if the President is guilty of
the ambiguous charge of ‘high crimes and misdemeanours’.
Impeachment, though, does not mean removal from office.
That power was reserved for the Senate which, following
impeachment by the House, must then try the President for
his crimes, and if a two-thirds majority is reached, remove
him from office.
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The development of Congress
The basic structures and principles of Congress at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century are the same as they were at
the end of the eighteenth. The nation of the United States of
America, however, has changed dramatically and the federal
government has had to adapt to keep pace with these changes.
The Constitution has been amended only twenty-six times
since its adoption, and in fact has changed very little. The first
ten amendments, known as the ‘Bill of Rights’ were adopted
in 1791 to satisfy state fears that their rights and those of their
citizens were not sufficiently protected from abuses by the
federal government. These rights included provisions con-
cerning freedom of speech, freedom of association and the
right to a fair trial, among others.
Gradually the right to vote was extended throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Non-white Americans
were given the Constitutional right to vote in 1870, women
gained equality in this regard in 1920 and the franchise was
extended to 18-year-olds in 1971. The seventeenth amend-
ment, ratified in 1913, provided for the direct election of
Senators.
Many of the changes which have occurred in Congress
have not appeared as Constitutional amendments. The role of
Congress both in relation to its place in the federal govern-
ment and within the nation as a whole has changed. The
House and Senate have developed separate identities and
styles, partly due to the different roles accorded them by the
Constitution, and partly due to traditions which have devel-
oped over the years.
Congress currently resides in the Capitol Building on
Capitol Hill, Washington DC, connected to the White House
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by Pennsylvania Avenue. It first moved to the nation’s current
capital in 1800, having spent the previous decade in
Philadelphia. The building is now surrounded by offices for
the Representatives, Senators and their staff and by the
Library of Congress. All buildings are connected by a series of
underground tunnels and are accessible by any member of
public, provided they can pass thorough a security check. In
this regard, the United States has one of the most open
governments in the world today.
The balance of power within the federal government
remained firmly tilted towards Congress throughout the nine-
teenth century and for the first half of the twentieth. Congress
proudly protected its role as the sole source of legislation and
resisted any attempts by the presidency to establish legislative
leadership. The presidency had quickly established itself in a
strong position in regards to foreign policy, but Congress
played the dominant role in the areas of domestic policy
played by the federal government.
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt (served 1901–09) and
Woodrow Wilson (1913–21), the so-called ‘progressive
Presidents’, both attempted to extend the influence of the pres-
idency to areas of domestic policy, particularly the area of busi-
ness monopolies. Both were unsuccessful as Congress spurned
what it saw as an intrusion into its Constitutional role. The
whole balance of power changed in 1932 with the election of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the presidency. President
Roosevelt came to the presidency at a time when the United
States was suffering from a crippling economic depression. He
was elected on a promise to use the federal government to
address the problems faced by America. His ‘New Deal’ pro-
gramme did much to help the nation out of its problems, but
its effect on the political process would be even greater.
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Roosevelt transformed the role of both the presidency and
the federal government. Under his leadership the federal
government became involved in areas such as welfare,
employment and public works which were previously viewed
as the preserve of the states. What was also notable was that
many of these initiatives came not from Congress, but from
the White House. Congress remained the only body with the
power to pass legislation, but Roosevelt gave the presidency
a leading role in formulating legislation for Congress to con-
sider. Since Roosevelt’s time, the President has regularly been
an active participant in the legislative process.
While Congress was forced to adapt to the political
changes in the late twentieth century, its role remains essen-
tially the same. The extension of the federal government into
areas previously reserved for state government has meant that
the range of issues Congress must consider has increased dra-
matically as has the sheer complexity of the legislation it must
pass. With the post-New Deal presidency looking to play a
more active role in the initiation of legislation, the legislative
process became increasingly characterised by co-operation
and competition between Congress and the White House.
The balance of power between Congress and the presi-
dency is constantly changing. Until the mid-1970s, academics
often wrote of an ‘imperial’ presidency, which placed the exec-
utive as the dominant branch of government, especially in
matters of foreign policy. With the failure of the war in
Vietnam and the resignation of President Nixon following the
Watergate scandal, both of which highlighted abuses of power
by the White House, Congress began to reassert its power not
only to check the presidency, but also in terms of its legislative
role. Today the struggle for dominance over the direction of
the federal government is a much more dynamic one.
14 The United States Congress
Conclusion
The primary role of Congress in the American political system
remains the same as when the Founding Fathers wrote the
Constitution in 1787; all legislative power is still vested in a
Congress of the United States, which consists of a Senate and
House of Representatives. What has changed is the political
and social context within which it operates. The latest change
which Congress has had to adapt to came in 1994 when, in
the mid-term election, the voters chose to elect a Republican
majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate
for the first time since 1955. The following chapters aim to
give an understanding of how Congress operates, both inter-
nally and within the wider political system. As part of this
task, events since 1994 will play a prominent part in the
explanation to show how Congress has adapted to the latest
developments in American politics.
Notes
1 Masculine pronouns are used for convenience of style and are not
intended to exclude females.
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2Congressional elections
All politics is local. (former House Speaker Tip O’Neil)
The Contract with America
In 1994 the Republican Party led by Newt Gingrich of
Georgia in the House and future presidential candidate Bob
Dole of Kansas in the Senate celebrated a remarkable victory
in the Congressional elections. For the first time since 1955
the Republicans had gained a majority in both chambers of
Congress. Indeed it was the first time in that forty-year period
that the party had held the House of Representatives at all (see
Table 2.1).
Newt Gingrich took much of the credit for the victory.
Gingrich was an outspoken conservative who had risen
quickly to a position of leadership within the Republican
members of the House of Representatives. He was also the
central figure behind the Contract with America. The
Contract was a manifesto outlining ten key policies which, if
a Republican majority were elected, would be brought to the
floor of the House for a vote within the first 100 days. It was
signed by a significant majority of Republican candidates
standing in the House elections and many in the Republican
Party believed that this document was central to their success
in the 1994 elections. It was the first time that so many of the
candidates of one party had pledged themselves to a national
platform of specific policies which, they argued, offered a
sharp contrast to the ability of the previous Democrat
Congress to get things done. As we shall see, there is evidence
to suggest that they were mistaken in this belief.
Congressional elections
Elections to Congress are held every two years on the first
Tuesday of November, electing the whole of the House and
approximately one-third of the Senate each time. House
members are elected from constituencies within states con-
taining, on average, around 500,000 voters; Senators repre-
sent their entire state. The newly elected members take their
seats at the start of the new Congress in January of the fol-
lowing year. In this way while the elections are always held in
even-numbered years, each Congress begins and ends in the
odd-numbered years.
What made the Contract with America in 1994 such a
notable event in the history of Congressional elections is that
conventional wisdom considers that local rather than
national factors play the greater role in American election
campaigns. Voters are assumed to vote as much on the
achievements and character of the candidates before them as
along a party line. Consequently, candidates run campaigns
which stress their personal strengths or their opponent’s
weaknesses rather than the strengths and weaknesses of the
respective parties. Campaign posters ask the public to ‘Vote
Gingrich’ or ‘Vote Gephardt’ rather than ‘Vote Republican’ or
‘Vote Democrat’. This phenomenon is known as candidate-
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Table 2.1 Party control of the House and Senate since 1945
Congress Year House Senate
79th 1945–47 Democrat Democrat
80th 1947–49 Republican Republican
81st 1949–51 Democrat Democrat
82nd 1951–53 Democrat Democrat
83rd 1953–55 Republican Republican
84th 1955–57 Democrat Democrat
85th 1957–59 Democrat Democrat
86th 1959–61 Democrat Democrat
87th 1961–63 Democrat Democrat
88th 1963–65 Democrat Democrat
89th 1965–67 Democrat Democrat
90th 1967–69 Democrat Democrat
91st 1969–71 Democrat Democrat
92nd 1971–73 Democrat Democrat
93rd 1973–75 Democrat Democrat
94th 1975–77 Democrat Democrat
95th 1977–79 Democrat Democrat
96th 1979–81 Democrat Democrat
97th 1981–83 Democrat Republican
98th 1983–85 Democrat Republican
99th 1985–87 Democrat Republican
100th 1987–89 Democrat Democrat
101st 1989–91 Democrat Democrat
102nd 1991–93 Democrat Democrat
103rd 1993–95 Democrat Democrat
104th 1995–97 Republican Republican
105th 1997–99 Republican Republican
106th 1999–2001 Republican Republican
107th 2001–03 Republican Democrat*
* The 2000 election returned 50 Democrats and 50 Republicans to the
Senate, giving the Republicans control of the chamber thanks to the
casting vote of Vice-President Cheney. However, in May 2001, Senator
Jim Jeffords left the Republicans to become an independent, giving the
Democrats control of the Senate.
centred campaigning. It can be attributed to three character-
istics of the American system.
Weak parties
Compared to the more dominant parties prevalent in Western
Europe, American parties appear to be loose ideological
groupings of legislators. As will be seen in chapter 5, party
leaders in Congress and elsewhere attempt to persuade and
cajole their members into voting along party lines. However,
they have few sanctions available to force members of
Congress to follow a fixed position. Such power would, in
fact, be largely undesirable to the parties as they need to allow
members the flexibility to act in the way most likely to lead to
their re-election.
Varied regional interests
The sheer size of America and the diversity of its population
makes it nearly impossible for a party hoping for nationwide
appeal to expect its members to take the same positions on all
issues or to have the same policy priorities. A Democrat
seeking election from a constituency covering New York City
would find it difficult to succeed if she adopted the same
policy positions and priorities as a fellow Democrat in, say,
rural Kansas. It would be folly for any party to expect candi-
dates to do otherwise.
Primary elections
Unlike in the United Kingdom, parties in the United States do
not have the power to choose who represents them in the elec-
tions for Congress. This decision is taken by the voters in each
state or district in primary elections. In the months preceding
the main Congressional elections, candidates hoping to
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become their party’s official nominee, fight other party hope-
fuls in a primary election. The winner becomes the Democrat
or Republican candidate in the general election. In most cases
only voters registered as a Democrat or a Republican (on reg-
istering to vote Americans can choose to register as a
Democrat, a Republican or an Independent) can cast a ballot
in the party’s primary. These are known as closed primaries.
Some areas still hold open primaries, where voters may
choose which primary they participate in, regardless of their
registered affiliation.
At the start of the twentieth century, primary elections
were far from standard across the United States. However, as
the years passed, an increasing number of state-level party
offices adopted primary elections to choose their candidates.
This strengthened the tendency towards candidate-centred
campaigns in the subsequent general election; many of the
decisions candidates make about their campaign (main policy
positions, sources of funding, the staff hired and campaign
structures) need to be made early on in the primary campaign.
During the primary election, as a candidate’s opponents are
from the same party, the aim of the campaign is to distinguish
the candidate from her challengers, to show why, in ideology
or character, she would make a better representative or
senator than the other members of her own party. The focus
is on the candidate rather than the party. Once the primary
election is won, while candidates can change their strategy
between the primary and general election, whether to shore
up their party’s core support or to lure voters away from their
opponent, much of their campaign remains based on their
own attributes rather than those of their party.
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Who wins?
There are over 500,000 elected officials in the United States,
only 542 of which serve at the federal level: the President and
Vice-President of the United States, 100 Senators, 435 Repre-
sentatives and 5 delegates from the US territories (Puerto
Rico, American Samoa, US Virgin Islands and Guam) and
Washington DC (delegates can sit in the House of Repre-
sentatives but are not allowed to vote). Consequently, with so
few positions of influence available, competition for election
to Congress is intense. Any citizen of the United States who
has reached the allotted age (25 for House elections and 30
for the Senate) can stand for election. A candidate wishing to
be the nominee of one of the major parties must first win the
appropriate primary election or other chosen system of selec-
tion in the case of a minor party. Anyone gathering the appro-
priate number of signatures as established by state law can
stand as an independent in the general election. The only
further restriction is that a candidate must be a resident of the
state they are hoping to represent.
So how does a US citizen improve their chances of being
elected to Congress?
Be the Democrat or Republican nominee
While parties in the United States are less dominant than their
counterparts in Western Europe, they still play a fundamental
role in American Government. In the modern era nearly all
candidates elected to Congress have been the nominee of
either the Democrat or Republican Party. Since 1955, only
five candidates have been elected to the House or Senate
without the nomination of one of the two main parties. There
are several reasons for this phenomenon.
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The first reason for the consistent election of one of the two
main party candidates is that the parties can provide nominees
with the resources and organisation necessary to run an effec-
tive campaign. State-level party offices have ready a network
of volunteers and contacts to support the party’s nominee and
they can supply a limited amount of campaign funds. Most
crucially, the candidate can run under the banner of the offi-
cial Republican or Democrat Party. Except where there is a
notable independent candidate, the two major party nominees
will receive far more media coverage than any third party
campaign. In many ways this is a self-perpetuating trend; the
media, wanting to focus on campaigns of the serious contend-
ers will turn to the major party candidates, not because they
are better people or more able campaigners than any indepen-
dent, but because the candidate with a major party label is
usually the winner. This perception is relayed to the public via
increased media coverage. The majority of voters, not wishing
to waste their vote on a no-hoper will be drawn to the
Democrat or Republican candidate. The perception that
major party candidates are the only viable ones is reinforced
by the resources parties can supply candidates with.
Even with a rise in the number of voters considering them-
selves politically independent, the majority of Americans still
view themselves, to varying degrees, Democrat or Republi-
can. Table 2.2 shows the changes in party identification
among the electorate (1952–98). While candidates cannot
assume that a voter identifying with their party will automat-
ically vote for them in the election, it is clear that as long
as voters perceive electoral politics essentially as a choice
between Democrats and Republicans, those parties’ candi-
dates will have an enormous advantage over most indepen-
dents at election time.
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Table 2.2 Party identification 3-point scale 1952–98. Generally speaking, do you usually think of
yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
Year ’52 ’54 ’56 ’58 ’60 ’62 ’64 ’66 ’68 ’70 ’72 ’74 ’76 ’78 ’80 ’82 ’84 ’86 ’88 ’90 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98
Democrat (%) 57 56 50 56 52 54 61 55 55 54 52 52 52 54 52 55 48 51 47 52 50 47 52 51
Independent (%) 6 7 9 7 10 8 8 12 11 13 13 15 15 14 13 11 11 12 11 10 12 11 9 11
Republican (%) 34 33 37 33 36 35 30 32 33 32 34 31 33 30 33 32 39 36 41 36 38 41 38 37
Apolitical (%) 3 4 4 4 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2
Source: The National Election Studies.
Be the incumbent
One of the most striking features of modern Congressional
elections is the high number of members of Congress who
gain re-election. This is particularly true in the House where
the re-election rates frequently exceeded 90 per cent. The
factors which explain this trend are known as incumbency
advantages.
The first advantage which incumbents have over their
challengers in both primary and general elections is that, in
the majority of cases, they will be better known than their
opponents. While in office incumbents have either two or six
years worth of television appearances, public meetings and
publicity to get their name and, hopefully, their achievements
known. Their opponents will have only months or even weeks
to try to gain name recognition.
Incumbents are aided further in the promotion of their
name and image by the resources which come with the job.
Members of Congress have a sizeable staff in both Washing-
ton DC and their home-state offices. While challengers will
have to find money for items such as stationary and postage
costs, the Government provides this for members of Congress.
The franking privilege (the ability to send mail to constituents
free of charge) designed to allow members of Congress to
keep their constituents informed of the actions of their repre-
sentatives, has often caused controversy. The law states that
the franking privilege cannot be used for the purpose of elec-
tioneering or sending any mail which ‘specifically solicits
political support for the sender or any other person or any
political party, or a vote or financial assistance for any candi-
date for any public office’.1 However, as critics point out, the
difference between a letter informing constituents of what
their representative has been doing on their behalf and one
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‘soliciting political support’ can be fine indeed. It is noticeable
that those incumbents facing the closest election battles are
often the ones who use the privilege most.2
Incumbents have a number of other institutional advan-
tages over their opponents, including government-subsidised
travel between the constituency and the Capitol and radio
and television facilities in Congress which allow members
to appear on local media while in Washington. However,
perhaps the greatest advantage incumbents possess is that
they can actually do the job. Representatives have two and
Senators have six years during which to impress their constit-
uents. As will be discussed in chapter 3, members try to pass
legislation or take policy positions in speeches which will win
the favour of their constituents and they attempt to ensure
that any programme distributing grants or other benefits
includes their own state or district (and their role in obtaining
benefits well publicised). Even more important is the part of
the job known as constituency service, which entails respond-
ing to the queries, complaints or problems of individual con-
stituents. Addressing the concerns of individual voters may
seem a fruitless task in a nation as large as the United States,
but as former House Speaker Tip O’Neil explained
A politician learns that if a constituent calls about a
problem, even if it’s a streetlight out, you don’t tell them to
call City Hall. You call City Hall. Members of the House
learn this quicker than anyone else because they only have a
two-year term. They learn that if you don’t pay attention to
the voters, you soon will find yourself right back there with
them.3
The decline of party identification in the modern era has
made such personal advantages even more important. With
Republican and Democrat nominees unable to rely solely on
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their party label, the ability to herald their own achievements
while in office gives any incumbent a head start over their
often less experienced challengers.
Spend more money than your opponents
Running for national office in the United States is an expen-
sive business. In the 2000 Congressional election over $694
million was spent by the major party candidates, an increase
of 42 per cent from 1998.4 The average expenditure of candi-
dates for the House of Representatives was $474,019 with
their Senate counterparts spending, on average, $4,787,863.
In the race for the Senate in New Jersey, Democrat Jon
Corzine spent over $54 million on his campaign alone, com-
pared to the $4 million spent by his opponent. Corzine was
elected by a margin of 3 per cent.
The cost of running for office can be partly explained by the
sheer size of the United States. While candidates for the House
of Representatives have on average 500,000 voters to reach,
Senate hopefuls often face a potential electorate running into
millions. In the 2000 election, candidates running for the
Senate in California had a formidable 24 million citizens who
were eligible to vote. These potential voters need to be reached
by the candidates either in person at rallies and meetings, over
the telephone, by mail or through the media of television,
radio and newspapers.
While the amount of money a candidate can spend is
important in Congressional elections, it is not enough on its
own. In the 2000 campaign, Rick Lazio spent over $33
million, some $7 million more than his opponent Hillary
Clinton, in the race for the vacant Senate seat for New York.
Lazio lost by 12 per cent of the vote. Despite his monetary
advantage, Hillary Clinton’s high personal profile, mistakes
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by the Lazio campaign and the Democrat vote holding strong,
led to Clinton’s victory.
Despite such instances, the link between spending power
and success is undeniable. In 2000, winning candidates for the
House spent, on average, $653,183 compared to $267,145
for losing major party candidates. In the race for the Senate
the figures were $6,405,755 and $3,119,413, respectively.
The differences become even more stark when the closest of
races are examined. In races where the winner was elected
with 55 per cent of the vote or less, winners spent, on average,
64 per cent more than their nearest competitors.
Matters are further complicated when the amount of
money raised and spent by incumbents is examined. In the
2000 House elections incumbents spent nearly three times
more, on average, than their challengers; Senate incumbents
spent around twice as much as their challengers. In the
twenty-nine races where sitting Senators contested their seats,
only three were outspent by their challengers. This trend of
incumbents achieving a monetary advantage over their oppo-
nents can lead us to one of two conclusions: If incumbents are
achieving high re-election rates largely due to their institu-
tional advantages (discussed above) and also spend, on
average, more money than their challengers, this would
suggest a link between the amount of money spent and success
in the election, which might not be the complete picture.
Alternatively, the spending figures may suggest that one of the
reasons incumbents are so successful in gaining re-election is
that they can raise and spend more money than their chal-
lenger. The reality is probably a combination of both.
Incumbents are able to achieve this spending advantage
due to their ability to raise more funds than their opponents.
In 2000 House incumbents out-raised their challengers by
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four to one, with their Senate equivalents having a two-to-one
advantage. Money for election campaigns usually come from
one or more of three sources: the candidate’s own pocket,
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Box 2.1 Jon Corzine v. Bob Franks, New Jersey Senate 2000
The 2000 race for the vacant Senate seat in New Jersey was
notable for one reason – the record amount of money spent by
the eventual winner, Democrat Jon Corzine. The vast majority of
Corzine’s funds came not from the usual source of Political
Action Committees and individual donations but from the multi-
millionaire candidate himself.
Corzine spending during the general election campaign totalled
in excess of $60 million, $3 million of which was spent on election
day alone in an attempt to make sure that Democrat voters went to
the polls. A former chairman of investment bank Goldman Sachs and
Co., Corzine had amassed his vast fortune on Wall Street. In contrast,
theRepublicancandidateCongressmanBobFranksmanaged to raise
and spend less than a tenth of his opponent’s total.
During the campaign, in a state where over half of voters are
registered as independents (the rest being equally divided between
Democrats and Republicans), Corzine used his fortune to
bombard voters with messages advocating increased government
support of education and healthcare. His opponent instead
focused on the need to root out ‘wasteful Washington spending’.
Inevitably attention focused on the money being spent by
Corzine. The candidate claimed that his largely self-funded cam-
paign meant that, once elected, he would be indebted to no-one
except the voters themselves. The Republicans pointed to the fact
that over half of Corzine’s $800 million wealth was tied up in
Goldman Sachs stock, and consequently his former company would
‘call his every move’. Corzine promised to liquidate his stock if
elected.
Despite the massive imbalance of spending in the campaign,
the race was a close one. Corzine won, but only by 51 per cent
to 48 per cent of the vote.
donations by members of the public and contributions from
outside groups such as businesses, trade unions and pressure
groups. It is the last of these which has caused the most con-
troversy in recent years.
Interest group or business donations are regulated under
campaign law dating from the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 (amended in 1974 and 1976). Any group wishing to
donate money to candidates for federal office must first form
a Political Action Committee (PAC) which must be registered
with the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the body
charged with supervising elections. PACs are limited in how
much money they can donate to any one candidate; currently
they can give up to $5,000 to a single candidate per election
(individuals are restricted to donations of $1,000 under the
same law). The aim of the regulation was to ensure that rich
groups, particularly corporations could not attempt to buy
undue influence over elected officials. How far this aim has
been achieved will be examined in chapter 8.
Groups donate money to Congressional candidates for two
main reasons: to aid the election of candidates sympathetic to
their cause (or to aid the defeat of those whose policies they
oppose) or to increase the likelihood of having influence over
the member of Congress once in office. Both these goals give
incumbents a number of advantages when raising funds. The
first advantage is that incumbents are in office and can cur-
rently influence the workings of Congress, making them a more
attractive prospect for a group or company hoping to influence
the legislative process through political donations. The second
advantage is that incumbents are statistically more likely to
gain re-election. Apart from the most principled of groups,
PACs are likely to find candidates with a good chance of
winning more attractive prospects than a sympathetic outsider.
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In the pursuit of influence, little will be gained from contribut-
ing to the funds of losing candidates. This attitude was reflected
in the 2000 election when House incumbents, on average,
received more than eight times the funds from PACs than did
their challengers; for the Senate the advantage was six to one.
As the cost of running a successful campaign increased, the
statutory limits on donations by PACs have proven to be only
partially successful. Groups and wealthy individuals have
managed to find four main ways to circumvent the law.
Firstly, services which help the candidate more than would a
simple $1,000 donation, can be offered free of charge. For
example, catering for a fund-raising dinner, transport to move
the candidate around the constituency, expensive direct
mailing lists provided free of charge. Secondly, PACs engage
in what is known as bundling. Rather than donate just the
allowed $5,000, groups can instead collect the individual
$1,000 donations of their members and, assuring the FEC
that the money comes from individual members rather than
the PAC’s own funds, present a candidate with a collectively
‘bundled’ large gift of tens or hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Thirdly, due to a Supreme Court ruling designed to
protect freedom of speech, any group can spend as much
money as they like either promoting or opposing a candidate,
as long as there is no contact between the group and any of
the candidates in order to co-ordinate their campaign. Finally,
in order that the imposed limits do not prevent parties from
encouraging a high turnout of voters on election day, the orig-
inal 1970s law placed no limits on the amount of money
which can be donated to local political parties to enable them
to ‘get out the vote’. Such donations are known as soft money.
Soft money has become a controversial issue in recent elec-
tions. The distinction between a party encouraging people to
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come out to vote and encouraging people to come out to vote
for their candidate is a fine one. Consequently, donors have
been quick to realise that one of the easiest ways to help a can-
didate is to make a large donation under the soft money law.
The issue became a high profile one with Senator John
McCain, who lost to George W. Bush in the 2000 Republican
Presidential primary elections, placing it firmly on the
national agenda. In 2001, McCain, along with Democrat
Senator Russ Feingold, introduced legislation to bring soft
money under the electoral regulations. After a long and some-
times bitter fight, Congress finally brought soft money under
the law.5
Run a good campaign
Money is important for success; indeed without funds for the
basics of a campaign victory is unlikely. However, as Rick
Lazio discovered in New York, money cannot guarantee a
seat in Congress. The characteristics of the local electorate,
mood of the electorate nationally, the character and record of
the candidates and the strength of their campaigns can all
affect the eventual result.
Too often is party overlooked as a factor in elections to
Congress. While it is true that the character and campaign of
the individual candidate are important to success in elections
in the United States, the party still has a large part to play.
Republican candidates are regularly more successful than
their Democrat challengers in the southern states and rural
Midwest, while Democrats often receive in excess of 85 per
cent of the African American vote and fare considerably
better in urban rather than rural areas. There are still a few
constituencies in which one of the two major parties fields
candidates unopposed, so small is the chance of the opposing
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party winning the seat. Although part identification has
declined in recent years, a vast majority of the population still
identify themselves with one of the two major parties to some
extent. Most candidates cannot rely solely on their party label
for election (and it obviously has no effect in the primary cam-
paign), but the predisposition of the electorate towards one
party cannot be ignored in assessing election campaigns.
Coupled with the constituency electorate’s party leanings
is the effect of national politics on individual campaigns. The
conventional wisdom agrees with Tip O’Neil when he states
that ‘all politics is local’, and it is largely right, however
national swings for or against one party can also have an
effect. One such factor is the performance of the President.
Traditionally, during presidential election years, observers
believe that a party’s performance in the Congressional elec-
tions will be affected by the performance of their candidate in
the presidential elections. The Congressional party, benefit
from the positive feeling towards their presidential candidate,
and get pulled along on the successful President’s coat-tails.
The performance of the winning presidential candidate’s
Congressional party in presidential election years is shown in
Table 2.3a. Since 1948, while the winning Presidential candi-
date’s party has often had success in that year’s Congressional
election, one is no guarantee of the other. Indeed in the last
four elections the party which won the race for the White
House has actually lost seats in the House of Representatives.
One reason for this trend has been the growth of split-ticket
voting, where voters vote for different parties for President
and Congress in the same year.
Perhaps more notable are the results of the mid-term elec-
tions which take place between Presidential elections. As
shown in Table 2.3b, the party which holds the White House
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tend to lose seats in Congress. Indeed, in all post-war mid-
term elections, only once has the President’s party not lost
seats in the House. This often reflects a general dissatisfaction
with the status quo which is usually taken out on the party
which holds the White House.
Although national trends and the party leanings of the
local electorate have a role to play, candidates for Congress
would be unwise to rely purely on their party label to deliver
victory in the general election. With the number of people
strongly identifying with one of the major parties on the
decline, the support of more and more ‘floating voters’ is there
to be won by a good campaign.
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Table 2.3a The coat-tails effect?
Year Winning Winning Performance of winning
presidential presidential presidential candidate’s
candidate candidate’s party (no. of seats)
party
House of Senate
Representatives
1948 Truman Democrat 75 9
1952 Eisenhower Republican 22 1
1956 Eisenhower Republican 2 No change
1960 Kennedy Democrat 21 No change
1964 Johnson Democrat 37 1
1968 Nixon Republican 5 6
1972 Nixon Republican 12 2
1976 Carter Democrat 1 No change
1980 Reagan Republican 34 12
1984 Reagan Republican 15 1
1988 Bush (G.) Republican 2 No change
1992 Clinton Democrat 18 1
1996 Clinton Democrat 9 2
2000 Bush (G.W.) Republican 1 4
By far the largest percentage of a candidate’s expenditure
goes on their media campaign. With a large electorate to reach
with their message, newspapers, radio and television are an
essential part of any serious modern Congressional campaign.
Focus groups and opinion polls are frequently employed to
ensure that the themes of advertising hit home with the public.
The theory in practice
On the surface, the election of 1994 seemed to upset much of
the perceived wisdom of how Congressional elections are won
and lost. One notable feature was the number of House incum-
bents who lost their seats in the election. Thirty-four incum-
bents (all Democrats) lost out to a Republican challenger in the
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Table 2.3b Mid-term election performance of the President’s
party
Year President President’s Performance of the President’s
party party (no. of seats)
House of Senate
Representatives
1950 Truman Democrat 29 6
1954 Eisenhower Republican 18 1
1958 Eisenhower Republican 49 13
1962 Kennedy Democrat 4 3
1966 Johnson Democrat 47 4
1970 Nixon Republican 12 2
1974 Nixon Republican 48 5
1978 Carter Democrat 15 3
1982 Reagan Republican 26 1
1986 Reagan Republican 5 8
1990 Bush (G.) Republican 8 1
1994 Clinton Democrat 52 8
1998 Clinton Democrat 5 No change
general election, the highest figure since 1966. Four Democrats
did not even make the general election, being defeated in the
primary election before that. Many were replaced by candi-
dates with limited or even no prior political experience. The
most significant Democrat incumbent to fall in the general
election was Tom Foley of Washington state. What made
Foley’s defeat stand out was that he was the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, making him the biggest scalp the
Republicans could claim.
Another feature of 1994 was the sheer size of swing
towards the Republicans. The Democrats lost fifty-two seats
in the House and eight in the Senate, the highest loss in either
chamber since 1946. For the Democrats and President
Clinton, 1994 represented an electoral disaster. While com-
mentators had expected Republican gains, few had predicted
the size of the landslide which occurred. The frosh class of
1995 (those elected to Congress for the first time in 1994) was
unusually large; there were eighty-six in total, of whom
seventy-three were Republican, and 90 per cent of those rep-
resented constituencies which had returned Democrats to the
previous Congress.
The victorious Republicans claimed that the 1994 election
defied the conventional wisdom that elections are won and
lost on local issues. Republicans said that the election had
been ‘nationalised’ by the Contract with America. By commit-
ting the whole House Republican Party to a specific collection
of policies, the Republicans not only contrasted themselves
from the ‘do-nothing’ Democrats, but gave the public a clear
set of goals by which they could be judged and, ultimately,
held accountable. The timing was particularly effective fol-
lowing the failure of President Clinton to pass his promised
high profile healthcare reforms despite a Democrat majority
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in both chambers of Congress. Some of the newly elected
Republicans saw the Contract as so central to their success
that they wore laminated copies of the document around their
necks and referred to it as their ‘Bible’.
While there is no doubt that the 1994 elections handed the
Republican Party a major victory, giving them complete
control of Congress for the first time since the 1950s, and the
number of Democrat seats which turned Republican was
exceptionally large, we should not exaggerate the extent to
which it defied previous electoral trends. Although a number
of incumbents were defeated, the incumbent re-election rate
still reached over 90 per cent in both House and Senate, a
higher figure than in the previous election. While an incum-
bency success rate of 90 per cent is slightly down on the
average figure for the 1980s, it is about average for the
whole post-war period. Similarly, while the total number of
Republican gains was high, it was not unprecedented in mid-
term elections; losses by one party in the House had reached
forty-seven in 1958, 1966 and 1974 and the net gain of eight
Senate seats for the Republicans had been equalled by the
Democrats in 1986.
As far as the Contract is concerned, the evidence for its
central importance to the subsequent electoral success is, at
best, shaky. It is probable that the existence of the Contract
helped the Republicans’ overall image, but awareness of the
document appears to be limited outside of the political com-
munity. In polls taken at the time, 71 per cent of those ques-
tioned had never even heard of the Contract with America,
and of those who had, only 7 per cent said it was more likely
to make them vote Republican, and 5 per cent claimed that it
would actually deter them from supporting the party. Its effect
is more likely to have been indirect, ensuring that Republicans
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across the nation campaigned on similar themes, aiding the
prominence of these issues in the public’s mind. There is evi-
dence that the results of 1994 should be attributed more to
the public voting against the Democrats and President Clinton
rather than for the Republican agenda. One Republican
Representative admitted that not realising this led to mistakes
being made. ‘When the Republicans held their very first con-
ference after the election, there was a question I was dying
to ask. And I’ve been kicking myself in the butt ever since for
not asking it. I wanted to ask, “Did we win or did they
lose?”’6
The subsequent elections of 1996, 1998 and 2000 fol-
lowed most of the established electoral trends. Incumbency
re-election rates remained around 90 per cent and there were
no dramatic shifts in the party balance in either chamber. The
Democrats did buck the trend by picking up seats at the 1998
mid-term elections, despite a Democrat incumbent in the
White House. Overall, the traditional wisdom as to how cam-
paigns are run, won and lost remains valid.
Summary
Elections to Congress are determined more by local issues and
personality than any equivalent election in Western Europe.
Such factors have been made even more central by the growth
of primary elections to determine the nominees of the major
parties. The ability to raise and spend significant amounts of
money has also become an important determinant of electo-
ral success. In addition, incumbents hold a large advantage
over challengers, with re-election rates consistently reaching
over 90 per cent. Despite this, the importance of the party
should not be overlooked. The 1994 Congressional elections
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saw the Republicans take control of the House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate for the first time since the 1952 election.
Claims have been made that this success was due to the
Contract with America which pledged Republican candidates
to a national manifesto of policy pledges, although the evi-
dence suggests that other factors were more important.
Notes
1 US Code, 39 USC Sec. 3210 (5C).
2 G. R. Simpson, ‘Surprise! Top Frankers Also Have the Stiffest
Challenges’, Roll Call (22 October 1992) pp. 1, 15.
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5 However, at the time of writing, there is still a chance that this law may
be subject to a challenge in the courts.
6 Quoted in R. F. Fenno, Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of
the 104th Congress (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press,
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3Representatives and Senators
Reader, suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a
member of Congress. But I repeat myself. (Mark Twain)
Once the November elections are over, the newly elected
Representatives and Senators gather the following January
for the start of the new Congress. Out of the thousands of
hopefuls who started the arduous process of campaigning in
the primary and general elections, only 535 people sit as
members of Congress for the next two years; 435 in the
House and 100 in the Senate. For most of those members, this
will not be a new experience; only one-third of the Senate’s
seats are up for election at any one time (leaving two-thirds
of the Senate to continue their six-year term without the need
for re-election) and the majority of the other members of
Congress will be returning to their offices after successful re-
election. As discussed in the previous chapter, on average,
over 90 per cent of the Representatives and Senators who
choose to run for re-election are successfully returned to the
next Congress.
What sort of person gets elected?
To make an overgeneralisation, the typical person who wins
election to Congress is a white male lawyer. It would appear,
at first sight, that the second part of President Lincoln’s
famous proclamation at Gettysburgh of ‘government of the
people – by the people – for the people’ has yet to be fulfilled.
However, this is still a matter for debate. The 2000 elections
ensured that the 107th Congress would contain an unprece-
dented number of women: 61 in the House of Representatives
and 13 in the Senate. In addition, the 107th Congress bene-
fited from 38 African American and 21 Hispanic members, all
in the House. While this is an improvement on ten or twenty
years ago, Congress is still some way from reflecting the wide
and varied demographics of American society. While women,
African Americans and Hispanics represent 51 per cent, 12
per cent and 12 per cent of the overall population respectively,
they contribute 17 per cent, 9 per cent and 5 per cent of the
members of the United States Congress.1
In terms of members’ previous occupations, Congress is
an institution dominated by lawyers and businessmen. In the
106th Congress (1999–2001), when asked to list their previ-
ous occupations, over 40 per cent of Senators and Repre-
sentatives claimed to be lawyers. The next largest category,
with 35 per cent, was business or banking, with politicians
coming in third (Box 3.1).2 Several reasons can be suggested
for this dominance by the legal and business communities.
People from these occupations often benefit from their con-
nections in the worlds of politics and business which are vital
for building support and collecting campaign funds. They will
often have already acquired the public speaking, negotiating
and networking skills needed in the political arena, and,
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perhaps most importantly, they are given an advantage in
having careers and salaries which allow them to take the time
off to dedicate to an election campaign. It also may be that
lawyers and businessmen are looked to and trusted to fulfil
the role of member of Congress, quite simply because they
resemble the majority of those who are already doing the job;
in other words, they act and appear in the way people have
come to expect their representatives to behave.
Should this difference between the diversity of the Ameri-
can population and the relative homogeneity of the members
of Congress be a cause for concern? Critics argue that true
representation cannot be achieved while the nation’s legisla-
ture is dominated by people from one section of society.
However well-intentioned any member of Congress tries to
be, they will never fully understand the position of different
groups or individuals because they have never been through
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Box 3.1 Previous occupations of members of the 106th
Congress (members may list more than one)
• 217 lawyers • 3 professional athletes
• 184 businessmen/bankers • 3 skilled labor
• 124 public service/ • 3 healthcare providers
politicians • 2 actors/entertainers
• 99 educators • 2 artists
• 28 farmers/ranchers • 2 clergy
• 24 estate agents • 2 military officers
• 17 journalists • 1 aerospace professional
• 17 medical professionals • 1 labour official
• 10 law enforcement officers • 1 homemaker
• 9 engineers • 1 secretary
• 5 miscellaneous fields
Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
their situations or experiences. It is argued that this is not just
a matter of how each representative casts their vote, but one
of which issues or problems are seen as important enough to
have a prominent place on the national agenda. In short, with
Congress, the business world and the mainstream media dom-
inated by wealthy white men, politics will inevitably have a
wealthy white male agenda.
Alternatively, it can be argued that representation in a
democracy does not require the legislature to be a reflection
of society. How a member of Congress behaves, casts their
votes and which issues they choose to prioritise is far more
important than their gender, colour or class. If a representa-
tive is not fulfilling these roles to the satisfaction of the
majority of their constituents, they will not be re-elected.
Indeed, the Senator for somewhere like California has the job
of representing voters from all possible communities and
groups. It is not possible for a member to physically resem-
ble all the people they represent. It is also claimed that it is a
mistake to assume that on any one issue there is a distinct
male, female, African American or Hispanic view; people
from all sections of society have differing opinions on all
issues, a fact which would not be changed by a more diverse
Congress. Business and law are both professions where you
are likely find some of the most well-educated and talented
Americans, it is argued that it is to Congress’ credit that it
attracts the brightest individuals when careers other than
politics are likely to pay better. Finally, it is contended that
Congress is becoming more and more diverse, with the per-
centages of women and minorities represented rising stead-
ily. Furthermore, while many lawyers are elected, the 107th
Congress (2001–2003) also included members with previous
experience as, among others, a florist, a steelworker, a river-
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boat captain, a hotel bellhop, a taxicab driver and a race-
track blacksmith.3
Members’ goals
On election night, once the votes have been counted, each
successful candidate will make a victory speech to their sup-
porters and, through the media, to their wider constituency.
Most of these speeches follow the same pattern, the candi-
date will thank the voters for their support and acknowledge
the work of their staff and volunteers, they will thank and
extend a hand of friendship to their opponent and his or her
supporters, promising to represent all the people of the dis-
trict or state. They will touch on the key issues of the cam-
paign, promising to concentrate their efforts to make a
difference in these particular areas and finally they will
pledge themselves to working as hard as they can in the inter-
ests of all constituents. On election night, these promises are
easy to make; achieving them once in Congress is another
matter entirely.
Whatever is said on election night, is it possible to make
judgements on the priorities and goals of members of
Congress? For the majority of members, their main priority is
to be re-elected in two or six years time. In his influential text
Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayhew paints a
picture of members of Congress as ‘single-minded seekers of
re-election’.4 According to Mayhew, while in office, members
engage in advertising, credit-claiming and position-taking in
order to make a favourable impression on the voters back
home; their decisions made with a constant eye on the reac-
tion of their constituents. While he accepts that other motiva-
tions will exist in Congress, Mayhew argues that
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the electoral goal has an attractive universality to it. It has to
be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be
achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained.
One former Congressman writes, ‘All members of Congress
have a primary interest in getting re-elected. Some members
have no other interest’. Re-election underlies everything else,
as indeed it should if we are to expect that the relation
between politicians and public will be one of accountability.5
If this image of members of Congress dedicated solely to
retaining their jobs at the next election is true, should it worry
the American public? The quotation above suggests that it
should not; that in a democracy it is the job of members of
Congress to represent the wishes of their voters. The demo-
cratic principle of accountability means members would be
failing in their role if they did not keep a constant watch on
how their behaviour will be viewed by their constituents
and modify their actions accordingly. However, Mayhew’s
study also raises some worrying questions about the role of
Congress as the nation’s legislature. Can Congress with each
of its members dedicated to looking after their own fortunes
and those of their constituents be capable of making laws in
the interest of the nation as a whole? It has been argued that
activities such as advertising and position-taking, which may
play well with the folks back home, do little to help make good
laws. Particularly when legislation is complicated, one could
argue that it is the job of the member of Congress to use their
own judgement to lead, rather than follow, their constituents.
There is, however, much material to suggest that the image
of members of Congress as ‘single-minded seekers of re-
election’ is an oversimplification. Richard Fenno produced a
model where legislators have not one, but three primary
goals.6 For Fenno, the goal of re-election is joined by two
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others: making good policy and gaining influence within
Congress. Naturally, if taking a position on a policy or casting
a vote in a certain direction is likely to have a direct effect on
their election chances, members will change their behaviour
accordingly. However, there will also be many situations
where a member’s actions will not have such an impact, where
an issue has no interest for the voters at home or where there
is no guide as to what the opinion of constituents would be.
At those times, members are freed from concerning them-
selves with re-election and can pursue their other goals of
making good public policy and improving their own standing
within Congress. There is one further question as to what
extent members’ behaviour is influenced by interest groups
who supply much needed funds for election campaigns. This
will be dealt with in chapter 8.
Achieving the goals
Whatever the specific priorities a member of Congress decides
on, they face a number of barriers to achieving their goals.
The main obstacle to reaching their ends is the fact they are
only one of 100 legislators if in the Senate or one of 435 in the
House. For any chosen policy to become law or money to be
appropriated for projects, the approval of a majority of both
the House of Representatives and Senate is required. Each
member’s pet projects or key priorities must compete with
those of all the other members for their colleagues’ support
and for time on the Congressional schedule. During the elec-
tion period, candidates across the country make promises of
what they will achieve if elected, however there must be doubt
as to exactly how much difference one person can make. This
section discusses some of the ways in which legislators try and
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overcome these barriers and successfully achieve the goals of
making good public policy and ensuring their eventual re-
election.
Policy specialisation
When the fate of a bill is finally decided on the floor of the
House or the Senate, all members are, in theory, equal. All
have one vote and are free to cast it in any way they see fit, or
not cast it at all if that is what they wish. However, in prac-
tice, there is much more to determining what becomes law
than the final vote in either chamber. In these areas all
members cannot be said to be equal. Hundreds of different
policy areas are dealt with by every Congress, with members
having the opportunity to debate and vote on issues as diverse
as taxation, environmental policy, education, gun law and
foreign affairs. It quickly becomes clear to new members that
it will not be possible for them to have a significant influence
(beyond the right to speak or cast their vote) in all areas of
policy. This inevitably leads to members concentrating their
efforts on a few carefully chosen issues, a process known as
policy specialisation.
Each member of Congress faces many demands on their
time and that of their staff. It is simply not possible for them
to dedicate their time and resources to gaining expertise in
every area of policy. While they will be expected to have an
opinion and some knowledge on any given issue that is raised
in an election campaign, if a member hopes to become fully
active in the legislative process they will usually dedicate their
time and resources to a few areas.
The choice of issues will largely be determined by the type
of constituency a member of Congress represents. Here the
goals of re-election and good public policy can coincide. For
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instance, a Representative whose constituency covers down-
town urban New York would gain little benefit from special-
ising in agricultural policy, however interesting the issue may
be. Alternatively, a Senator from a rural state whose primary
occupation was farming would hardly be promoting their
constituents’ interests (or their own re-election chances) if at
least one of their key issues was not related to agriculture.
The choice of which issues a member concentrates on may
also be influenced by their backgrounds and interests. They
may choose to dedicate time to policies in which they have
prior experience or expertise, or to issues which they person-
ally feel are important. Especially in the Senate, the choice of
speciality can also be influenced by their colleagues choices.
There is evidence to show that Senators will try to specialise
in different areas to those chosen by the other Senator from
their state, so to make sure they have their own territory
marked out for the media and voters to see.7
At the heart of policy specialisation by members is the com-
mittee system of House and Senate, which will be considered
in detail in the next chapter. The committees are the engine
room of Congress where legislation is researched and formu-
lated. To a large extent the committees are the bodies who
decide which legislation will be put to a vote of the House or
Senate and which will quietly die. Consequently, for most
members, if they are to have any significant influence over an
area of policy they must ensure they have a seat on the relevant
committee, as it is here that many of the key decisions are made.
When first elected to Congress members will supply their party
leadership with a wish-list of committees on which they would
like to serve. The party leaders will then allocate committee
places, with the level of demand for each seat determining how
far they can accommodate each legislator’s request.
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The allocation of committee seats will go a long way in
narrowing the areas in which a member can effectively spe-
cialise. While there is nothing to stop a member becoming
knowledgeable and speaking out on an issue not under their
committees’ jurisdiction, the direct influence they can exercise
is likely to be limited. Instead, if used to its potential, the com-
mittee system will help policy specialisation by giving legisla-
tors an arena in which they can both accumulate knowledge
and influence policy. Members’ influence over their key issue
area will rise as they gain a reputation for being an expert in
the field and move up the committee hierarchy. When this
influence is in a policy area of importance to their constitu-
ents, it will also have the effect of aiding their re-election.
Constituency service
The choice of policy areas to focus on can be viewed as one
way of serving constituents and aiding re-election, as can
voting in accord with the wishes of the folks back home.
There are also ways in which members of Congress can help
their constituency more directly.
The most basic of these is constituency case work. Case
work entails dealing with the problems or requests of individ-
ual constituents. Members receive thousands of letters, emails
and telephone calls from their voters every year. Many of
these will be communications expressing an opinion on an
issue of importance to them or voicing approval or displeas-
ure over the actions of their representative on Capitol Hill.
Others will be requesting help for a wide variety of reasons;
there may be complaints that a social security or pension
cheque has not arrived, a constituent may be having problems
with some level of government or a student may request infor-
mation for a project they are researching. Any member of
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Congress with the intention of being re-elected will ensure
that their staff do their utmost to help with each and every
problem, even if it is not something which is directly under
their control. The gratitude a member will receive from that
voter, if their office is seen to be interested or even go out of
its way to help, will be greater than any credit which would
be received by casting a particular vote or making a rousing
speech. Alternatively, if the member’s office is seen to be
unhelpful or not interested in an individual’s problems, the
negative effect can outweigh years of good work. The
assumption is that a pleased constituent will tell their family
and friends about the episode helping to create an image of
their member of Congress as someone who cares. A disgrun-
tled voter who feels ignored will also make sure their neigh-
bours know.
Members will also be pro-active in making sure they create
an image of a legislator serving their constituency. Regular
visits home, appearances at local public, social or sporting
events and a high media presence all promote the member as
a good ‘local’ Senator or Representative. Every member main-
tains at least one office in their constituency (often more than
one for Senators from a large state) to allow easy contact with
the voters. Building up a good local reputation can create a
strong personal following for the member which can ensure
re-election. Over the years it has been noticeable that, when
polled, voters consistently express a much higher opinion of
their own Senators and Representatives than they do of
Congress as a whole. This can be partly attributed to the
amount of effort members put into serving, or appearing to
serve, their constituents.
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Pork barrel
The most controversial of ways in which members serve their
constituents, but perhaps the most effective in terms of build-
ing a positive image, is what is know as pork barrel. Pork
barrel (so called because the first recorded instance actually
involved barrels of pork) is a term used for federally funded
projects which a Senator or Representative acquires for their
constituency to help with their re-election. These can include
projects such as the building of a new hospital, the construc-
tion of a new highway bringing jobs and investment, money to
help with cleaning a dirty river or assistance to local busi-
nesses. Members can be particularly successful at bringing
home such benefits to their constituency if they have a place on
any committee in charge of distributing such projects or funds.
Critics of Congress argue that much of this spending is
wasteful as it directs taxpayers’ money to districts with
members on the right committee rather than to places which
genuinely need such investment. The term ‘pork barrel’ is,
however, a subjective one. What to one person may seem the
much needed investment of federal funds into a suitable
project in a needy part of the country, to their opponents will
be politically motivated pork barrel. Whatever the incentive,
members will frequently attempt to claim credit back home
for some project or funding their district or state benefited
from which is partly due to their intervention. There is no
better photo opportunity for a member of Congress than the
opening of a new highway, dam, hospital or community
project supported by federal funds.
This issue of pork barrel lies at the heart of the debate sur-
rounding the duties and goals of a member of Congress. All
435 House members and 100 Senators play two, often con-
flicting, roles. They are members of the federal legislature
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which is given the sole responsibility for making national laws
by the Constitution, but they are also representatives of spe-
cific local areas whether that be a district or state. When fed-
erally funded programmes or initiatives are distributed will
members be fulfilling their role properly if they fight to benefit
the constituents whom they represent or by seeking to serve
the national good, even if that means their own voters will not
gain? The issue is further muddied by the fact that what con-
stitutes the greatest need is often a matter for debate and inter-
pretation, especially when demand for federal help outstrips
the available funds.
Gaining influence within the chamber
Aside from any personal gratification that may be achieved,
the goal of gaining influence within the chamber is largely a
means to an end. While being awarded a seat on a committee
and becoming active in its deliberations concerning specific
policy areas is an important part of a member being able to
shape the policies passed by Congress, it is only a first step.
Any proposal a member wishes to make may face opposition
from other members on the committee or from outside, it will
also face stiff competition for a prominent place on both the
committee’s agenda and the Congressional agenda as a whole.
Thousands of proposals are made every Congress by members
looking to promote their own or their constituents’ interests,
but with only two years (the length of a Congress) to complete
the journey from bill to law, the majority will fall by the
wayside, never making it to a final vote in the House or
Senate.
Any member entering Congress for the first time will find
there is stiff competition to get their voice heard on any one
issue and their priorities considered ahead of the many others
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on the agenda. This is especially true in the House where a leg-
islator is only one voice in a chamber of 435 members. The
first job of any member hoping to exert influence within their
chamber is to learn the procedures of Congress. It is virtually
impossible for a frosh (the term for a first-term legislator)
member to personally convince every other legislator neces-
sary to get their bill or proposal considered and then success-
fully passed through Congress. What they can do is learn the
intricacies of the legislative process and which key positions
or people hold the most power over such matters as schedul-
ing or are in a position to persuade others. By developing their
knowledge of Congress and their relationships with other
members, frosh legislators can improve their chances of
achieving their goals.
Once members have a few years of service behind them
they can start to move into positions of authority either within
their committees or party themselves. These topics will be
dealt with in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. Suffice to say
that posts such as subcommittee or committee chair, or a posi-
tion of authority within one of the parties bring with them an
increased influence over the content and scheduling of legisla-
tion. Under the process of seniority members move up the
roster of their committees and subcommittees the longer they
serve, until reaching the chair or, in the case of the members
not belonging to the majority party, the ranking minority
position.
Without achieving a formal position of power within
Congress, members can begin to assert influence by gaining a
reputation of expertise in their chosen areas of policy; many
issues are complex and no legislator can hope to become an
expert in all fields. When casting a vote for a particular piece
of legislation, non-expert members wish to be assured that the
52 The United States Congress
law they are voting for is a good one, that their vote will not
be tied to an unforeseen negative outcome by future oppo-
nents. By gaining a reputation of a knowledgeable and trust-
worthy legislator on a particular issue, a member can
potentially increase their influence over the decisions of their
colleagues.
Staff support
To aid their efforts to represent constituents, make good
public policy or make their way within Congress, all members
are given a great deal of support. Along with the franking
privilege and funds to visit their constituency on a regular
basis, all members and both parties are given good staff
support. Each member establishes their own office and hires
the staff to fill it. The budget they are given is set according to
the size of their constituency. How much is spent on the
Washington office and how much on its constituency equiva-
lent is entirely up to the individual. Currently, there are
approximately 24,000 Congressional staff workers serving
members, committees and the party leaderships, an increase
of some 18,000 since 1960.8 The average House member
employs 14 staff, the Senate average is 34.
In addition to personal, committee and party staff, mem-
bers are supported by a number of legislative agencies.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accounting Office
(GAO) are all non-partisan offices who will give support to
any member looking to research Congressional activity or to
write a bill. They are especially helpful in providing expert or
technical advice on policy detail or helping staff to frame leg-
islation in the correct legal language.
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Reconciling conflicting goals
While the theory of the aims and objectives of members of
Congress may seem straightforward, the decision-making
process for individuals can be a delicate matter of judgement.
A member’s constituents which can number, for Senators, in
the millions, will rarely be of one mind when it comes to how
their elected officials should act. Members must make judge-
ments about their constituents’ preferences when it comes to
expressing opinions, casting votes or choosing which issues to
concentrate on. Subjects such as abortion or gun control often
split voters evenly but raise strong feelings. When members
decide that an issue is of little importance to their constitu-
ency and thus leave them free to act according to their con-
science, how can they be sure that two years down the line
events have not transpired to place the subject at the centre of
an opponent’s election campaign? Members of Congress must
make considered judgements on a wide range of topics. Two
examples can help illustrate some of the subtleties involved in
Congressional decision making.
The impeachment of President Clinton
Following allegations of impropriety by President Clinton
concerning the so-called ‘Whitewater’ land deals he, his wife
and business partners had made in his home state of
Arkansas, an independent council was established to look
into the President’s behaviour. Failing to find any evidence
against the President over Whitewater, the council, Kenneth
Starr, began to widen the scope of his investigation. What he
discovered was that during a sexual harassment case brought
early in his Presidency, Bill Clinton had denied suggestions
that he had an affair with White House intern Monica
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Lewinsky. The case actually had little to do with the intern
and the denial raised little publicity until Starr revealed that
he had evidence that Lewinsky had indeed been involved with
the President, a fact which suggested that the President had
lied before a Grand Jury. The independent council submitted
his report to the House of Representatives in September 1998
accusing the President of obstructing justice.
The US Constitution gives Congress the power to remove
the President from office in the event he is proven to have
committed ‘high crimes and misdemeanours’. First the House
of Representatives must impeach the President by majority
vote, the Senate will then hold a trial and, if found guilty by
a two-thirds majority, the President is removed from office.
Following the allegations in Starr’s report, the House held
hearings, deliberated and finally voted to impeach President
Clinton. The Senate began its trial, but, with public opinion
swinging firmly behind the President, it failed to achieve even
a majority in the vote to remove him from office.
In opinion polls, the public far from approved of the
President’s action, but a large majority felt that his actions fell
well short of the ‘high crimes and misdemeanours’ needed to
impeach. The most common feeling was that this was a man
who had seriously erred in his private life, but was still doing
a good job as President. Indeed, although nearly 60 per cent
of the public believed that the President had lied about his
affair with Lewinsky, his job approval ratings rose dramati-
cally during the crisis from 48 per cent before the allegations
of infidelity to a high of 70 per cent in February 1999, at the
height of the action against him. They were never to fall below
50 per cent again. In polls, 68 per cent felt that Congress
should make the debate over social security its main priority
with only 23 per cent thinking impeachment as or more
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important. Consistently 60 per cent of the public felt Con-
gress should not remove him from office and, tellingly, 64 per
cent believed that most members of Congress had lied to
someone about having an extramarital affair.9
If members of Congress are so wedded to the views of their
constituents when deciding how to act, why did a majority of
the House of Representatives defy public opinion and vote to
impeach President Clinton? Were they not worried that taking
such a position would hurt their standing in the eyes of the
voters? As with many actions taken by Congress, there is no
simple answer. Many claimed a strong personal feeling that
the President had betrayed his office by perjuring himself and
lying to the nation. It was, they argued, their duty as a
member of Congress to uphold the Constitution and proceed
against the President. However, the actual vote on impeach-
ment turned out to be more about party ties than personal
conscience. The House divided on the issue largely on party
lines with all but five Republicans voting to impeach and all
but five Democrats voting to acquit. Party allegiances and
Washington politics took precedence over public opinion for
three reasons.
Firstly, it seemed unlikely that one member’s vote on the
issue would have little importance in the 2000 Congressional
elections where local issues tend to take centre stage. Except
for staunch supporters or opponents of Bill Clinton, would
people really change their vote in the Congressional elections
over the impeachment of the President? It seemed unlikely
and certainly no one should lose their seat over it. Indeed the
most likely arena for the decision to have any salience would
be the primary elections, where voting with the majority of
fellow party members could not be seen as detrimental,
although voting against the party could. Secondly, House
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members were in a no-lose situation, if they voted to impeach
it would still be the Senate who had to decide whether the
President would be removed from office or not. The House
action was always one step removed from the final decision
on Clinton’s fate. Finally, for many Republicans, the opinion
polls could not be totally believed; surely, they argued,
support could not keep holding up for a President who in their
eyes has not only acted immorally, but had perjured himself
and lied to the American people. In any event, plunging the
Clinton Presidency into further crisis shortly before the end of
his term in office would do little harm to the Republican can-
didates for the presidency and Congress in the year 2000.
By the time the Senate trial came to a close it was clear that
the early public support of the President was no freak and,
accordingly, the vote went against removing him from office.
What opponents of Clinton had trumpeted as a case of
perjury and obstruction of justice which threatened the
dignity of the White House, the public had clearly seen as a
political sex scandal of more tabloid proportions. What the
episode can show us is that to perceive of Congressional beha-
viour as a direct reflection of what constituents want was, in
this particular instance, only part of the picture.
Term limits
For anyone contending the primary objective of any member
of Congress is to be consistent re-election at all costs, it may be
surprising to find that the Republican Party’s 1994 Contract
with America contained a commitment to introduce term
limits. Under the proposals, after serving two consecutive
terms in the Senate or either three or six (members were to be
given two options to debate) consecutive terms in the House,
members would be barred from running for re-election. The
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idea behind the scheme was to counter the ability of incum-
bents to be elected time and time again due to the advantages
of office, and to replace the long-term professional politician
with fresh faces. Currently, eighteen states have similar restric-
tions on their own legislatures.
When the legislation came to a vote on the House floor, a
majority of members voted for the proposal (227:224), but in
this instance it was not enough for it to pass. The Supreme
Court had ruled earlier in that year that Congressional term
limits would require a Constitutional amendment rather than
a simple law. According to the Constitution, amendments can
only be adopted after gaining a two-thirds majority in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate and the approval
of two-thirds of the states. In this instance the proposed
Constitutional amendment introducing Congressional term
limits fell at the first hurdle, failing to achieve the required
majority in the House. Forty Republicans joined the majority
of Democrats to vote against, with 38 Democrats voting with
the majority of Republicans in favour.
To say that the failure of the amendment was a foregone
conclusion – that Representatives were not about to vote
themselves out of job, even if it was in twelve-years time –
misses the point that a majority of members appeared to be
willing to do just that. We can only speculate as to their true
motives. Many may have genuinely believed in the proposals
as best for the nation, others, who planned to retire or move
on within the next twelve years may have felt freed from pro-
tecting their own interests to vote in line with their own
beliefs, those of their constituents or with their party leader-
ship. There is also the distinct possibility that, as it became
clear that the proposal stood no chance of gaining the two-
thirds majority needed for it to progress, members were free
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to be seen supporting the idea, all along knowing that their
jobs were safe from the consequences of it succeeding.
Of particular interest are those members who during the
election campaign, as a matter of principle, pledged to impose
their own term limits on themselves if the amendment was not
successful. Some of them advocated a much shorter time limit
than twelve years and so the strength of their commitment can
already be seen. The results were mixed. For instance, Demo-
crat Representative from Massachusetts Martin Meehan, first
elected in 1992, pledged to stand down after eight years of
service and George Nethercutt from Washington state, a
Republican first elected in 1994, promised he would retire
after only six years. Once ensconced in Congress both
changed their minds and were still in office at the start of the
107th Congress in 2001. Nethercutt explained that ‘experi-
ence . . . taught me that six years may be too short a time to
do the job the people . . . elected me to do’, Meehan argued
that campaign finance reform was of such importance that he
needed to stay in the House. In contrast to Nethercutt and
Meehan, some House members did indeed stick to their own
personal term limits. Elizabeth Furse of Oregon (elected in
1992) and Jack Metcalf of Washington state (elected in 1994)
both declined to run for re-election after serving three consec-
utive terms.
What both of these examples illustrate is that, while we
can legitimately make assumptions as to the goals and
motives of members of Congress, it should not blind us from
the fact that every situation is complex and different from
next, and the way that each individual will respond to and
judge the situation will also vary.
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Summary
While Congress is becoming a more diverse body, the typical
member is still a white male lawyer. Whether this is bad for
American democracy is a matter for debate. Whatever the
profile of the member, they are likely to have similar goals: to
be re-elected, to make good policy and to gain influence
within Congress. Which of these goals will be the priority will
vary from issue to issue and will be a delicate matter for each
member’s judgement. Attention to the needs of constituents
will always be important. To achieve any of these goals,
members will need to specialise in certain areas of policy in
order to get their voice heard and their proposals passed. At
the heart of this is the committee system.
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4The committee system
Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst
Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.
(Woodrow Wilson)
Writing while still a postgraduate student, President Woodrow
Wilson commented, ‘Congressional government is committee
government’. Committees are the engine rooms of Congress.
In order to become law, every piece of legislation must ulti-
mately face a vote in the chambers of House and Senate,
but it is in the committee rooms that nearly all proposals
take shape and where most proposals die. This chapter exam-
ines the role and the power of the committee, the legislators
who populate these bodies and discusses whether the commit-
tee system as a whole is good for democracy in modern
America.
Committee structure
There is no mention of committees in the Constitution, but it
quickly became clear that if Congress was to function prop-
erly as the federal legislature, some sort of division of labour
was going to be necessary. To overcome the problems inherent
in getting a large group of legislators to deal effectively with a
large range of detailed issues, the early stages of the legislative
process are now delegated to committees.
It is the responsibility of the House of Representatives and
Senate as a whole to determine the number and size of their
own committees, although these decisions are now mainly
made by the party leaderships before being ratified by the
whole chamber. The number of Democrats and Republicans
on each committee is worked out between the two leader-
ships, the figures broadly reflecting the balance between the
two parties in the chamber as a whole. It is up to the individ-
ual parties to decide which of its members sits on which com-
mittee.
There are essentially five types of committees in Congress.
Standing committees carry out the day-to-day work of
reviewing the bills introduced into Congress, gathering infor-
mation and framing the legislation to be put to the floor.
These are the workhouses of Congress and will be examined
in detail shortly. Ad hoc committees are other sources of leg-
islation, these temporary bodies can be established to write
and report legislation on specific topics. Once completing
their task or running for a specified time, the ad hoc commit-
tee will then cease to exist. Such bodies are only used occa-
sionally. Select or special committees are another type of
temporary panel designed to look at a specific topic. Unlike
ad hoc committees, select committees usually do not have the
power to report legislation (although the Select Intelligence
Committees of House and Senate have been made permanent
and granted that power); instead they are mainly used to
research a specific issue or to investigate the behaviour of the
executive branch. One of the most noticeable select commit-
tees in recent years was the Senate Select Committee on
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Presidential Campaign Activities, established in 1973 to
investigate allegations made against President Nixon follow-
ing the Watergate affair.
Like select committees, joint committees have no power to
write legislation. They are investigating committees com-
posed of members from both House and Senate. The only
other committee which comprises both Senators and Repre-
sentatives are the conference committees. Conference com-
mittees are temporary bodies, established to iron out the
differences between the two chambers when both have passed
slightly different versions of the same bill. We will look at
these particular bodies in chapter 6.
Standing committees
In the 107th Congress there were nineteen standing commit-
tees and one permanent select committee in the House and
sixteen in the Senate, each with its own area of policy to con-
sider. These are set out in Box 4.1. At the start of the Congress
each chamber determines the committees which will serve
them over the next two years. Nearly every bill which is
entered into either House or Senate will begin its journey in
the committee concerned with that particular area of policy.
For the majority of bills however, the committee will also
mark the end of its journey. Committees act as the gate-
keepers of Congress, deciding which legislation will be
reported for consideration by the full chamber and which will
die quietly with no further action.
On average, while 4,000 bills are entered into each
Congress by its members, only about 400 complete the
journey into law. The vast majority of these end their life at
the committee stage. This is partly a political role, with the
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Box 4.1 Congressional committees
Senate House of Representatives
Standing Committees
Agriculture, Nutrition and Agriculture
Forestry
Appropriations Appropriations
Armed Services Armed Services
Banking, Housing and Urban Budget
Affairs
Budget Education and the Workforce
Commerce, Science and Energy and Commerce
Transportation
Energy and Natural Resources Financial Services
Environment and Public Works Government Reform
Finance House Administration
Foreign Relations International Relations
Governmental Affairs Judiciary
Judiciary Resources
Health, Education, Labor and Rules
Pensions
Rules and Administration Science
Small Business Small Business
Veterans’ Affairs Standards of Official Conduct
Transportation and Infrastructure
Veterans’ Affairs
Ways and Means
Special, select, and other Committees
Indian Affairs Committee Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
Senate Select Ethics Select Committee on Homeland
Security
Senate Select Intelligence
Senate Special Aging
Joint Committees of Congress
Joint Economic Committee
Joint Printing Committee
Joint Taxation Committee
committee choosing the topics it wishes to see action on, and
partly a matter of practicality; there is simply not the time to
consider all areas of policy effectively during the life of a
Congress. The issues chosen by the committee to take action
on are determined by a number of factors. The personal pref-
erences of committee members can be influential, allowing
those with a seat on a relevant panel to help frame legislation
they see as important. Pressure can mount on a committee to
address a particular problem or issue from within Congress
and also from outside sources such as the media, interest
groups, the public or another branch of government. Alter-
natively, from its own investigations, the committee may iden-
tify areas where existing laws are not functioning properly
and use their position in the legislative process to develop the
suitable remedy.
Aside from the gate-keeping function, the primary purpose
of committees is to research and write the legislation to be
debated by the full chamber. The process by which this
happens and its consequences is the topic of the following
section.
The committees at work
Subcommittees
Even with the work of legislating divided between commit-
tees, it was soon realised that some further division of labour
was going to be necessary if Congress was to function effec-
tively. To meet this demand, subcommittees were created
under each committee. Each subcommittee, made up of a
small number of members drawn from the ranks of its parent
committee, specialises in a narrow area of policy. During the
107th Congress, for instance, the House Committee on
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Energy and Commerce divided its work between six subcom-
mittees:
• Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection
• Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality
• Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials
• Subcommittee on Health
• Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
• Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet
This further division of labour allows these small panels of
legislators and their staff to devote their time and resources in
order to gain enough knowledge to write effective legislation.
As will be discussed later, the position of subcommittees
within Congress has also become a matter of Congressional
politics as well as practicality.
Committee hearings
Once a bill, or several bills on the same topic have been
referred to a committee for consideration, they will be handed
down to the relevant subcommittee who will carry out the
bulk of the work. The first job of the subcommittee is to
research the issue; this is done by holding hearings.
Hearings are sessions of a subcommittee (or committee)
where witnesses from a variety of backgrounds are invited to
give their opinion and answer questions on the current law or
proposed legislation. Exactly who is invited to give evidence
is entirely in the hands of the committee, but most hearings
have a familiar cast of participants. The committee will ensure
it takes testimony from the executive department or agency
with responsibility for the area of policy under consideration,
representatives of any group, industry or workforce who are
likely to be affected by the policy and pressure groups with an
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interest in the issue. Individuals can also appear before the
committee, whether they be elected officials (e.g. members of
Congress with a interest in the topic, state governors, city
mayors or other local officials), respected experts in the area
or ordinary citizens who find themselves affected by the law.
The primary function of hearings is to allow the commit-
tee members to gain enough knowledge to determine whether
a change in the law is necessary, and if it is, what the details
of the new law should be. Hearings, however, also serve
several other purposes. They allow groups with a stake in the
issue to get their voice heard, which not only allow the groups
to feel they are not being excluded from the political process
but also to ensure that America’s laws have a democratic
basis. Hearings ensure that those members who will ulti-
mately write the law are, at least in theory, exposed to a wide
spectrum of opinions and arguments to help them make their
own minds up, preventing a blinkered approach. They can
also alert members of Congress to how proposals will be
received by the public. Finally, the hearings have a public
relations element to them, allowing the committee to demon-
strate that they are taking their job seriously, that they have
done their research and subsequently any legislation which
they present to Congress can be trusted to do the job it
claims.
To what extent groups or individuals can actually shape
the content of legislation by appearing at hearings is a matter
for debate. It can be argued that it is unlikely that committee
members, who have often debated the key issues over a
number of years, will have their mind changed by the argu-
ments or evidence presented by a group or individual.
Members of Congress have often committed themselves to a
particular course of action or stated a position on the issue
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during previous election campaigns or Congressional debates.
Evidence about a problem which needs to be addressed in
itself does not bring with it a universally agreed solution, as
with much in politics, answers are a matter of opinion.
Evidence, for instance, that America’s oil supplies are running
low could lead a legislator to conclude that either further reg-
ulation of drilling by oil companies is necessary to protect the
dwindling resources or that deregulation is necessary to
encourage the discovery of new reserves; two opposite con-
clusions. The accusation is that the point of view of a commit-
tee member will be more affected by politics and the interests
of their voters than by the merits of the debate during a
hearing. In short, it is argued, members do not approach this
stage of the legislative process with an open mind.
Despite such arguments, there is evidence that such hear-
ings do have an impact on the final shape of legislation. While
they will rarely prompt legislators to do a u-turn on strongly
held and publicly-stated beliefs, the exact detail of a proposed
law is frequently far from settled. Hearings ‘flag-up’ particu-
lar problems or issues which may previously have been
ignored. They can present alternative solutions to problems
which may have not been considered and, if the committee is
split on the issue, there is a chance to sway the votes of those
members who previously had little interest in the particular
issue.
Mark-up
Once the subcommittee has completed its hearings it will
move to mark-up, that is, to write the detail of the legislation.
Amendments to the proposals on the table can be offered by
any of the members for a vote by the subcommittee as a
whole. Line by line, the bill will be agreed, if not by all, by a
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majority of the subcommittee. It will then face a final vote
before being reported back to its parent committee.
Once the bill has been reported to full committee, it will
go through another mark-up at committee level. This gives
members not on the subcommittee a chance to offer amend-
ments, and those members on the subcommittee who were
unsuccessful in the previous mark-up, to try and get their pro-
posals adopted by the full committee. Once amendments have
been offered and the final bill agreed, it is reported out of com-
mittee to be placed on the waiting list for debate and final
passage.
The importance of the committee stages of the legislative
process should not be underestimated. In many ways it is the
committees which determine the agenda of Congress. The
gate-keeping function gives committees the power to deter-
mine which legislation makes it on to the schedule of the
House or Senate for final passage. The committee and sub-
committees determine their own agenda, if they decide that an
issue is not a priority, it is unlikely that any bills referred to
them for consideration will reach even the hearing stage
during that Congress. Even if hearings are held on an issue,
the committee or subcommittee can still decide not to proceed
with legislation. This is exactly what happened with President
Clinton’s much heralded healthcare reforms in 1993.
Aside from the gate-keeping function, the committees are
also the primary arena for framing the bills which eventually
become law. While it is the whole of the House and Senate
which ultimately determine America’s federal laws – they
have the final power to amend, reject or pass legislation – it is
the committees that writes the legislation which is the basis
for debate, and consequently have a major input into the form
of the final law.
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Committee selection
If a member wishes to influence federal policy to aid them in
pursuit of their goals (discussed in chapter 2), they will be at
a disadvantage if they do not have a seat on the committee
which deals with the issue of most importance to them. The
process of committee selection is in the hands of each party,
in particular the party leadership.
At the start of each Congress, the first job of the
Republican and Democrat leaders in the House or Senate is to
agree the proportion of seats each party will be allowed on the
various committees. While in theory the party with a major-
ity in either House or Senate could force through their own
wishes, it has become convention that the party balance of the
committees is agreed between the leaderships and is roughly
comparable to the ratio of Republicans and Democrats in the
chamber as a whole. Once the number of members from each
party on each committee has been agreed, the process begins
of assigning members to those seats.
One of the first jobs for new members of Congress is to
supply the steering committee of their party with a request list
of the committees they wish to take a seat on. Members return-
ing to Congress after re-election (or, in the case of some
Senators simply returning to continue their six-year term) can
usually expect to keep their previous assignments, but they can
also request to be transferred between committees. The
Democrat or Republican steering committees, headed by the
party leaderships, understand the importance of gaining the
right committee assignments to their members’ ability to serve
their constituents and aid re-election, and will do their best to
accommodate as many requests as they can. However, how far
any one request can be satisfied will depend on a number of
factors.
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The most significant restriction on the ability of members to
gain a seat on the committee or committees of their choice is
the number of vacant seats available. Vacancies on commit-
tees occur through members who had previously held a seat
not returning to the new Congress (either thorough retirement
or failing to gain re-election), returning members moving
committee or through the expansion of the number of seats
held by one of the parties. Even where there are vacancies,
some committees are considered more desirable than others
and consequently the parties will regularly receive more
requests for seats on these than there are places available. To
this end, the rules of the House and Senate categorise the com-
mittees as to their importance, and restrict the number of com-
mittees a member can sit on according to category (see Box
4.2). In the House, seats on the most important committees
are rarely given to new members and as such must be ‘earned’
by competent service over a period of time. As we will see in
chapter 5, this process gives both party leaderships a limited
ability to reward or punish members for their behaviour.
Bias in committees?
The process of assigning seats to members has led to accusa-
tions that the membership of certain committees, in terms of
their views on the issues contained within their committee’s
jurisdiction, are not representative of the House or Senate as
a whole. In political science terminology, certain committees
have a policy bias. If this is true, it must be a matter of concern
considering the influence committees potentially have over
the content of legislation. Are America’s federal laws being
shaped by small groups of politicians whose views are not
necessarily representative of Congress as a whole? There are
two central competing theories.
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Box 4.2 Classification of committees
The rules of the House restrict members from sitting on more than
two full committees and four subcommittees. Four committees
(Appropriations; Commerce; Rules; Ways and Means) are classi-
fied as ‘exclusive’; members on one of these committees cannot
hold any other assignments. Some of the remaining committees are
classified as ‘major’ by the parties, and restrict members to sitting
on only one major committee at a time (although they may also
hold a seat on a non-major committee). The exact classification of
these and the restriction applied varies between the parties.
The rules of the Senate classify committees as either ‘A’, ‘B’ or
‘C’. Generally, Senators can serve on no more than two ‘A’ com-
mittees and one ‘B’ committee; they may, however, be also
assigned a seat on a ‘C’ committee.
‘A’ committees ‘B’ committees
Agriculture, Nutrition and Budget
Forestry Rules and Administration
Appropriations Veterans’ Affairs
Armes Services Joint Economic Committee
Banking Housing and Urban
Affairs ‘C’ committees
Commerce, Science and Ethics
Transportation Indian Affairs
Energy and Natural Resources Joint Committee on Taxation
Environment and Public
Works
Finance
Government Affairs
Foreign Relations
Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions
The distributive theory of committees argues that bias in
committees does indeed exist. Under this model, the purpose of
committees is to help individual members achieve their goals by
allowing them to become involved in areas of policy of most
concern to their constituents. Take the example of Terry
Everett, Republican Representative for Alabama’s second dis-
trict. First elected in 1992, the son of a former sharecropper,
Everett represents a district dominated by two industries:
farming and defence. Everett’s district produces more peanuts
than almost any other area in the United States and contains the
US Air Force’s Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, the
Army’s Aviation Warfighting Centre at Fort Rucker and a large
missile assembly plant in rural Pike County. It should come as
no surprise that in order to serve his constituents effectively and
to aid his own re-election Everett sought, and received, assign-
ments to both the Agriculture and Armed Services committees
of the House. In addition he formed the House Peanut Caucus
and serves on the Speciality Crops subcommittee (of the
Agriculture committee) which deals with peanuts.
Terry Everett is, of course, not alone in requesting commit-
tee assignments which meet his representation and re-election
needs. Indeed it would be illogical for a representative whose
district covers, say, New York City, to seek a placement on the
Agriculture committee. It is also in the interests of the party
leaderships to ensure that, as far as possible, their members
receive committee assignments which will go some way
towards aiding their re-election. Accordingly, the result of this
process is that committees are accused of being unrepresenta-
tive of Congress as a whole; that, for example, the Agriculture
committee, consisting of members of Congress from districts
dominated by farming and farmers, will not necessarily legis-
late in the interests of the nation as a whole.
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This analysis is not accepted by everyone. The informa-
tional model, originally developed by Keith Krehbiel, argues
that it would be folly for Congress to allow itself to be domi-
nated by small groups of unrepresentative legislators, making
laws only in the interests of their constituents. Ultimately, all
laws must be approved by a majority of both House and
Senate. Each member who votes for a piece of legislation faces
the possibility of that decision being scrutinised by opponents
in a future election, especially if the law they helped approve
turns out to have negative results or unexpected side-effects for
their own constituents. Accordingly, it is not in the interest of
the parties or Congress as a whole to allow their committees to
become dominated by members with atypical views or to pass
legislation which would benefit the few at the cost of the many.
Under the informational model, the job of a committee is
not to provide benefits to its own members (although this may
still happen), but to act as the ‘brains’ of Congress. No
member can be an expert on all issues, especially as legisla-
tion is frequently technically complex. Members want to be
assured that the laws they are casting their votes for are well-
researched and will not have any major unforeseen negative
consequences. The committees are the way in which the
House and Senate delegate the job of researching and formu-
lating legislation, to try and ensure that the legislation which
is eventually passed has a sound basis and will complete the
job it sets out to do. In short, the committees are the servants
of Congress and it not in the interests of the House or Senate
as a whole for them to become unrepresentative units solely
looking after their own interests.
The truth is probably somewhere between these two com-
peting theories. Whatever the reality of how representative
committees are of Congress as a whole, is it still true that if a
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member wishes to hold significant influence over an area of
policy, a seat on the relevant committee is still vital.
Power within the committee
Not all committee members however will have an equal say
over all areas of policy under their jurisdiction. Much of this
distribution of influence is down to self-selection. Even with
a committee place secured, if a member wishes to gain influ-
ence in a particular policy area, it will still take a significant
investment of their resources to gather the expertise and
commit the time necessary to become fully involved. It is not
practical, and probably not desirable, for a member to
attempt to become an expert in all areas of a committee’s
policy. Consequently, members will pick and choose which
policies they wish to concentrate on.
However, power within committees is primarily distrib-
uted on formal lines. The most powerful member of any one
committee is the chair. Under a process known as seniority,
this position is usually held by the member of the majority
party who has served the longest on the committee, with their
counterpart in the opposing party known as the ranking
minority member. Until the 1970s, committee chairs were
more or less all-powerful. They controlled the committee staff
and budget, could determine when and where the committee
gathered for hearings, which issues made it onto the agenda
and had the power to determine the number and nature of
their committee’s subcommittees. Chairs would also assume
the power of voting by proxy, that is casting the votes of
members of their own party who were absent from any com-
mittee meeting. Some of the more determined chairs became
notorious for using their powers to maintain a vice-like grip
over the policies under their committee’s jurisdiction.
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Changes in the rules and procedures of Congress, espe-
cially in the House (discussed below), has meant that commit-
tee chairs have had their influence curtailed. However, the
committee chair is still the most powerful member of the
committee. They still have a great deal of control over the
allocation of committee staff and resources, the scheduling of
committee hearings and the general shape of the committee
agenda. Aside from these institutional powers, the committee
chairs gain much of their influence because of their position
of leadership and experience. The committee chairs, as leader
of the majority party on their committee will be active in
negotiating to form the coalitions needed to pass legislation
and as a matter of course will be involved in the major legis-
lation under their jurisdiction. Having spent enough time on
the committee to rise to the position of leadership, the com-
mittee chairs often have a great deal of knowledge and expe-
rience of the issues to buttress their power.
Power over the floor
For all the advantages of the committee in writing legislation
and the power of the committee chair to impose their will on
the committee, it would be for nothing if the legislation
emerging from the committee is not passed into law. For any
bill to become law it must be passed by majority vote on the
floor of both the House and Senate. The aim of any commit-
tee must be to not only ensure that the legislation it reports
passes a vote by their parent chamber, but that it is passed
without significant amendment. Committees possess a num-
ber of informal powers to help them achieve this aim.
The first informal power is linked to the informational
model of committees, discussed above. We showed how
members need to be sure that the laws they vote for will not
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have any unexpected side-effect. Members also want to be
sure that the policies they approve are good ones; that they
have been well-researched and carefully formulated. This is
especially true in areas which are technically complex and
perhaps foreign to most non-committee members. Members
may disagree with the aim of the law and vote against it, but
when they do vote in favour of a piece of legislation, they need
to have confidence that the committee has done a good job,
that the legislation will effectively achieve its stated goal. As
Krehbiel argues ‘committees earn the compliance of their
parent chamber by convincing the chamber that what the
committee wants is in the chamber’s interest’.1
Consequently, committees who earn a reputation for
expertly researching their legislation will often find that non-
committee members are more likely to trust their judgement
and pass the laws without significant amendment. Richard
Fenno illustrates this point by quoting a prominent House
leader who spoke about one House committee in glowing
terms, ‘The Committee has a very good reputation. I think the
Committee is accepted as doing work of high standards. They
present their bills well. They are very seldom amended on the
floor . . . You know they have gone through it with a fine-
tooth comb’.2 In this way, committees that establish a rep-
utation for drafting well-researched legislation will have
enhanced the chances of their bills surviving the scrutiny of a
floor debate and becoming law.
A second power which is often attributed to committees
appears as a result of what has become known as log-rolling.3
Under this process, it is argued, a trade takes place between
the various committees to allow passage of committee bills.
Non-committee members will, except in situations of extreme
uncertainty over a proposal, defer to a committee’s findings in
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the expectation that their own committee’s reports will be
treated with the same respect. Any member daring to upset
this arrangement may run the risk that proposals emanating
from their own committee, in which they have a greater inter-
est, will face similar opposition. Any losses, in terms of policy
preferences, suffered by a legislator will be made up for in the
long term by gains in the areas of most importance to them.4
The degree to which log-rolling allows committees to see
the policies they prefer pass into law is debatable. It would be
a mistake to assume that committees have free rein to deter-
mine the content of legislation which passes Congress. During
floor debates legislation is frequently amended and is occa-
sionally defeated. However, it is also true that by determining
the bill which forms the basis of the debate and by holding an
advantage in terms of expertise, committees are in an advan-
tageous position to influence the final outcome.
The extent to which committees can impose their will on
the House or Senate can depend on the nature of the commit-
tee itself. As the quote supplied by Fenno (above) indicates, a
committee which has earned a reputation for approaching its
task professionally and producing reliable legislation will find
it easier to persuade the rest of the House or Senate to support
its bill. Such reputations can depend on whether the commit-
tee is in agreement. Legislation with the unanimous support
of committee members is more likely to inspire confidence in
non-committee members who may have little knowledge of
the issue than a bill over which committee members disagree.
This is especially true if disagreements between committee
members continue during the floor debate. The ability of the
committee to use its superior knowledge to persuade non-
members to support their legislation will be damaged if the
committee itself cannot agree on what is the best way
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forward. Consequently, a divided committee usually leads to
divisions in the rest of the House or Senate when it comes to
the floor debate. If the committee is divided along party lines,
then the shape of the floor debate will often mirror that split.
It is important then for a committee to work to accommodate
its own members if it wants to ensure its bills make the final
journey into law.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty committees face in turning
their bills into law is simply that for a law to be made, any
proposal must gain the approval of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate and run the gauntlet of a pos-
sible presidential veto. While, say, the House Committee on
Health may research and draft legislation on healthcare for
senior citizens, and using their position within the chamber,
succeed in persuading the House of Representatives to
approve the measure, it cannot become law unless the Senate
also agrees. To this end, it is important for House committees
to maintain a dialogue with their Senate equivalent, and vice
versa.
Can the House or Senate control their committees?
Theoretically, while committees hold a great deal of power,
final authority within Congress lies with the House or Senate
as a whole. Decisions made by a committee or by the party
leaderships can be overturned by a vote of the full chamber.
The number of seats allocated to the parties on each commit-
tee and which members fill those seats are both decisions
which require ratification by a vote of the full chamber.
However, in reality, members rarely choose to exercise this
power and such votes go through as a formality.
Another device designed to check the power of committees
available in the House of Representatives is the discharge
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petition. If a committee is refusing to act on a piece of legisla-
tion, the House can force the committee to report the measure
by issuing a petition. However, with the petition needing the
signatures of a majority of House members (currently 218),
they are very rarely successful. Members are often reluctant
to interfere with a committee’s work fearing that the use of
such devices may lead to their own committee facing similar
challenges. Since 1967, only 11 such petitions have gained the
necessary signatures. The discharge petition was used effec-
tively in 2002 over the issue of campaign finance reform (see
Box 4.3).
The area in which the House of Representatives has been
successful in curtailing their committees is the power of the
chair (the Senate, in contrast have few formal rules on such
matters). During the 1960s the Democrats controlled the
House, but the powerful committee chairmen were becoming
increasingly out of step with the wishes of the majority of
Democrats on issues including civil rights. This was due to an
anomaly in American politics whereby conservative Demo-
crats from the southern states had served for a longer period
than any of their more moderate party colleagues and accord-
ingly had risen to positions of authority within the committee
system through the rule of seniority. In the 1970s, frustrated
by the obstructionist nature of the committee chairs, the
House Democrats succeeded in pushing through a number of
reforms which limited the chairs’ power.
One of the reformers first actions was to challenge the con-
vention of seniority. The Democrat Caucus (which includes all
Democrat members) in the House voted to give subcommit-
tees greater autonomy from their full committee chair. In
1971, in an attempt to share power more widely, the Demo-
crat Caucus adopted a rule whereby no Democrat House
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Box 4.3 The battle for campaign finance
In July 2001 the House of Representatives gathered to debate a
bill which would tighten the rules governing political donations.
In particular it looked to bring so-called ‘soft money’ (donations
to parties, rather than directly to candidates) under the law. A
similar bill had already passed the Senate and so if the House did
likewise, there was a good chance of the reforms becoming law.
It quickly became clear that the House’s approval was going
to be hard fought, especially as the Republican leadership was
opposed to the measure. The first battle was to be over the rule,
which set the terms of debate. The main sponsors of the bill,
Christopher Shays and Martin Meehan wished to introduce some
amendments, planned to broaden support for it. However, under
the proposed rule, rather than allow a single vote on the changes,
the Republican leadership were insisting, through the rule, that
separate votes must be taken on each measure, a total of 14.
Supporters of the bill charged that the rule was designed purely
to make it as difficult as possible for Shays and Meehan to see
their changes passed, and thus undermine support for the bill as
a whole. When the rule was put to a vote, enough Republicans
defied their leadership and voted with the majority of Democrats
to see it defeated. With no rule, there could be no debate. During
angry exchanges, the Republican leadership announced that they
had no plans to bring another rule to the floor in the near future,
effectively dooming the bill to failure.
Supporters of the measure were not giving up. With the
unfolding scandals surrounding the collapse of Enron
Corporation and questions being asked about the effect of
political donations by the company, the fate of the campaign
finance bill remained a high-profile issue. By January 2002, the
Democrat leadership had managed to gather the signatures of
218 House members (including a number of Republicans) on a
discharge petition. This success meant that they could present
the petition and force the bill back onto the floor of the House.
It was the use of this device that was instrumental in seeing the
campaign finance bill finally become law.
member could chair more than one subcommittee. Two years
later, a raft of proposals which became known as the ‘subcom-
mittee bill of rights’ were adopted and further strengthened in
1974. The power of committee chairs was limited by so-called
‘sunshine’ rules that ensured that most meetings were now
guaranteed to be open to the public and also prevented the
chair from sometimes holding no meetings at all. The propo-
sals also strengthened the position of subcommittees by
taking the power to choose who would chair each subcom-
mittee away from the full committee chair and allowing all
Democrat committee members to vote on the matter. Sub-
committees were strengthened further by being given control
over their own staff.
The transformation of the role of the subcommittee in the
House of Representatives led to political scientists Roger
Davidson and Walter Oleszek adapting Woodrow Wilson’s
characterisation of ‘Congressional government as committee
government’, instead describing it as subcommittee govern-
ment. The reforms succeeded in limiting the power of com-
mittee chairs and created an environment where more junior
representatives could become effectively involved in the
policy-making process and rise to positions of authority in a
relatively short period of time.
Republican reforms in the 104th Congress
The Constitution of the United States laid out the principle
that the House of Representatives and the Senate can deter-
mine their own rules. The reality of politics, especially in the
House, has meant that this power is in the hands of the major-
ity party. Consequently, when the Republican Party took
control of the House of Representatives in 1995, it was unsur-
prising that the leadership, and in particular, Speaker Newt
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Gingrich should make their own changes to the committee
system. These changes have gone some way towards revers-
ing the impact of the Democrat reforms of the 1970s.
As Gingrich saw it, the problem with the committee system
in the House was twofold. Firstly, the number of committees
allowed (and indeed encouraged) members to pursue their
individual projects and gather pork barrel for their districts
without any restraint or thought for the greater national need.
Secondly, the autonomy of committees and subcommittees
prevented the party leadership from being able to pursue a
policy agenda for the nation as a whole. This was a particularly
pertinent point considering the commitment the Republican
leadership had to the Contract with America.
The reforms passed by the new Republican majority in
1995 took away many of the advantages held by the subcom-
mittees, but ensured that power did not simply revert to the
full committee and its chair. In order to reverse the trend of
decentralisation of power within the House, the number of
committees and subcommittees were reduced. Under the
Gingrich reforms, three full committees were abolished,5 and
in the majority of cases the number of subcommittees a com-
mittee was entitled to was restricted to five. The autonomy of
subcommittees was limited with control of all committee staff
being placed under the command of the full committee chair,
taking away the power of the subcommittee leader and
ranking minority member to appoint one member of staff
each. However, the full committees suffered as well, seeing the
total number of committee staff throughout the House cut by
one-third. Individual members were restricted to serving on
two full committees and four subcommittees, and any chair
of a committee or subcommittee were limited to serving three
consecutive terms in that post.
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By limiting the amount of committees one member could
serve on and by ensuring a limited tenure for chairs, the Re-
publican leadership hoped to prevent members from building
their own personal power bases from where they could chal-
lenge the authority of the party leadership. To check the
ability of individual members to pursue their own ends fur-
ther, all committee and subcommittee meetings were to be
held in public (unless doing so would threaten national secur-
ity), the details of every vote cast by each member were to be
published and the casting of proxy votes by the chair was out-
lawed.
The changes which the Republicans made were a direct
attempt to limit the ability of committees to pursue their own
ends at the expense of the party leadership. Within their own
party, changes were also made to make full committee chairs
responsible to, and removable by, the party as a whole. Indeed
one of the first actions Newt Gingrich took on assuming the
Speaker’s chair was to ensure that three senior Republicans
who would have risen to the position of committee chair
under the norm of seniority were replaced by more junior
members who were ideologically acceptable to Gingrich. In
short, the purpose of the 1995 Republican reforms was to
swing the pendulum of power away from the committee and
subcommittee towards the party leadership, but with only
limited success.
Assessing the role of committees
The power of committees in Congress has regularly come
under fire by politicians and commentators alike. Particular
criticism has been reserved for their part in what has been
described as ‘subgovernments’ or ‘iron triangles’. The argu-
ment put forward is that in any one policy area the relevant
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Congressional committee, executive branch department or
agency and interested pressure groups reach agreement and
use their position within government to dictate policy. On
leaving office in 1960, President Eisenhower (himself a former
General) warned of the dangers of such subgovernments in
the area of military spending, or what he termed the ‘military-
industrial complex’. Eisenhower argued that the power of the
presidency was thwarted by the combination of bureaucrats
and military leaders in the executive branch, Congressional
committees with jurisdiction over defence issues and arms
manufacturers, all who had an interest in increasing defence
spending for their own ends.
The validity of this argument has, however, been ques-
tioned since. Hugh Heclo, for one, has argued that such rigid
subgovernments reaching agreement over the direction of
policy are very hard to achieve. The number of actors in-
volved in any one policy area are often great, making agree-
ment very difficult to reach. Indeed, proliferation in the
number of interest groups since the 1970s has led to a situa-
tion whereby, in any policy area, a diversity of opinions is
almost guaranteed. Even where there is agreement over the
goals which should be pursued, there will frequently be dis-
agreement over the means or the detail of the policy.
To whatever extent the power of committees has been
diluted or effected by changes since the 1970s, it is clear that,
within the federal government, Congressional committees are
still the primary arena in terms of policy formulation. Just as
President Clinton discovered with his Health Care plan, com-
mittees hold the power to kill, pass or rewrite any legislation
which comes to them. Even though the full chamber of the
House or Senate officially holds the final authority, in reality,
the power of committee is still a formidable one.
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Summary
Committees and their subcommittees are the engine rooms of
the House and Senate. They are the arenas in which legisla-
tion is researched and written before going to the full chamber
for debate. Committees also act as the gate-keepers of Con-
gress, the place where most legislation will die. Members of
Congress generally request committee assignments which will
give them influence over issues which will aid them in achiev-
ing their goals of re-election and good public policy. This has
led to accusations that committees are often not representa-
tive of the views of Congress as a whole. This could be impor-
tant considering that committees do have a certain degree of
informal power over their full chamber when it comes to the
passage of legislation, although this can vary between com-
mittees and between issues. Within the committee power is
not distributed evenly, with the chair holding the most influ-
ence.
Notes
1 K. Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press 1991), p. 256.
2 R. F. Fenno Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little Brown,
1973), p. 198.
3 The equivalent term in the UK would be ‘back-scratching’.
4 R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,
1984).
5 District of Columbia, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Post Office
and Civil Service.
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5Parties in Congress
The Democrats are the party of government activism, the
party that says government can make you richer, smarter,
taller, and get the chickweed out of your lawn. Republicans
are the party that says government doesn’t work, and then
get elected and prove it. (P. J. O’Rourke)
One of the most often overlooked aspects of Congress is the
role played by political parties. It is true that parties in the
United States are weaker and more fragmented than many of
their Western European counterparts. It is also true that the
majority of members of Congress cannot rely on their party
label alone to assure their election and instead must develop
their own platform and reputation. However, it is a fact that
since 1945 only a handful of candidates for Congress have
successfully gained election without the official endorsement
of one of the two major parties. Consequently, parties are still
of vital importance in Congress and deserve fuller under-
standing.
Organisation by party
On 24 May 2001, Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont, in
a statement he called his ‘declaration of independence’,
announced that ‘In order to best represent my state of
Vermont, my own conscience, and the principles I have stood
for my whole life, I leave the Republican Party and become
an Independent’. Jeffords was not the first sitting member of
Congress to defect from the party under whose banner they
were elected. Indeed, since 1981 there have been sixteen
party defections in Congress, although, before Jeffords, only
one from the Republican Party in that time. What made
Jefford’s decision so notable, was that his actions changed the
balance of power in the Senate. The results of the 2000 elec-
tion had left the Senate divided between fifty Democrats and
fifty Republicans. Jefford’s defection, placed the Senate in the
hands of the Democrats.
Congress is organised along party lines. The leaders of the
Democrat and Republican Parties in the House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate hold key positions in their chamber with
power over the legislative agenda, the organisation of
Congress and matters such as members’ committee assign-
ments. The largest share of this power is reserved for the lead-
ership of the majority party. The main leadership posts are
outlined in Box 5.1 and their roles are outlined below.
Party leaders in the House of Representatives
Speaker of the House
Party politics aside, the Speaker is an extremely important
figure in the Government of the United States, being second
only to the Vice-President in the line of succession to the pres-
idency. Within the House itself the Speaker is the presiding
officer, referring bills to committees, presiding over debates
and judging points of order. These roles occasionally afford
the Speaker a great deal of influence over the fate of legisla-
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tion, but in reality, for most of the time, such duties are for-
malities and as such are carried out by assistants. The power
of the modern Speaker is derived partly from the institutional
position and duties and partly from his other role, that of
leader of the majority party in the House. In this role the
Speaker has a great deal of influence over the pursuit of his
party’s legislative agenda. He is a central figure in deciding
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Box 5.1 Party leadership in the 107th Congress
Majority party Minority party
House of Representatives
Republicans Democrats
Speaker of the House: No equivalent post for the 
Dennis Hastert minority party
Majority Leader: Minority Leader: 
Richard Armey Richard Gephardt
Majority Whip: Tom Delay Minority Whip: Nancy Pelosi
Republican Conference Chair: House Democratic Caucus 
J. C. Watts Chair: Martin Frost
Republican Policy Committee Democratic Policy Committee 
Chair: Chris Cox Vice-Chairs: Several
Senate
Democrats Republicans
Majority Leader: Tom Daschle Minority Leader: Trent Lott
Assistant Majority Leader Assistant Minority Leader
(Democrat Whip): (Republican Whip):
Harry Reid Don Nickles
Democrat Policy Committee Republican Policy Committee 
Chair: Byron Dorgan Chair: Larry Craig
No Democrat equivalent Republican Conference Chair:
Rick Santorum
legislative priorities, determining committee assignments,
accommodating members’ requests and, through the Rules
Committee (discussed below) the agenda of the House as a
whole. He will act as the party’s spokesman and chief nego-
tiator with the minority party leaders, the Senate and the
President. While any leader of the party has few official sanc-
tions to bring rogue members into line, the importance of the
post of Speaker and his central position in the party’s ‘com-
munication network’ gives the office holder a great deal of
influence to dispense favours and persuade members with the
aim of forming the coalitions necessary to get legislation
passed.
Ultimately, the power of the Speaker will depend on the
ability of the office holder. Over the years, some speakers have
used the tools at their disposal to great effect. Legendary
speakers in the history of the House include ‘uncle’ Joe
Cannon (speaker, 1903–11) and Sam Rayburn (1940–47,
1949–53, 1955–63) who were noted for the power with
which they brought to the post of Speaker. As discussed in
chapter 4, Newt Gingrich (1995–99) attempted to use his
position within the Republican Party and Congress as a whole
to concentrate power of the legislative agenda in the Speaker’s
chair. How far he succeeded will be discussed below.
Majority Leader
The Majority Leader acts as deputy to the Speaker. His role,
however, is more ‘hands-on’ than the Speaker. The Majority
Leader is in charge of guiding legislation through the floor
debates, negotiating with minority party members and build-
ing coalitions to pass the majority party’s legislative prior-
ities.
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Minority Leader
There is no minority party equivalent to the Speaker of the
House. Instead, the Minority Leader must play the leadership
roles of both the Speaker and Majority Leader within his own
party. The Minority Leader plays a central role in setting the
minority’s legislative priorities, negotiating with the majority
and with the White House, assigning members to committees
and building coalitions to pass or defeat legislation on the
floor.
Majority Whip
The Majority Whip has the job of marshalling the rank and
file of the majority party. He acts as a link between the leaders
and party members in Congress, gathering information on
members’ voting intentions, persuading members to follow
the party line and providing information about forthcoming
votes and the leadership’s legislative priorities.
Minority Whip
The Minority Whip performs the same functions for the
minority as the Majority Whip does for the majority.
Republican Conference Chair
The Republican Conference contains all Republican members
in the House who then elect the chair. The chair acts as a
spokesman for the party, a mediator between Republicans
where there are sharp policy disagreements, and as a discipli-
narian of members who consistently defy the party line. The
conference as a whole is also the arena where leadership elec-
tions take place and where disputes over internal Republican
matters are finally settled.
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Democratic Caucus Chair
The Democratic Caucus and its chair perform the same role
for the Democrats as the Conference does for the Republicans.
Republican Policy Committee Chair
The Republican Policy Committee has the job of analysing
legislative proposals and recommending strategy to the party.
It also produces briefing papers to help members in answer-
ing questions from the public and the press.
Democratic Policy Committee Vice-Chairs
The Democratic Policy Committee and its vice-chairs perform
the same role as the Republican Policy Committee.
Party leaders in the Senate
Senate Majority Leader
The leader and main spokesman of the majority party in the
Senate. The Majority Leader manages the day-to-day business
on the Senate floor, working with committee leaders, schedul-
ing floor debates and setting legislative priorities.
Senate Assistant Majority Leader
The Assistant Majority Leader performs a similar function to
the Majority Whip in the House. The job entails keeping party
members informed of upcoming issues and working to build
coalitions to ensure that the legislation supported by the party
pass on the floor of the Senate.
Senate Minority Leader
The Senate Minority Leader is the head of the minority party
and fulfils the equivalent role of the Senate Majority Leader.
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Senate Minority Whip
The Senate Minority Whip is the minority party equivalent to
the Assistant Majority Leader.
Senate Republican Conference
The Senate Republican Conference is the meeting of all Re-
publican Senators and acts as a forum where party leaders and
rank-and-file members can meet and discuss their concerns.
Senate Republican Policy Committee
The Committee and its chair is charged with developing
policy and legislative strategy.
Senate Democratic Conference Secretary
The third-ranking Democrat Senator, the Democratic Con-
ference Secretary oversees the Conference which performs the
equivalent role for Democrats as the Republican Conference.
Senate Democratic Policy Committee
The Senate Democratic Policy Committee performs the equiv-
alent role to the Republican Policy Committee.
The power of party leaders
A common caricature of parties in the United States is of loose
organisations with little ability to control or even choose the
elected officials who represent them. To a certain extent this
is true; as was discussed in chapter 2, the diversity of the
nation and the primary election system has led to members of
Congress having a great deal of autonomy from their party.
However, leaders attempt to use the limited powers at their
disposal to keep the party in line.
Parties in Congress 93
Leadership styles
The ‘power to persuade’ is normally associated with the
President, but it is no less important to party leaders in
Congress. With few official sanctions available to discipline
members, the success of a leader in controlling the party often
depends on their personal diplomatic skills. Cajoling, per-
suading and negotiating with members in order to form
voting coalitions is an essential part of a leader’s job. Different
leaders have used different approaches to achieve this end,
with varying results.
One of the most successful leaders in this way was Lyndon
B. Johnson, Senate Majority Leader from 1955 to 1960.
Johnson used his intellect, presence and sheer physical size to
persuade or even bully Senators into supporting the party’s
position. This became known as ‘the treatment’ and was
described by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak thus:
The tone was supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance,
scorn, tears, complaint, the hint of threat. It was all these
together. It ran the gamut of human emotions. Its velocity
was breathtaking, and it was all in one direction.
Interjections from the target were rare. Johnson anticipated
them before they could be spoken. He moved in close, his
face a scant millimetre from his target, his eyes widening and
narrowing, his eyebrows rising and falling. From his pockets
poured clippings, memos, statistics. Mimicry, humour, and
the genius of analogy made The Treatment an almost hyp-
notic experience and rendered the target stunned and help-
less . . .1
As Evans and Novak suggest, LBJ’s success was not simply
due to intimidation. Party leaders hold advantage over other
members of their party due to their knowledge of the issues
and Congressional procedures. This is partly accrued through
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the length of service in Congress which leaders inevitably
have, but also through the party’s communication network.
Leaders need to keep their finger on the pulse of the whole
range of legislative activity within their domain.
Bob Dole, Senate Majority Leader 1985–87 and 1995–96,
and Minority Leader 1987–95, was more of a coalition
builder than LBJ, but like Johnson he also relied on an ency-
clopaedic knowledge of the legislative process. Senator Mark
Hatfield, who worked closely with Dole, described his leader-
ship style thus:
First of all, he is an information gatherer. In other words, he
has to know where different members of the Senate are
coming from . . . maybe he has enough Republican votes to
pass something. But if he doesn’t . . . then he has to move
across the aisle, and find out who on that side of the aisle he
can bring together with those Republicans to pass a bill.
Now that’s the role of the majority leader. His style is differ-
ent than LBJ . . . Senator Dole gathers information . . . I’m
not aware that Senator Dole ever threatened . . . And I’m not
sure that I have ever heard any one of my colleagues say he’d
threatened them . . . Senator Dole is not that type of leader.
He’s a consensus builder.2
Newt Gingrich, House Speaker 1995–98, had a contrasting
style to Dole’s. Gingrich was more aggressive and partisan. He
came to the job on the back of a Republican electoral land-
slide, and was determined to push through the Contract with
America. Gingrich personalised the Republican program and
the inevitable conflict with the Clinton White House more
than any other Speaker. He attempted to centralise power in
the Speaker’s chair by pushing through changes in the rules
of Congress which diminished the autonomy of committees
(discussed in chapter 4). With the support of newly elected
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Republican members (many of whom initially felt loyalty
towards Gingrich for his part in their election), Gingrich per-
suaded the party to vote to award the chair of three commit-
tees to members more sympathetic to his views, passing over
the norm of seniority.
Control of the legislative process
As the example of Gingrich suggests, party leaders have more
tools at their disposal than simply force of personality. The
Constitution states that ‘Each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings’ (Article 1, Section 5); at the start of each
Congress, the majority party leaders can propose changes
to the way either the House or Senate operated, provided
the changes are approved by a majority of Senators or
Representatives. In this way, Gingrich instituted changes in
the committee system, much as Democrats did in the 1970s.
Alternatively, leaders are in an advantageous position to push
through changes within their own party which affect their
degree of control over the legislative process, as Gingrich did
by ensuring committee chairs were inhabited by members
who would be sympathetic to his agenda. The leadership
also has some influence over who is assigned to which com-
mitee.
The leader of the majority party in the House or Senate also
have the power of referral. When a bill is introduced it must
be referred to a committee for consideration. While this pro-
cedure is usually straightforward, there are occasions when it
can give the leadership influence. During the 1960s, the
Democrat leadership was trying to push civil rights legislation
through Congress, but was being thwarted by committee
chairmen opposed to the measures. In an attempt to overcome
this opposition, the leaderships in House and Senate pursued
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different strategies regarding committee referral. In the House,
the bill was written as to allow the leadership to refer it to the
Judiciary Committee, a strategy which increased its chances of
success as the committee was chaired by Emanuel Celler, a sup-
porter of civil rights. The Senate leadership was aware that the
Judiciary Committee of the Senate was dominated by oppo-
nents of civil rights who would kill the bill. Consequently, the
leadership delayed any action until the measure had passed the
House, which allowed them to take the rare step of not refer-
ring the bill to a committee at all. After a vote on the floor, the
Senate agreed to consider the House bill without any commit-
tee consideration. It was this tactic which facilitated the
passage of the groundbreaking Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Since 1974, the Speaker of the House of Representatives
has also had the option of multiple referral. If the Speaker
feels that a bill deals with issues with fall under the jurisdic-
tion of more than one committee, he can send either all or
parts of the bill to those committees. This can affect the
chances of the whole bill or parts of it surviving the commit-
tee process. With different committees having different
overall viewpoints, the ability to refer bills to more than one
committee gave the Speaker a greater deal of influence over
the legislative process than he had before.
Perhaps the greatest of the party leaders’ powers is that of
scheduling. The ability to influence which issues rise to the top
of the Congressional agenda, and which see no action due to
time running out. If a bill does not pass into law by the end of
the Congress into which it was introduced, it fails and must
be re-introduced from the beginning in the following
Congress and begin the process again. With many pieces of
legislation competing for space on the agenda, it is an impor-
tant power to be able to influence which issues take priority.
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How this works in practice differs between the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
House Rules Committee
The House Rules Committee has responsibility for regulating
the schedule and debates in the chamber of the House of
Representatives. When a committee has completed its work
on a bill, it will report the legislation to the Rules Committee
for a rule to be issued. The rule sets out the maximum
amount of time to be allowed for debate and determines
whether amendments are allowed to be offered. Three types
of rule exist: an open rule allows amendments to be offered
on any part of the bill during the debate, a closed rule forbids
any amendments being offered, dictating that the bill can
either be passed or failed in its original form but not altered.
Alternatively a modified rule allows amendments to be
offered on specified parts of the bill, but not on others. Which
rule is issued can have a significant effect on the chances of
the bill passing into law, or at least, succeeding in its original
form.
The power to finally decide when a bill is placed on the
Congressional schedule and how the debate will take place is
a significant one. Consequently, the rules committee is domi-
nated by the leadership of the two parties. However, as
with all issues, power ultimately resides with the House of
Representatives as a whole. Rules issued by the committee
must be passed by a majority vote in the House to come into
effect. In the majority of cases this is a formality, although on
occasions can cause controversy. Once the rule has been
agreed the bill it is concerned with can then be placed on the
House calendar for debate.
98 The United States Congress
Unanimous consent agreements in the Senate
The Senate has no rules committee, however the scheduling
and structuring of debates is still a matter for party leaders.
Instead of issuing rules, as in the House, the leaders of the
Democrats and Republicans will craft what are termed as
unanimous consent agreements. The agreement will outline
when a bill is debated and how long that debate is allowed to
continue. It will be put to the Senate and if there is no objec-
tion, debate can proceed. The problem with this system is
that, as the name suggests, the agreements need unanimous
consent and as such can be disrupted by a single Senator. The
effects of this will be discussed in the next chapter.
Conference committees
Even after a bill has been debated and passed, party leaders
still have an opportunity to influence its fate. As will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter, one of the difficulties of a bicam-
eral system is that the House and Senate may not agree on the
details of a particular piece of legislation. Even if the same bill
survives the committee stages of the two chambers, different
amendments may be offered during floor debate. When this
situation occurs, and neither chamber seems willing to accept
the other’s version as a whole, a House-Senate conference
committee will be convened to negotiate the differences and
produce a final version of the bill. Consequently, the members
who sit on this committee have a considerable amount of
influence over the final shape of legislation. Changes intro-
duced in committee or during floor debate may disappear
from the legislation at the conference stage. Each time a con-
ference committee is convened, it is the party leadership who
proposes the membership from their side of Congress. While
it is normal for committee members who have been active in
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the formulation of the bill to be appointed and, ultimately, the
full membership House or Senate retains a veto over the
appointment process, this procedure can give the party lead-
ership influence over the shape of the final legislation.
Sanctions on maverick members
Party leaders have few sanctions at their disposal with which
to bring members into line. Unlike parties in the United
Kingdom, they cannot threaten them with the removal of the
party label at the next election or offer promotion to the
cabinet. The sanctions available to Congressional party
leaders are less formal, and are connected to the influence they
have over scheduling, agenda setting, coalition building and
committee appointments. By providing the appropriate com-
mittee appointment, giving legislation priority on the sched-
ule and using their influence to persuade others to move the
legislative process along, leaders can aid members in achiev-
ing their goals. Assurances of priority for their wishes can be
used to persuade a member to follow the party line on an
important vote. Similarly, members who persistently ignore
party demands could find the leadership somewhat less than
enthusiastic in accommodating their requests.
Party unity
The lack of sanctions at the leadership’s disposal to control
maverick members is only part of the reason why unity
between party members in Congress is low. In many cases it
is not in the interest of the party to demand all members vote
the same way. Leaders are aware of the demands which the
desire for re-election place on individual members. When con-
sidering how they cast their vote or set their priorities,
members must give careful consideration to how their actions
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will be received by the voters. They are aware that any one
vote cast could be turned into an issue by a future opponent
in either the primary or general election. Such constituency
pressures can differ greatly between members of the same
party. It is in the interest of leaders to help their members in
their bid for re-election, and understand that the priorities of
the party and those of individual constituencies will some-
times conflict.
Party government
The system of separation of powers and the weaknesses in
party discipline has meant that any form of party government,
so common in European legislatures, is extremely difficult to
achieve. The Congressional system works on compromise,
persuasion and trade-offs. It is near impossible for the major-
ity party in Congress to push through a comprehensive slate
of policies. The times in American history where a legislative
programme, such as the New Deal in 1934, has succeeded in
becoming law, the driving force has been the White House
rather than Congressional parties.
When Newt Gingrich became Speaker of the House in
1995, he made a bold attempt at party government. His strat-
egy was based on two threads: the changes in the committee
system designed to give more influence to the Speaker, and the
Contract with America. For many House Republicans, espe-
cially those who were first elected in 1994, the Contract was
seen as having been central to their takeover of Congress and
consequently they felt a duty to the voters to ensure the passage
of the legislation promised within it. Initially, some members
wore laminated copies of the Contract around their necks,
others referred to it as their ‘bible’. Bolstered by the support of
new Republican members who attributed to Gingrich a large
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part in their election, the Speaker attempted to marshal his
party to ensure the passage of the party’s programme.
This attempt to unify the Republican Party behind a legis-
lative programme was successful to a degree, but its failures
highlighted the difficulty in achieving anything approaching
party government. The commitment made in the Contract
was not to pass the proposals into law, but to bring them to a
vote on the floor of the House of Representatives within 100
days. The Republicans, filled with determination following
the election, fulfilled this pledge. Furthermore, they also
succeeded in passing into law legislation concerning Con-
gressional accountability, unfunded mandates and stockhold-
ers rights, the latter being passed despite a presidential veto.
However, the majority of their proposals never completed the
journey into law. Three pieces of legislation suffered at the
hands of a presidential veto, an attempt to give the President
powers to veto parts of a bill was struck down by the Supreme
Court as unconstitutional and a proposal to limit the number
of times a Representative could seek re-election was defeated
in the House itself. An important stumbling block, however,
was the US Senate. Senate Republicans had not signed the
Contract and did not feel bound to supporting all elements in
it. The nature of the Senate is less confrontational than the
House and as such allows the party leadership less scope in
enforcing a party line.
Once the House had dealt with the provisions contained in
the Contract, the initial enthusiasm by Republicans for any
form of party government subsided. As the time for re-
election drew nearer, traditional local political concerns took
centre stage. With no publicly issued manifesto to hold
members to, the familiar patterns (and difficulties) of party
control re-emerged.
102 The United States Congress
Relations between leaders
How smoothly Congress functions can be affected by how
well the party leaders can get on. Sometimes this can just be
a matter of personality. Before the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, politics in the House of Representatives
were complicated by the strained relationships between the
leaders of the Democrats and Republicans, particularly those
between Richard Gephardt and Richard Armey. During the
104th Congress, Democrats attempted to make political
capital by demonising House Speaker Newt Gingrich. A
similar attempt had been made on Senate leader Thomas
Daschle by Republicans in the 107th Congress.
It can also be a matter of party differences. Consequently,
a change in which party ‘controls’ the House or Senate can
have a significant effect on the politics of the federal govern-
ment as a whole. If one party controls the House and their
opponents control the Senate, in theory it can make agree-
ment more difficult to reach. However, this should not be
overstated, as discussed above, the Contract with America ran
into problems in the Senate, despite the Republicans holding
a majority in both chambers. On the other hand, Congress
managed to pass often controversial campaign finance reform
in 2002, despite the House being controlled by Republicans
and the Senate by the Democrats.
Summary
While parties in the United States are weaker than their
Western European equivalents, they still play a major role in
Congress. Which party controls the House or Senate makes a
big difference to the politics of Capitol Hill. The party with a
majority will dominate the committees and have a major say
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over which issues make it onto the Congressional agenda. The
party leaders have the most influence over the legislative
process, although they are limited in the formal sanctions they
have at their disposal to control their own party members.
Consequently, achieving any form of ‘party government’ can
prove difficult.
Notes
1 R. Evans and R. Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power
(The New American Library, Inc., 1966), p. 104.
2 Senator Mark Hatfield, PBS Frontline, 10 July 1996.
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6Floor deliberations and beyond
The motion to lay on the table the motion to reconsider the
vote by which the motion to lay on the table the motion to
proceed to the consideration of the fair housing bill was
rejected was agreed to. (Proceedings of the Senate,
Congressional Record, 4 December 1980)
To the general public, the most visible parts of Congress are
the debates which take place on the floor of the chambers of
the House of Representatives and the Senate. Debates are tele-
vised live and can contain moments of great controversy and
excitement. The most extreme incident took place during a
debate in the chamber of the House of Representatives on 1
March 1954. As a quorum count was taking place of the 243
members present at that time, two men and a woman sitting
in the public gallery jumped to their feet, and shouting ‘Free
Puerto Rico’, pulled out Luger automatics and opened fire on
the members below. Five Representatives were hit; all sur-
vived but the injuries left Alabama’s Kenneth Roberts in a
wheelchair for the next two years.
Most debates, however, are much more sedate. Indeed, vis-
itors to Congress are often surprised by how few members are
present during a typical debate. For low profile issues, or those
which are technically complex, debates often take place with
only a handful of members present. This situation can change
suddenly; when a vote is called or a quorum count is to be held,
a bell is rung in the Capitol Building and surrounding offices
and members pour through the corridors and the tunnels
which connect their offices to Congress into the chamber.
Floor debate
The chambers of the House and Senate are where all legisla-
tion begins its life and, for the bills which have survived the
committee stages, where they complete their Congressional
journey. Floor debates are the showpieces of Congress, but
much of their business is procedural and mundane. Each
morning both the House and Senate start the day with a
prayer and, since 1989, the House has followed the prayer
with members reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Each week in
‘morning business’ in the Senate or ‘morning hour’ on
Mondays and Tuesdays in the House (which, strangely, lasts
for an hour and a half), time is also given over for members
to give a five-minute speech on any topic they choose.
The debates determine the final fate of legislation. When a
bill has been reported by a committee and placed on the cal-
endar of the House or Senate it will be debated and subjected
to attempts to amend it before a vote is taken on its final
passage. For the vast majority of legislation, all that is needed
is the approval of a simple majority of members voting in each
chamber to pass into law.
House
Officially, it is the Speaker who chairs sessions in the House
chamber, but apart from the most prestigious or politically
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important business, the duties are given to a more junior col-
league to perform. Over the course of a normal day a number
of Representatives will preside in place of the Speaker, calling
the House to order, recognising members who wish to speak,
ruling on points of order and overseeing voting procedures.
The structure of a debate on a bill on the House floor is
determined by the rule (discussed in chapter 5). An example of
a rule is given in Box 6.1. In this example the terms of debate
are established for a bill concerning safety in transportation. It
states that ‘any time after the adoption of this resolution the
Speaker may . . . declare the House resolved into the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for
consideration of the bill’. This is a procedural device to allow
the debate to take place. Any meeting of the full House requires
that half the total membership, some 218 members, be present
before business can commence. This is known as a quorum. By
resolving itself into the Committee of the Whole, the House
can continue with its business with a quorum of only 100
members.
The rule then waives the first reading of the bill, another
technical procedure which prevents the lengthy process of the
whole bill being read aloud before debate can proceed. It
decrees that the time set aside for debate will be evenly divided
between the ‘chairman and ranking minority member of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’. This deter-
mines who will be managing the bill on the floor. The bill
managers control the time available for debate and allocate it
to members who wish to speak. The job is usually given to the
chair and ranking member of the committee which reported
the bill, who often work with the party leaders and whips to
ensure the passage, defeat or alteration of the bill, depending
on their preference.
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Box 6.1 An example of a rule
107th Congress, 1st Session, H.RES.36
Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 554) to establish a
program, coordinated by the National Transportation Safety
Board, of assistance to families of passengers involved in rail pas-
senger accidents.
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution
the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule XVIII, declare
the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 554) to
establish a program, coordinated by the National Transportation
Safety Board, of assistance to families of passengers involved in
rail passenger accidents. The first reading of the bill shall be dis-
pensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall
not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chair-
man and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure. After general debate the bill
shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule.
Each section of the bill shall be considered as read. During con-
sideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition on
the basis of whether the Member offering an amendment has
caused it to be printed in the portion of the Congressional Record
designated for that purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII.
Amendments so printed shall be considered as read. At the con-
clusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee
shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments
as may have been adopted. The previous question shall be con-
sidered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final
passage without intervening motion except one motion to recom-
mit with or without instructions.
The rule also provides for the amendments under ‘the five-
minute rule’. The five-minute rule allows members to propose
amendments and allocates five minutes for speeches in favour
of each amendment and five minutes for speeches against.
However, this time is regularly extended at members’ requests.
Senate
Officially, the Vice-President of the United States is the presid-
ing officer of the Senate. However, this role is usually only ful-
filled on ceremonial occasions or when the Senate is tied on
a vote and the Vice-President appears to cast the deciding
ballot. In the absence of the Vice-President, the job of presid-
ing officer falls to the President pro tempore, traditionally the
longest serving member of the majority party. In practice, the
President pro tempore will in turn delegate the duties of pre-
siding over debates to other, more junior, members of the
majority party.
Filibuster
The Senate as a whole is more accommodating to individual
members’ requests than the more formally disciplined House.
Debates are often much slower and less focused than those in
the House. One of the most important differences between
debates in the two chambers is the possibility of a filibuster in
the Senate. The Senate has no Rules Committee and instead
determines the length and structure of its debates by unani-
mous consent agreements. Such agreements, however, can be
disrupted by a single member. One such disruption is the fili-
buster. On occasions, a Senator opposed to a proposal (but
aware that it is likely to be approved) will hold up proceed-
ings by rising to speak on the Senate floor and once recognised
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by the presiding officer continuing to talk and talk and talk
and talk. Once a Senator has the floor, he cannot be stopped
from speaking unless he himself yields to another Senator. The
idea behind the filibuster is to disrupt proceedings to such an
extent that supporters of the proposal will attempt to nego-
tiate a compromise or withdraw the measure entirely. As the
Senator continues to talk, no other floor business can take
place, forcing other scheduled debates down the calendar; a
tactic which is particularly effective in the last days of the
Congress. While the filibuster is taking place, proponents of
the measure have to try to ensure that their fellow supporters
remain close to the Senate floor. At any time, opponents may
call for a quorum count and if too few Senators are present,
the Senate will adjourn. Alternatively, on an issue where the
Senate is closely divided, there is a danger of enough support-
ers of the measure leaving the Capitol that a vote could be
called by the filibustering Senator and the measure may be
defeated. These are particular dangers towards the end of the
week when Senators are looking to return home to their con-
stituencies. Faced with these problems, the proponents of the
measure may choose to withdraw it for another time, or to
negotiate.
The filibuster was immortalised in Frank Capra’s excellent
1939 film Mr Smith Goes to Washington, where an honest
but naive young Senator, Jefferson Smith (played by James
Stewart) talks until he collapses to prevent the passage of a
resolution expelling him from the Senate on false charges. The
most famous instance in real life occurred in 1957 when
South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond spoke continuously
for twenty-four hours and eighteen minutes to prevent the
passage of civil rights legislation. Thurmond still holds the
record for the longest filibuster. As long as they stay on their
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feet during a filibuster, Senators can speak on any subject they
wish or, if they like, simply read from a text. Louisiana’s leg-
endary former Senator and Governor Huey P. Long was no
stranger to the filibuster (once lasting fifteen hours), and
would frequently spend the time reading from Shakespeare
and cookery recipes for what he called ‘pot-likkers’.
In order to prevent filibusters succeeding, the Senate rules
were changed in 1917 to adopt the process of cloture. Today,
if two-thirds of the Senate (currently sixty Senators) approve,
a vote can close the debate, stopping the filibuster. Despite
this, the filibuster is still an effective tool, largely because of
the difficulty of achieving the two-thirds majority. Aside from
the filibuster, Senate debates are traditionally more accommo-
dating of individual members, and not so dominated by a few
knowledgeable or experienced members as House debates can
often be.
Amendments
In the Senate, any member can offer any amendment to any
bill during the floor debate. They will have the opportunity to
rise and propose their amendment, a short debate can take
place and then the matter will be put to a vote. The process
for offering and debating amendments in the House is the
same, but members face restrictions as to the type of amend-
ments which can be offered. Restrictions can be placed by the
Rules Committee, who (if their decision is accepted by
the House as a whole) can decree all or parts of a bill exempt
from amendment. A permanent restriction faced by House
members is that an amendment will be ruled out of order
if, in the opinion of the Speaker, it is not germane, meaning
that the amendment must concern the same issue as the bill it
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seeks to change. In the Senate, non-germane amendments are
allowed and, as such, Senators can attempt to attach any pro-
vision to any bill, regardless of its relevance.
Purpose of amendments
While all amendments have the same goal – to change the
content of the bill being debated – the motivation behind them
can differ greatly. Perfecting amendments seek to correct or
improve the legislation. These can be offered for a number of
reasons: the supporters of the bill may wish to alter parts in
order to reach a compromise which will attract more support
in the final vote, members may attempt to attach riders to the
bill to ensure their state or district benefits from the legisla-
tion, or it may be a genuine attempt to remedy a minor fault
in the bill. Wrecking amendments are designed not to make
the bill better, but to alter it to such an extent that would make
its final passage unlikely. Opponents may offer an amendment
which would make the legislation more radical, hoping that
enough supporters of the bill will join opponents to vote for
the provision, but that the amended bill will persuade waver-
ing members to help defeat the final measure. During the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congressman Howard
Smith of Virginia, a staunch opponent of the legislation,
offered an amendment extending the act to cover discrimina-
tion of women. Enough supporters of civil rights approved of
this extension, that the amendment was adopted. Smith had
hoped that the change would make the bill unpalatable to per-
suade enough members to join with the existing opponents to
ensure its final defeat. The plan backfired however, and the
Act along with Smith’s amendment eventually passed into
law. Substitute amendments seek to replace the bill in its
entirety. Opponents will offer a complete alternative to
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the legislation, rather than attempting to form coalitions
in support of a series of different amendments. Substitute
amendments take a commitment of time and resources to
write and will often come from the party hierarchy.
Voting
Once an amendment has been debated, or the amendment
process has been completed and the bill is ready for a final
decision, the presiding officer will call for a vote. The proce-
dures differ slightly in the House and Senate.
Voting in the House
The first vote on an amendment or bill will be a voice-vote.
The matter for decision will be announced and all those who
support the measure will call ‘aye’ and all those who oppose
it will call ‘no’. The presiding officer will then announce
which side has appeared to have won. Especially on uncon-
troversial issues, the opinion of the majority of the House will
be obvious and the result will stand. On more closely con-
tested decisions, a recorded vote may be requested at the
behest of the necessary number of members (twenty-five in the
Committee of the Whole). Through a system of lights and
bells in the Capitol Building and surrounding offices,
members will be alerted that a recorded vote is taking place,
allowing them to make their way to the chamber. Once
members arrive, they vote electronically. Each member has a
credit-card sized voting card which they place in one of nearly
forty voting machines located about the House chamber and
press the appropriate button to vote ‘yea’, ‘nay’ or ‘present’.
Members are allowed to vote ‘present’ when they have no
opinion on or knowledge of the issue or do not wish to
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express their opinion, but do not want their constituents to
think they were simply absent. As members cast their vote it
is registered against their name on a large electronic display
above the Speaker’s chair. Most votes last fifteen minutes to
allow members to come from around the Capitol to vote, but
this time limit can be extended at the discretion of the presid-
ing officer. Once the time has elapsed the presiding officer
announces the final result.
Voting in the Senate
There are occasions in the Senate when the process of voting
itself is dispensed with. If the mood of the Senate on an issue
is obvious, the presiding officer will suggest that ‘without
objection’ the motion is accepted or rejected. If no one objects,
the decision stands. Voice-votes and roll-call (recorded) votes
are also used by the Senate. Unlike the House, there is no pro-
vision for electronic voting. When a recorded vote is called for,
Senators gather in the chamber and a clerk calls their names
one by one to which they respond with their vote. It is the
smaller size of the Senate which makes this possible.
Recorded votes
Recorded votes are often called for practical reasons, because
the House or Senate are evenly divided and the result cannot
be precisely obtained by a voice-vote. It can, though, also be
a political manoeuvre. Once a member has registered their
opinion in a recorded vote, that information is in the public
domain and can be viewed by voters or used by opponents in
an election campaign. It is also accepted that members should
attend a vote whenever physically possible. A poor atten-
dance record in recorded votes can be used by opponents as
evidence of a Senator or Representative not doing their job.
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Consequently, calling for a recorded vote can be a tactic by
supporters of a measure which they feel has public support to
try and compel their colleagues to come to the chamber and
publicly register their vote.
Do floor debates change anything?
In principle, debates encapsulate the essence of representative
democracy. The Senators and Representatives chosen by the
people, gather to consider legislative proposals and to per-
suade each other of the best course of action. When the argu-
ments have been made and considered, a free vote decides the
outcome. However doubts have been raised as to whether
debates in Congress make any real difference.
Speaking in the 1930s, Senator Carter Glass said ‘In the
twenty-eight years that I have been a member of one or the
other branches of Congress, I have never known a speech to
change a vote’.1 The accusation is that on any one issue,
members’ minds are made up long before legislation gets to a
debate. This can be seen as a function of committee power
(members deferring to the wishes of the specialist panel), con-
stituency pressures (members determining the direction of
their vote by a judgement as to the attitude of the majority of
their voters) or following a party line. In such cases, it could
be argued that such factors have more of an impact on the
result of the vote than any argument put forward in a debate.
Critics of the Congressional process could also point to the
fact that in most cases only a small percentage of members
who cast votes are actually present on the floor to hear the
debate and as such could not have been affected by the argu-
ments put forward there.
New York Congresswoman, Bella Abzug disagrees with
this assessment. Writing in 1972 she argued
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There is a theory around here . . . that to attend a debate on
the floor is a waste of time. Since everybody has his mind
made up in advance, the theory goes, what’s the point of
going to a debate? . . . Well that’s the theory, and I, obviously,
don’t buy it. I hardly ever leave the Floor when the House is
in session, because what I was sent here to do is sit and watch
and participate. Besides, I don’t think debate is a waste of
time. I have seen my own arguments sway votes.2
Often speeches in debates are not aimed at persuading other
members listening. They can be strategic tools designed to
state a member’s position for public consumption or to satisfy
an interest group. Alternatively, coalition or party leaders can
use the debate to indicate their support for a particular
measure as a message to their supporters. However, in partic-
ularly close votes, the power of argument during a floor
debate should not be dismissed. A powerful oration can be
essential in persuading wavering opponents or convincing
existing supporters to stand by their view.
House-Senate Conference
Once a bill has been debated, amended and succeeded in a
final vote, that is not the end of the legislative process. One of
the difficulties presented by a bicameral legislature is that once
each chamber has considered the same legislation, with the
addition of committee and floor amendments, two very differ-
ent versions of a bill can emerge. In order for the legislation
to be sent to the President for his signature, one single bill,
agreed by both the House and Senate is needed. Where the dif-
ferences are minor or uncontroversial, the process of reconcil-
ing the House and Senate is often straightforward. The
chamber which first passed the legislation has an opportunity
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to consider the changes made by their opposite number and
accept the new version of the bill. If they cannot accept the
new version, a House-Senate Conference is called.
The House-Senate Conference committee meets on the
Senate side of the Capitol Building. Membership of the con-
ference is determined by the party leaders in the respective
chambers, but will usually consists of members (and espe-
cially leaders) of the committee or subcommittee which orig-
inally considered the issue. These members will have the
in-depth knowledge of the issue necessary to negotiate on
behalf of the chamber. Shepsle and Weingast have argued that
this process in itself increases committee power, by effectively
providing its members with a veto over parts of legislation in
conference.
The conference itself is a forum for discussion, negotiation
and compromise. The two delegations are given the task of
producing a single piece of legislation which will be accept-
able to both the House and Senate. Sections of the bill can be
amended or dropped entirely to facilitate agreement between
the conferees. Each side of the conference is expected to
defend their chamber’s version of the legislation as far as pos-
sible, but ultimately they are free to choose on which issues to
give way.
In the vast majority of cases, the conferees will reach a com-
promise agreeable to at least a majority of each delegation.
Not all members of the conference will have gained all they
wanted, but it is in their interests that a final bill emerge. Only
on rare occasions will a conference fail to reach agreement, an
eventuality which would doom the legislation at this late
stage. Once the conference has finished its deliberations, the
final version of the bill is sent back to the floors of the House
and Senate for their approval. Attached to the bill will be a
Floor deliberations and beyond 117
statement explaining the conference’s decisions. If either the
House or Senate does not approve of the changes made, they
can vote to either recommit the legislation, sending it back to
the conference for further consideration, or to reject the bill
entirely. However, in practice, the majority conference reports
are accepted by the both the House and Senate and the legis-
lation is sent to the White House for the President’s signature.
In itself, the decision to call a conference, rather than accept
the other chamber’s version, can be politically motivated and
controversial. In February 2002, campaign finance reform leg-
islation was up for debate on the House floor having success-
fully passed the Senate some months before. The Republican
House leadership opposed the legislation, but were aware that
it was likely that enough Republicans would join with the
Democrats to pass the bill. One tactic opponents of the legis-
lation used was to offer multiple amendments in an attempt to
make the House’s version of the bill sufficiently different from
the Senate. They hoped that if they succeeded, the Senate
would be reluctant to accept the House’s alterations and a
House-Senate conference would be called. With the majority
party leadership able to influence which House members
would be sent to the conference, there was a serious threat that
the bill would not survive a conference or that it would be sig-
nificantly altered. The attempt was unsuccessful, however, as
with only minor differences between the two versions, the
Senate accepted the House bill with no need for a conference.
Summary
If a bill is to become a law, it must gain the approval of both
the House and Senate in a floor debate. For most legislation,
a simple majority is required. The procedures for debating
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and voting are similar in the House and Senate, although the
rules of the Senate afford individual members more scope to
disrupt proceedings. The floor debate also gives members an
opportunity to offer amendments to legislation. The motiva-
tion behind such amendments can vary. If different versions
of the same bill emerge from the House and Senate, it is often
necessary to call a House-Senate Conference to iron out the
differences before the bill can be sent to the White House for
the President’s signature.
Notes
1 P. F. Boller Jr.,  Congressional Anecdotes (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), p. 181.
2 Ibid.
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7President and Congress
President John Tyler stated that he enjoyed good health, and
felt much better since Congress had finally adjourned. (L. A.
Godbright, 1869)
At the heart of the Constitution is the separation of power
between the President of the United States and Congress. The
President has the roles of chief diplomat, Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces and, as head of the executive
branch, the responsibility for executing the laws passed by
Congress. While the President and Congress were given sep-
arate powers and responsibilities, the Founding Fathers also
ensured that each would be checked by the other.
Checks and balances
The President has the power to appoint ambassadors, federal
court judges, Supreme Court justices, cabinet members and
other top federal posts. Each of these appointments, however,
must be confirmed by a vote in the Senate. The Constitution
gives the President the power to sign treaties on behalf of the
United States, but these must also pass the approval of the
Senate (requiring a two-thirds majority). The actions of the
departments and agencies of the executive branch are subject
to scrutiny by Congressional committees who may, in excep-
tional circumstances, censure officers for their behaviour.
Members of Congress take the role of watchdog seriously.
Committees spend a great deal of time questioning and scru-
tinising the departments and agencies who deal with the pol-
icies under the committees’ jurisdiction. Many committees
also maintain constant, more informal, communications with
the agencies and their staff to keep informed as to the suc-
cesses and failures of existing laws. The exact approach to the
oversight role will vary between committees. One criticism of
Congress is that too many committees approach oversight
with a ‘fire-fighter’ approach, responding when a problem
with the executive branch comes to light, rather than main-
taining a more systematic style of surveillance.
When major problems arise, Congressional committees
take centre stage in the investigation of what went wrong.
Most of the time, such investigations are of little interest to
anyone outside of the Washington establishment. Despite this,
they can have a real effect. In 1983, the controversial head of
the Environmental Protection Agency, Anne Gorsuch, was
censured by the House of Representatives for obstructing
Congressional oversight by refusing to supply certain docu-
ments. Following the censure, Gorsuch resigned. However,
when Congress investigates the activities of the President and
his key advisers, the process of oversight can capture the atten-
tion of the whole nation. In 1986, evidence began to emerge
that the Reagan Administration had been covertly selling arms
to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages held in Lebanon
and then, in direct contravention of the law, passing on the
profits of the sales to the ‘Contra’ rebels fighting in Nicaragua.
A series of Congressional investigations discovered not only
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that had profits from the Iranian arm sales been diverted to the
Nicaraguan rebels, but that members of the administration
had lied to Congress in an attempt at a cover-up and had tried
to subvert the process of Congressional oversight. While the
President was never directly implicated himself, it did great
damage to the remaining years of his Presidency.
Foreign policy
Most of this book has been concerned with domestic policy;
the area in which Congress is usually dominant. Foreign
policy, on the other hand, has been historically the domain of
the President. Military action often needs immediate deci-
sions, something which a Congress of 535 members is not best
suited to take. However, as the example above shows,
Congress also has a role to play.
The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
and along with the Pentagon and State Department decides on
America’s military and diplomatic strategies. Like all power
in Washington DC, the Constitution ensures that checks and
balances exist. The Founding Fathers gave Congress the
power to control the funding of the armed forces, to decide
when war is declared and, in the case of the Senate, final
approval over the appointment of ambassadors. Some of
these powers have proven to be limited. Although it is
Congress not the President which can officially declare war,
the whole notion of declaring war has become outdated.
Among others, the Vietnam, Gulf and Afghanistan Wars,
were never officially declared. Indeed, despite being involved
in numerous conflicts, the United States has not declared war
on a nation since World War II. Similarly, while Congress has
the power to withdraw funds from any military action it dis-
approves of, the public support of the armed forces which
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generally greets military action makes Congress wary of being
seen to oppose the President. One main criticism of Congress
during the Vietnam War was that it shirked its responsibilities
by, in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, giving President Johnson
a blank cheque to pursue the war in any way he wished.
However, these limitations do not mean that Congress is
impotent in matters of foreign policy. When the Vietnam War
started to lose popularity at home, it was Congress which
began to reassert itself by limiting the funds available to
President Nixon, in an attempt to control his policy.
Determined to not repeat the mistakes of the past, Congress
passed the War Powers Act in 1973. This Act formalised the
role of Congress in checking the President’s actions by con-
trolling the funds for military action. Under the War Powers
Act, the President on sending troops abroad must, within
sixty days, gain formal approval from Congress. If such
approval is not forthcoming, he has a further thirty days to
withdraw the troops.
The War Powers Act, however, has been criticised for
being ineffective. Critics argue that in the modern era many
military actions are finished within ninety days, making the
approval of Congress irrelevant. Furthermore, in the early
stages of a conflict, Congress will be less willing to oppose
military action with public support, making the President’s
task of gaining official sanction straightforward. Indeed, the
War Powers Act would have been unlikely to make much
difference to the Vietnam War which only began to lose
American public support years after troops had been sent into
action.
Congress can play a more effective role when foreign
policy is not militarily based. Increasingly, economics, trade
and actions through the United Nations and NATO are
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becoming as important as troops and bombs. Congress
through its Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees
can begin to have a real impact on policy. The Helms-Burton
Act, passed in 1996, imposed stringent economic trade sanc-
tions on the island of Cuba in attempt to isolate the Castro
Government. This foreign policy initiative came not from the
White House, but from Congress.
Impeachment
In the most extreme of circumstances, the Constitution gives
Congress the power to remove the President from office
through the process of impeachment.
On 19 December 1998 President William Jefferson
Clinton became only the second President in the history of the
United States to be impeached by the House of Repre-
sentatives. The House voted to impeach on two articles,
perjury before the Grand Jury and obstruction of justice, both
relating to the President’s affair with White House intern
Monica Lewinsky and his subsequent denials. They rejected
two other charges of perjury in another testimony and abuse
of power. In line with the procedures laid out in the
Constitution, the Senate then convened to try the President on
the impeachment charges. If President Clinton was found
guilty by the Senate he would have been the first President to
be removed from office by the United States Congress. The
trial was presided over by Supreme Court Chief Justice
William H. Rhenquist and all 100 Senators were sworn in as
the jury. It lasted until 12 February 1999, when the Senate
voted to acquit the President of both charges. The
Constitution requires a two-thirds majority to reach a guilty
verdict, the charge of perjury was rejected with 45 Senators
voting guilty, 55 voting to acquit; the charge of obstructing of
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justice saw the Senate tied 50–50, short of the 66 members
needed to convict.
The Constitution states that the President may be removed
from office through the process of impeachment by the House
and conviction by the Senate if he has committed ‘high crimes
and misdemeanours’. This phrase is open to interpretation
and central to the debate surrounding the Clinton impeach-
ment was whether the President’s actions could be classed as
such. The first President to be impeached by the House was
Andrew Johnson in 1868. He survived in office when the
Senate fell short of the required two-thirds majority by a
single vote. Officially, Johnson’s misdemeanour was the
sacking of an official in contravention of the then Tenure of
Office Act. However, in reality the charges against Johnson
were a pretence for a wider political dispute over the role of
government in the post-Civil War period of reconstruction. In
Johnson’s case, the impeachment process was used as a polit-
ical tool in a battle between President and Congress.
The same allegation was made by the Clinton White
House: that the charges against the President were nothing to
do with any crime Clinton may have committed but were a
partisan attempt by Republicans to damage the President.
Hillary Clinton went so far as to describe the charges as part
of a ‘vast right-wing conspiracy’. Supporters of the President
pointed to the fact that the charges were based on a report
from independent council Kenneth Starr. Starr had been
appointed in 1994 to investigate allegations against the
Clintons involving a failed land development deal in Arkansas
known as ‘Whitewater’. Having failed to find damning evi-
dence in that case, Starr was given permission to widen his
enquiries. After examining issues such as the suicide of White
House counsel Vince Foster, the firing of staff in the White
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House travel office and invasion of privacy using FBI files,
Starr finally found evidence that President Clinton had lied
about having sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. Clinton
first denied the affair completely, declaring ‘I did not have
sexual relations with that woman’, but as the evidence
mounted he was forced to admit to wrongdoing.
The argument over impeachment centred around the
severity of his misdemeanour. Defenders of the President
argued that Starr’s report was partisan and essentially about
Clinton’s private life, which did not fall into the category of
‘high crimes and misdemeanours’. They pointed to the lurid
details included in the report, arguing that they were unnec-
essary and an attempt to undermine the President. Supporters
of impeachment countered that the charges were based on evi-
dence of perjury and obstruction of justice which contradicted
the oath the President had taken on assuming office to ‘faith-
fully execute the office of the President of the United States . . .
and preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the
United States’.
As the impeachment process began, it became clear that
this would be a largely partisan battle. With some notable
exceptions, Republicans were arguing for impeachment and
Democrats taking a position against. Such an alignment
would give advocates of impeachment enough votes for
victory in the House, but would fall short of the two-thirds
majority needed in the Senate. Ultimately, it can be argued
that Bill Clinton was saved from the ignominy of becoming
the first President to be removed from office by the power of
public opinion. As the debate on impeachment proceeded,
opinion polls showed a marked rise in support for the
President. While the majority of people disapproved of the
President’s behaviour, there was a clear feeling that the public
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did not want to see him removed from office and approved of
the job he was doing as President. Rather than the impeach-
ment process harming his public standing, Clinton’s approval
ratings continued to rise to a high of 70 per cent in February
1999.
Legislative leadership
The Constitution states that the President of the United States
‘shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of
the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient’. The
Founding Fathers obviously saw some role for the President
in initiating legislation, but in an advisory role. In the early
years of the Republic, Congress jealously guarded its position
as the sole legislative authority. The President had primacy in
affairs of defence and foreign policy, but his role in the legis-
lative process was largely restricted to the power of the veto.
Attempts were made by various Presidents to play a larger
role in domestic legislation (most notably the ‘progressive
Presidents’ Theodore Roosevelt (1901–9) and Woodrow
Wilson (1913–21)), but any advances in the power of the
President remained minimal.
The situation changed dramatically with the election of
Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. America was suf-
fering from the Great Depression, unemployment reached
unprecedented levels and the banking system was in danger of
collapse. With no national system of welfare and the states
unable to cope, poverty became widespread. President
Roosevelt was elected on a promise of using the federal
government to address these problems. His ‘New Deal’ pro-
gramme, which for the first time established a national
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welfare system, transformed the role of the federal govern-
ment by involving it in areas previously accepted as the
domain of state government. Roosevelt also transformed the
power of the presidency. For the first time, the President took
the lead in formulating legislation. The first 100 days of the
Franklin Roosevelt Presidency witnessed a whirlwind of leg-
islative activity with a raft of legislative proposals produced
by the White House and adopted by the Democrat-dominated
Congress. Critics charged that during this period Congress
failed in its Constitutional responsibilities; rather than act as
a deliberative legislative assembly, it became little more than
a rubber stamp for the President’s programme.
This period of presidential legislative leadership was un-
precedented in American history and was never to be repeated
again. However, the New Deal set a precedent that allowed
future administrations to play a much greater role in the for-
mulation of legislation. All presidential candidates now run
for election promising changes in domestic policy, whether it
be healthcare, education, welfare or the environment, even
though Congress remains the only body which can introduce
legislation and pass laws.
The power of the President to get the legislation he desires
remains, in the words of Richard Neustadt, the ‘power to per-
suade’. The President has no formal sanctions to compel
Congress to consider and pass legislation he supports. Instead
he must negotiate, bully and bribe (legally) members of
Congress to persuade them to follow his wishes. The White
House will work with party and committee leaders in Con-
gress as well as individual members to try and achieve their
legislative goals. Common inducements offered to members
to persuade them to support the President will often involve
a promise of future support for that member’s pet project, or
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to ensure that their home state or district will benefit from leg-
islative proposals on other matters.
At the other end of the spectrum, the White House will
often attempt to punish members who do not respond to
White House pressures. This approach can backfire. In 2001,
when Republican Senator Jim Jeffords voted against key pro-
visions of President George W. Bush’s economic package he
found himself shunned by the White House. He was not
invited to the annual ‘teacher of the year’ award at the White
House, despite the fact that education was one of his main
interests in the Senate and that the recipient of the award
came from his home state of Vermont. The attitude of the
Bush Administration towards Jeffords was reportedly influen-
tial in finally persuading him to leave the Republican Party, a
development which gave the Democrats control of the Senate.
The White House will try and use the knowledge and
expertise supplied by its agencies and departments to per-
suade members to support the administration’s policy. How-
ever, much will often depend on the ability of the President or
his Congressional liaison staff to personally persuade mem-
bers to give them their support. President Lyndon B. Johnson,
who was famous for his persuasive skills while Senate
Majority Leader, attempted to use the same techniques from
the White House (see Appendix 7.1). President Jimmy Carter
had a great deal of difficulty in his relations with Congress,
which has been frequently attributed to his inexperience and
that of his aides in Washington politics. Carter had previously
held office as Governor of Georgia. In contrast President
Ronald Reagan, who like Carter only had political experience
outside of Washington, benefited from appointing experi-
enced former members of Congress and Capitol Hill staffers
to his liaison team. They managed to use their contacts to
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develop relationships and work with Congress with some
success.
The President’s ability to persuade is inevitably affected by
his popularity in the country as a whole. A President with
strong public backing for his proposals will be in an advanta-
geous position when attempting to persuade members to lend
their support. Nothing focuses the mind of Representatives
and Senators more than the prospect of their decisions affect-
ing the level of public support they hold in their district or
state. Consequently, in the immediate aftermath of an election
victory, a new President is expected to have a ‘honeymoon
period’ when they can use the political capital gained by their
election to begin to persuade Congress to pass their election
platform into law.
This notion of ‘political capital’ is central to the power to
persuade. The goodwill a new President brings to the position
must be used judiciously and can easily be squandered. Two
contrasting examples of the use of political capital are the first
few months of the presidencies of Bill Clinton and Ronald
Reagan. In fairness to Clinton, he arrived at the White House
with a less certain mandate from the voters than many of his
predecessors. A strong showing by third-party candidate H.
Ross Perot ensured that Clinton was elected to the presidency
with less than 50 per cent of the popular vote. Nevertheless,
any political kudos that Clinton entered the White House
with soon diminished following a series of public relations
disasters which damaged his public standing. One of the
Clinton Administration’s first acts was to announce an end to
the ban on gay men and women serving in the armed forces.
However, the President soon discovered the limitations of
Washington politics when he ran into staunch opposition
from the military and was forced to compromise on a ‘don’t
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ask, don’t tell’ policy which satisfied no one. Soon after, in
May of 1993 a scandal erupted when seven workers in the
White House travel office were abruptly fired, leading to accu-
sations of abuse of power which triggered a Congressional
enquiry. In the same month, President Clinton received a, now
infamous, $200 haircut aboard Air Force One while it sat on
a runway at Los Angeles Airport, causing other flights to be
delayed. The negative impact on the popularity of the new
administration did nothing to help the difficulties President
Clinton faced in persuading Congress to pass his legislative
agenda.
Clinton’s biggest difficulty in providing legislative leader-
ship came with his proposals on extending the scope of federal
healthcare. The issue had formed a central plank in his elec-
tion manifesto, and on arrival in the White House the
President placed his wife (now Senator) Hillary Rodham
Clinton in charge of a commission to research and formulate
the plan. The plan was an important part of the Adminis-
tration’s legislative agenda. Their proposals were presented to
Congress in early 1994, but despite Clinton’s own party, the
Democrats, having a majority in both the House and Senate,
the plan died in Congress. The Administration blamed inter-
est groups, specifically medical insurance firms who would
lose customers if federal healthcare entitlement was ex-
panded, for pressuring members of Congress to abandon the
scheme. There was some truth in this as insurance groups did
spend a great deal of money opposing the plan. The Health
Insurance Association of America ran a series of television
adverts which depicted two average middle-aged Americans
‘Harry’ and ‘Louise’ examining Clinton’s proposals while dis-
cussing its ‘hidden costs’ and the loss of ‘provider choice’.
However, the Administration’s inexperience in dealing with
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Congress was also a major factor. There was criticism of
Hillary Clinton’s task force which met behind closed doors
before producing a fully formed programme. The scheme
itself was said to be complicated and difficult for the average
American to understand, let alone support. The lesson to be
learned by the Administration was that while the White
House can produce and support legislative programmes,
Congress holds the sole power to bring such schemes into law.
The White House must work with Congress rather than
dictate to it.
In contrast, in 1981, the new Reagan Administration used
his honeymoon period to its full. The United States was suf-
fering from an economic downturn and Reagan had come to
office pledging to reduce the size of government and revitalise
the economy. His budget proposed cuts in taxes and most
areas of spending (although defence spending was to rise) and
the elimination of many federal regulations on businesses.
The proposals faced fierce opposition in Congress; members
were aware that many of the programmes which faced cuts
benefited their constituents. Interest groups also campaigned
against cuts in programmes they supported. With such oppo-
sition, it looked highly unlikely that President Reagan would
succeed in passing much of his budget through Congress.
During his Presidency, Reagan became known as the ‘Great
Communicator’ and he used his communication skills to
appeal directly to the voters. This strategy, known as ‘going
public’, is often a last resort, but when used successfully can
be a potent weapon. He appealed to the public to contact their
Senators and Representatives in support of his economic plan
and the appeal worked. Faced with a barrage of letters from
their voters, Congress relented and passed many of Reagan’s
key proposals. Speaking to the nation later that year, Reagan
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thanked the public for their support
All the lobbying, the organized demonstrations, and the cries
of protest by those whose way of life depends on maintain-
ing government’s wasteful ways were no match for your
voices, which were heard loud and clear in these marble halls
of government. And you made history with your telegrams,
your letters, your phone calls and, yes, personal visits to talk
to your elected representatives . . . Because of what you did,
Republicans and Democrats in the Congress came together
and passed the most sweeping cutbacks in the history of the
Federal budget.1
Veto
If the position of the President is limited in terms of initiating
legislation, the Constitution gives a clear role at the other end
of the legislative process. Once a bill has passed both the
House and Senate, it is sent to the President for his signature.
On receipt of the legislation he has three options:
• Sign the bill – passing it into law.
• Do nothing – where, after ten days, it will pass into law
without his signature.
• Veto the bill, sending it back to Congress.
If the legislation is vetoed, Congress can pass it into law over
the objections of the President if a two-thirds majority is
obtained in both the House and Senate. Historically, this has
been difficult to achieve with less than 5 per cent of all vetoes
being overridden by Congress (see Table 7.1).
The use of the veto should not be viewed as a decision
taken in isolation. Throughout the whole legislative process,
the White House will be talking with Congressional leaders
and the objections of the President will be known before a bill
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Table 7.1 Presidential vetoes (1789–2001)
President Regular Pocket Total Vetoes
vetoes vetoes* vetoes overridden
George Washington 2 — 2 —
John Adams — — — —
Thomas Jefferson — — — —
James Madison 5 2 7 —
James Monroe 1 — 1 —
John Quincy Adams — — — —
Andrew Jackson 5 7 12 —
Martin Van Buren — 1 1 —
William Harrison — — — —
John Tyler 6 4 10 1
James K. Polk 2 1 3 —
Zachary Taylor — — — —
Millard Fillmore — — — —
Franklin Pierce 9 — 9 5
James Buchanan 4 3 7 —
Abraham Lincoln 2 5 7 —
Andrew Johnson 21 8 29 15
Ulysses S. Grant 45 48 93 4
Rutherford B. Hayes 12 1 13 1
James A. Garfield — — — —
Chester A. Arthur 4 8 12 1
Grover Cleveland 304 110 414 2
Benjamin Harrison 19 25 44 1
Grover Cleveland 42 128 170 5
William McKinley 6 36 42 —
Theodore Roosevelt 42 40 82 1
William H. Taft 30 9 39 1
Woodrow Wilson 33 11 44 6
Warren G. Harding 5 1 6 —
Calvin Coolidge 20 30 50 4
Herbert C. Hoover 21 16 37 3
Franklin D. Roosevelt 372 263 635 9
Harry S. Truman 180 70 250 12
reaches his desk. A threat of a veto is one of the tools the
White House can use to try to persuade Congress to shape leg-
islation in line with the President’s agenda. In 1994, when
Congress was debating Bill Clinton’s healthcare proposals,
the President, afraid that his plan would be watered down,
warned Congress ‘If you send me legislation that does not
guarantee every American private health insurance that can
never be taken away, you will force me to take this pen, veto
the legislation, and we’ll come back here and start all over
again’. Such an inflexible approach can backfire as Clinton
found when no healthcare bill was reported at all.
Using the veto can be a risky strategy. As an essentially
negative tool, by blocking the proposals of Congress the
President can appear to be siding with inaction over action.
He also faces the possibility of an embarrassing defeat if the
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Table 7.1 continued
President Regular Pocket Total Vetoes
vetoes vetoes* vetoes overridden
Dwight D. Eisenhower 73 108 181 2
John F. Kennedy 12 9 21 —
Lyndon B. Johnson 16 14 30 —
Richard M. Nixon 26 17 43 7
Gerald R. Ford 48 18 66 12
James Earl Carter 13 18 31 2
Ronald Reagan 39 39 78 9
George Bush 29 15 44 1
William J. Clinton 37 1 38 2
George W. Bush — — — —
Total 1484 1066 2551 106
Pocket vetoes are those used when Congress has adjourned and, as such,
cannot be overridden.
veto is overridden. Alternatively, opponents of the President
in Congress may attempt to force a confrontation with the
White House over a veto in the hope of winning the support
of the public, especially during an election year. However, as
Newt Gingrich discovered in 1995, this strategy can backfire.
The confrontation between the Republican leadership and
President Clinton took place over the budget. As is customary,
the President had submitted his budget to Congress for
consideration at the beginning of the year. There was little
prospect of the Republican-dominated Congress accepting
Clinton’s proposals. The Republicans wanted to see large cuts
in federal spending to balance the budget which had been in
deficit for many years. The White House was willing to accept
some cuts, but objected to the level of reductions in the
Republican plans. Such a situation where the White House
and Congress disagree on the plans for the budget is not
unusual, indeed it is quite common. Normally, to ensure that
the Government is funded while the negotiations over the
budget are continuing, Congress will pass a continuing reso-
lution to keep programmes afloat until a compromise has
been reached. In 1995, however, the Republican Party leader-
ship in Congress ensured that the continuing resolution con-
tained some of the budget cuts that Clinton was opposed to.
Since their landslide victory in 1994, the President had been
on the back foot and House Speaker Newt Gingrich was
looking to push home his advantage. Accordingly, the con-
tinuing resolution passed by Congress contained some of
the budget cuts for healthcare wanted by the Republican
Congress. President Clinton vetoed the measure and, on 14
November 1995, because there was no budget to fund the
machinery, the Government partially shutdown. Almost half
of the federal employees were sent home from work, national
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monuments and parks closed and new applications for
welfare payments could not be processed.
This showdown between the President and Congress was
a dangerous play by both sides. The Republican leadership
hoped the blame would lie with the White House for block-
ing their attempts to balance the budget, a goal which seemed
to have support in the country. The President argued that he
was protecting vital public services from attack by the
Republican Party. In his address to the nation announcing the
shutdown he laid out his case,
Today, as of noon, almost half of the federal government
employees are idle. The government is partially shutting
down because Congress has failed to pass the straightfor-
ward legislation necessary to keep the government running
without imposing sharp hikes in Medicare premiums and
deep cuts in education and the environment . . . Let me be
clear – we must balance the budget. I proposed to Congress
a balanced budget, but Congress refused to enact it.
Congress has even refused to give me the line-item veto to
help me achieve further deficit reduction. But we must
balance this budget without resorting to their priorities,
without their unwise cuts in Medicare and Medicaid, in edu-
cation and the environment . . . it is my solemn responsibil-
ity to stand against a budget plan that is bad for America and
to stand up for a balanced budget that is good for America.
And that is exactly what I intend to do.2
The deadlock lasted until 27 January 1996 with the Govern-
ment shutting down twice during that period.
In this instance, it was the President’s actions which won
public support. As the deadlock over the budget continued,
opinion polls showed support for the President’s position. On
15 November, the second day of the shutdown, 49 per cent of
those questioned said they blamed the Republican leadership
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for the crisis, with only 26 per cent blaming Bill Clinton. The
President’s pitch to the nation seemed to have worked, and he
maintained this lead in the opinion polls throughout the dead-
lock. By 10 January, 57 per cent of voters supported the
President, with 36 per cent backing the Republican leader-
ship’s stand.3 Ultimately, a compromise was reached between
the two sides, but one that was viewed more as a victory for
Clinton than for the Republicans. The Republican Chairman
of the House Budget Committee admitted ‘We did the wrong
strategy. That’s okay. We tried. It didn’t work. Now we’ve got
to be smarter’.4
In this case President Clinton’s use of the veto was a mas-
terstroke. By painting himself as the guardian of public ser-
vices, he galvanised public support in a way which he
had failed to do during the previous three years. With the
economy strong and support for the President rising in the
opinion polls he proceeded to defeat the Senate Majority
Leader Republican Bob Dole in the 1996 election.
Divided government
The case of the Government shutdown illustrates how conflict
can occur when Congress and the presidency are controlled
by different parties. Such divided government has been a
regular situation in the United States in recent years. In the
period 1933–69, the same party controlled both branches of
government for all but eight years. Since 1969 however,
divided government has become the norm, and in that time
the President has faced a Congress with either one or both
chambers controlled by the opposing party for all but six
years.
Explanations of why divided government has become so
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frequent vary. During the 1980s it was often argued that the
parties’ reputations meant that voters preferred Republicans to
run the White House and Democrats to run Congress;
Republicans were seen as stronger on foreign policy (especially
in the Cold War terms of being anti-Communist), whereas the
Democrats were identified with better social welfare. Con-
sequently, the argument ran, the electors were simply electing
the parties to the branch of government which best suited their
policies. However, this explanation faced difficulties in the
1990s when between 1995 and 2001 the electorate kept a
Democrat in the White House and a Republican majority in
Congress. An alternative explanation is that voters engage in
‘split-ticket voting’ in a deliberate attempt to ensure that one
party does not become all powerful. This is often attributed to
a general dissatisfaction with both political parties.5
It would be logical to assume that the White House and
Congress would be able to co-operate more easily when they
are controlled by the same party. Indeed, there is evidence that
when one party controls both branches of government, the
President is more successful in passing his proposals and less
likely to use the veto than under divided government.6
However, the difference should not be overstated. As Bill
Clinton found with his healthcare plan, unified government is
no guarantor of Presidential success. Indeed, David Mayhew
has gone so far as to argue that ‘it does not seem to make all
that much difference whether party control of the American
Government happens to be unified or divided’.7
Summary
The Constitution of the United States ensures that each power
given to the President or Congress is checked by the other
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branch of government. Since 1933, domestic policy has been
characterised by co-operation and competition between the
White House and Congress. Despite this, Congress remains
the only body which can pass federal laws. Congress acts as
a watchdog over the executive branch, with the ultimate
power to remove the President if he is found guilty of ‘high
crimes and misdemeanours’. In turn, the President has the
ability to veto legislation passed by Congress, although if
two-thirds of the House and Senate agree, the veto can be
overturned. Foreign policy is usually the domain of the White
House, but Congress has proved able to play a role in this area
also.
Appendix: the Johnson treatment
On 23 January, 1964 the Senate Finance Committee was giving final
consideration to a tax cut bill backed by President Johnson. On that
morning, Senator Everett Dirksen surprised the White House by
proposing an amendment which would repeal taxes on a wide range
of luxury goods. The committee passed the amendment. The new
cuts, it was estimated, would cost the treasury over $400 million,
and threatened to endanger the success of both the bill and
Johnson’s budget. The president needed the committee to reconsider
the amendment and reject it. Johnson took over the campaign to
persuade committee members himself. While he trod carefully with
senior committee members, he was not afraid to try and strong-arm
others. What follows is a transcript of a telephone conversation
between President Johnson and fellow Democrat and committee
member Senator Abraham Ribicoff, who had supported and con-
tributed to Dirksen’s amendment.
Johnson: Hey Abe. Can’t you go with us on this excise thing and let
us get a bill? Goddamn it, you need to vote with me once in a
while – just one time.
Ribicoff: Mr President, look. I made a commitment. President . . .
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Let me say this – the Treasury Department is reaping the whirl-
wind.
Johnson: I know it. I know it. We were ready to report this bill, and
now we’ve got it just good and screwed up, and the Democrats
are going to be a miserable failure in the eyes of the country.
Now why can’t you all meet at two o’clock, ad let’s leave this
excise like we had it before you met this morning?
Ribicoff: Well, I don’t know how you’re going to keep it – the thing
was overwhelming.
Johnson: No, it’s not. No. Clint Anderson is going to help us.
Hartke will help us. And if you’ll help us, we’ll have it over. And
I’ll appreciate it and I’ll remember it. Help me one way or the
other.
Ribicoff: You know, just one word, Mr President –
Johnson: You’ve had these problems, executive, and you know
we’ve had that damn bill there since September. And every day
it’s costing us $30 million in consumer income, every single day.
Ribicoff: One of my problems is one of the amendments in there is
something in my home state that’s already been announced.
Johnson: I know it, but every one of them has got it in there, my
friend. But God almighty, I think about the problems I’ve had.
And when you wanted to go on that committee, I just stood up
and said, ‘By God, it’s going to be.’
Now, I just want one vote, and I want to get that bill out of there,
and I’ve got to have it, Abe. And you’ve had problems. You’ve
been an executive. And you can find a way to help me.
They’ve asked me to call you 40 times this year and I’ve never done
it. But this time, when it means $400 or $500 million – this is
going to be a whole motion to leave all the excises as they were
before Williams and them got mad on the oil thing. And don’t
let John Williams and Everett Dirksen screw me this way.
Ribicoff: Let me see how I can save my face. I’ve got a problem –
Johnson: Don’t you worry about saving your face. Your face is in
damn good shape, and it’s going to be better when I get with you.
I’ll save your face. [Ribicoff chuckles.] You save my face this
afternoon, and I’ll save your face tomorrow.
Ribicoff: Well some time, I would really like to talk to you.
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Johnson: You can do it any hour, any hour. I’ve had 56 days in this
job, and they’ve been the most miserable 56 I’ve ever had.
Ribicoff: You’re doing good, sir.
Johnson: And my people are going [in] opposite directions. And
now damn Harry Byrd goes one way and he says cut your damn
budget, and I’ll help you get your bill out. He called me yester-
day and said it would be reported tomorrow. I thought it was all
settled.
Ribicoff: You’re doing great, Mr President. Honest to God. You’re
doing so great it isn’t even –
Johnson: Will you go in there and help me this afternoon?
Ribicoff: Let me try. Let me see how I can work it out.
Johnson: You just work it out. Now don’t say how. I don’t give a
damn about the details. I just want you to work it out. Will you?
Ribicoff: I’ll do my – OK, Mr President.
Johnson: Bye.
Ribicoff: Bye.
Later that day the Senate Finance Committee voted 9 to 8 to reject
the Dirksen amendment. The tax cut bill was reported by 12 to 5.
Source: Presidential Recordings Project, Miller Center.
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8Congress, the media and 
interest groups
Any dictator would admire the uniformity and obedience of
the U.S. media. (Noam Chomsky)
In the previous chapters, the relationship between the voters,
parties, the President and members of Congress have been
examined. This section looks at two other actors who impact
on Congress: the media and interest groups.
Media
The media performs a crucial role in the American political
process. The majority of voters will have little or no personal
contact with Congress or its members. These voters rely
heavily on newspapers, radio, television and the Internet for
information about their elected representatives. This position
gives the media the potential to influence the political agenda
of the nation greatly. It also has opened up the media to accu-
sations that it is not living up to its responsibilities.
Development of the modern media
In a country the size of the United States, the media has always
had an important role to play in relaying information about
the federal government to citizens across the nation. From the
beginning of the republic until the twentieth century this role
was the sole preserve of newspapers.
Newspapers in the United States are generally local con-
cerns. In the early years of America this was a matter of prac-
ticality; the technology to distribute a daily newspaper across
the whole nation was not available. Today, while one major
national newspaper, USA Today, exists, locally produced
broadsheets are still the norm. The most influential of news-
papers, the New York Times and the Washington Post are still
locally based.
As the twentieth century progressed, radio and television
began to challenge the dominance of the printed word. These
new mediums could respond quicker than newspapers and
were often seen as being more politically neutral. Especially
in the eighteenth century, newspapers were often openly
partisan. The political establishment was quick to adapt
to the development of the new media. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt used radio to deliver his ‘fireside chats’ to the
American public. John F. Kennedy, the first ‘television
President’ used his good looks and easy manner to deliver his
messages directly into the homes of the people. Still today, the
President will deliver a weekly radio address on any subject of
his choice and will on important occasions address the nation
via television.
Newspapers still have an important role to play. They have
retained the ability to pursue stories over a longer period of
time and to undertake in-depth investigations, free from the
pressures suffered by television and radio to report news on
an hourly basis. The most famous of these investigations was
the Watergate affair which, ultimately, led to the resignation
of President Richard Nixon. The central figures behind reveal-
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ing the scandal and the cover-up which followed were two
reporters from the Washington Post, Carl Bernstein and Bob
Woodward. Their efforts led to the award of a Pulitzer Prize
and were immortalised in the film All the President’s Men
starring Robert Redford and Dustin Hoffman.
Entertainment v. information
The main criticism which has been levelled at the media is that
there exists a conflict between providing entertainment and
providing serious news, and that this conflict has led to the
media, especially television, trivialising politics. Television is
now the main source of news for the vast majority of the
American public. Television companies are businesses which
rely on advertising revenue to make a profit. In order to
attract and retain advertisers, stations must keep people
watching their shows. The need to entertain has become par-
amount.
It has been argued that the pressure to attract viewers has
had two effects on television coverage of politics. The first
effect is to shorten the amount of time spent on news stories.
To avoid any danger of boring the audience into switching
channels, news programmes have become fast moving,
favouring short news items rather than detailed investigations
and reliant on ‘soundbites’ over more in-depth interviews.
Even the most complex of issues must be condensed into a few
minutes to ensure the continued attention of the audience. The
average length of a soundbite on American television during
presidential election campaigns has shrunk from 43.1 seconds
in 1968 to 8.2 seconds in 1996.1 Noam Chomsky, a critic of
media coverage of politics, quotes a source from ABC’s
Nightline (one of the more serious and respected news pro-
grammes), who described the ideal guest on the programme as
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someone who can restrict their answers to 30 seconds or less.
It is easy to argue that such limitations make it impossible to
investigate or explain complex political issues without gross
oversimplification.
The second effect of the conflict between entertainment
and news is the trivialising of political coverage. Television
has been accused of focusing on sensational, salacious or
trivial stories under the guise of news reports which reduce
politics to a series of scandals, gaffes and personality issues.
In 2001, Congressman Gary Condit of California found
himself in the glare of the media spotlight. Condit, a conser-
vative Democrat, was widely considered to be a rising star in
Washington DC politics. He was willing to work with both
Republicans and Democrats and with the House of Repre-
sentatives closely divided between Democrats and Republi-
cans following the 2000 election, members such as Condit
became crucial in the battle for votes. It was no surprise when
he was invited to join the Democrat leadership council. For
all of Condit’s political achievements and his growing impor-
tance in Congress, few outside of California’s 18th district
would probably have heard of Gary Condit. On 30 April
2001 Chandra Levy, who had been working for Congressman
Condit as an intern, disappeared. As fears grew for her safety,
it became known that Levy had been having an affair with the
Congressman. Condit was far from open about his relation-
ship with Chandra Levy and was accused by the police of
being obstructive to their investigation. Police investigators
removed items from his home and soon rumours circulated
regarding any role Condit might have had in Levy’s disappear-
ance. Despite police statements insisting that Condit was not
being investigated in any way in relation to Levy’s actual dis-
appearance, the damage to the Congressman had been done.
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In March 2002 he was defeated in the Democrat primary for
his district, a seat which he had held so comfortably in previ-
ous elections that he had started giving some of his campaign
funds to charity.
The case against the media has merit; however there is also
a good case for the defence. While television news pro-
grammes have a duty to report the issues of the day, they also
must present them in a way which is accessible and interest-
ing to the general public. If they did not do this, the public
would get quickly bored and not watch the news at all. For
those with a desire to see a more in-depth analysis of politics,
coverage is available. CSPAN, for instance, broadcasts live
sessions of Congress and reports on Congressional politics.
Programmes such as Nightline, Meet the Press and Face the
Nation provide a more detailed coverage of issues than the
regular news programmes. Newspapers such as the New York
Times and the Washington Post also provide a good level of
political analysis. It can be argued that, while the media is
guilty of sensationalism, in the case of Gary Condit, they
pursued a valid story. While such scandals have nothing to do
with the policies members of Congress advocate, they point
to flaws in character and judgement. Candidates for Congress
often make great of their strength of character in an attempt
to win votes and once elected need to be trusted to use their
judgement to the benefit of their constituents and the nation
as a whole.
Interest groups
Interest groups (or pressure groups) are groups of individuals
or organisations who band together in order to promote or
defend their shared interests. The American political system
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provides numerous access points for anyone looking to influ-
ence policy. Groups can approach individual members of
Congress, Congressional committees and staff, executive
branch departments and agencies along with numerous state
and local government institutions. The strategies groups use
to influence Congress vary depending on their size and
resources.
Insider strategies
Insider strategies involve direct contact between interest
groups and members of Congress (or their staff). Those
groups with sufficient resources will hire professional lobby-
ing firms to contact lawmakers on their behalf. Professional
lobbyists will have expert knowledge of how the legislative
process works and who the key players are for any issue and
will have developed relationships with members of Congress
over time. Many lobbyists are former members of Congress
or Congressional staffers. Worried about conflicts of interests,
there is a legal ‘cooling off period’ which prevents Repre-
sentatives and Senators from moving immediately from
elected office to a lobbying firm. Small interest groups lobby-
ing on their own can often find problems in gaining access to
members, especially on major issues where there are many
groups competing for their time. Groups can start to over-
come this problem by establishing offices in Washington DC
and building relationships over a period of time.
One of the biggest advantages interest groups hold is their
knowledge of the issues they are concerned with. This exper-
tise can be used in a number of ways: to try and persuade a
member to vote in the required direction, to supply sympa-
thetic members with evidence or arguments to use in support
of their view, or to testify in front of a committee hearing.
148 The United States Congress
Committee hearings are the most high profile of arenas where
groups can put their arguments to Congress. There is some
doubt, however, as to whether evidence put to the committee
can actually change the minds of long-standing committee
members. This was considered in chapter 3.
The most controversial aspect of interest groups’ activities
is the money donated to the campaign funds of sitting and
prospective members of Congress. As discussed in chapter 2,
despite interest groups being restricted by the Federal Election
Campaign Act to donations of $5,000 per candidate per elec-
tion, the amount of money received by all candidates has risen
dramatically since the 1970s. In addition the rise in so-called
‘soft money’ donations to local political parties have in-
creased interest groups’ financial investment in the electoral
process. The fear expressed by campaigning groups such as
Common Cause and The Center for Responsive Politics is
that a political system awash with financial contributions
from businesses groups and other interests opens itself to the
danger of corruption (see Appendix).
The loophole of soft money was finally regulated in 2002
when a bill co-sponsored by Republican Senator John
McCain of Arizona passed Congress after a long struggle.
McCain, had consistently advocated campaign finance reform
after being caught in a scandal involving donations. In 1989,
five Senators were accused of attempting to interfere with an
investigation into the collapse of a Savings and Loan company
owned by Charles Keating. It emerged that Keating, in total,
had donated over $1 million to those Senators’ campaign
funds. After a lengthy investigation, the Senate criticised four
of the Senators for poor judgement and reprimanded one,
Senator Alan Cranston of California for ‘improper and repug-
nant’ conduct. The Senate concluded that Senators John
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McCain and John Glenn had not been extensively involved.
This was not the first time the US Congress had been hit
by scandal involving money. In 1980, in the ‘ABSCAM’
scandal, an FBI undercover operation brought charges of
bribery against six Representatives and one Senator. All either
resigned their seats or were defeated in the next election,
except Congressman Michael J. ‘Ozzie’ Myers who was
expelled from the House. In 1997 House Speaker Newt
Gingrich was fined over $30,000 following charges of ethics
violations and misleading the House over his use of funds
from a non-profit organisation for political purposes. The
scandal contributed to his early retirement from Speakership
and ultimately from the House. The irony in the Gingrich
scandal was that, in 1989, he had been at the forefront of a
campaign which led to the resignation of Speaker Jim Wright
following allegations of misuse of funds from book royalties.
For the most part, however, donations from interest
groups are open and made within the law. Whether donations
can ‘buy’ a member’s vote is open for debate. While a dona-
tion of $5,000 is no small amount, it is only a fraction of the
average total raised by members of Congress, especially for
those running for the Senate. The first consideration of any
member when deciding how to act or cast a vote will be the
possible reaction of their constituents. In most circumstances,
no amount of money from an interest group will persuade a
member to vote or act in a way that would jeopardise their re-
election. However, on issues which are not high profile, or
which constituents have little interest in, there remains a ques-
tion of to what extent money can sway votes. Academic
studies do not agree; some suggest a link between donations
and votes, others argue that no link exists at all.
In the majority of cases, however, money is not spent in an
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attempt to change the view of members of Congress, instead it
tends to flow from interest groups to members who are already
sympathetic to their position. With this, groups are trying to
achieve two things. Firstly, by donating money to the election
campaigns of candidates who support their position, groups
hope to facilitate the election of members sympathetic to their
cause. Secondly, if that member is returned to Congress, groups
hope that their financial investment will result in improved
access. Donations are normally used as part of a wider lobby-
ing strategy, with the money being used to increase the effec-
tiveness of a group’s arguments and persuasion.
For most groups, the money available for political dona-
tions is limited. This means that targeting the right members
is crucial if the money is to be used effectively. It will be of
little use to a group if their campaign contributions find their
way to members who are publicly opposed to that group’s
point of view. Funds will also not be used efficiently if given
to members who are unable or unwilling to make an impact
in Congress on the donating group’s key issue. Consequently,
groups will often target members of Congress who sit on a
committee with jurisdiction over the issue, especially those
who have a track record of activity in the area of concern
Outsider strategies
Outsider strategies are those which groups use to put pressure
on Congress and its members without working directly in
Capitol Hill itself. Such strategies look to mobilise and dem-
onstrate public support around their issue. The aim of out-
sider action is to suggest to members of Congress that their
stand on the issue may have electoral consequences. Examples
of such strategies can include organising demonstrations,
letter writing campaigns or advertising in the media.
Congress, the media and interest groups 151
There is some question to how effective outsider strategies
are in influencing the legislative process. It is argued that
groups resort to such activities when, unlike, say, business
groups, they do not have the resources or contacts to effec-
tively lobby from within Congress. On Mothers’ Day 2000,
one of the largest public protests America had seen took place
under the name ‘The Million Mom March’. The March was
a protest against gun violence and for legal controls on the
possession of firearms. Over 750,000 people marched on the
National Mall in Washington DC. Thousands also joined
marches in towns and cities across the country. The demon-
strations achieved maximum publicity for the cause of gun
control, but had very little impact in terms of new legislation.
However, this assessment is not entirely fair. Research by
Kay Schlozman and John Tierney suggests that rather than a
last resort, public activity is the norm for a majority of inter-
est groups. They estimated that over 80 per cent of groups
engaged in grassroots lobbying and letter- writing campaigns,
and one-third of groups placed adverts in the media.2 These
efforts are often used to supplement more direct lobbying.
While change may not be achieved immediately, public cam-
paigns can have the effect of keeping an issue on the political
agenda. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights demon-
strations led by interest groups such as the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) made
a huge impact on the national political scene. Television pic-
tures of the brutality which occasionally greeted the marchers
highlighted the issue further. These public displays were
central to the debate which eventually led to the passage of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.
For most groups, such mass action is impossible to organ-
ise. Letter-writing campaigns or marches will be much more
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low key. The success of small group action will depend on
how effectively they can target individual constituencies of
members.
Is there a level playing field?
All interest groups are not equal; inevitably some will have
larger financial resources, others will have greater public
support. However, one question which has long been debated
is that if a group is sufficiently resourced and organised to
lobby Congress, will they find a level playing field? The argu-
ments on this matter can be characterised by two extremes –
pluralism and elite theory.
Pluralist group theory, expounded by such writers as
Arthur Bentley and David Truman, views government as a
neutral arbiter of competing interests.3 Government has no
preconceived position on any issue, but instead acts as the
venue where interest groups can compete to influence policy.
In the case of Congress, it will be the committees which
provide the focus for competition between interests. Under
the pluralist model, as problems arise, groups will mobilise in
response. As one interest gets their way in terms of policy,
others will mobilise in opposition, forming what are known
as policy subsystems. If there is significant support for a point
of view, this will be represented at government level. In this
way, the battle between organised interests is a dynamic one
which shifts and changes with political and social develop-
ments. An often quoted example of such mobilisation is the
rise of the labour movement during the 1930s in response to
hardships brought on by the Great Depression.
At the other end of the theoretic spectrum is elite theory.
Under this model, government is a vested interest in itself, rather
than some sort of neutral arbiter. Government is populated by
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types of people with similar backgrounds, views and values.
A leading elite theorist, C. Wright Mills, writing in 1956,
described those elected to Congress thus
as social types . . . [they] are not representative of the rank
and file citizens. They represent those who have been success-
ful in entrepreneurial and professional endeavours. Older
men, they are of the privileged white, native-born of native
parents, Protestant Americans. They are college graduates
and they are at least solid, upper-middle class in income and
status. On average, they have had no experience of wage or
lower salaried work. They are, in short, in and of the new
and old upper classes of local society.4
As discussed in chapter 2, the background of members of
Congress had become more diverse since Mills was writing.
However, the accusation still remains that Washington estab-
lishment is still dominated by a business-oriented upper class
and their shared attitudes set the parameters for debate.
Accordingly, groups representing big business will have a
huge advantage over public interests. They will have greater
contacts throughout Washington DC, better resources and
share the beliefs and goals of most members of Congress. 
One variant of elite theory is that which suggests that the
policy process is dominated by iron triangles (briefly discussed
in chapter 4). The three points of the triangle are the Con-
gressional committee with jurisdiction over an issue, the
department or agency with responsibility for executing the
law and certain interested groups. The argument runs that
each part of the triangle reaches consensus on the direction of
policy and because of the dominance of the committee over
the legislative process, dissenting voices are not allowed in.
The most famous case of an iron triangle was suggested by
President Eisenhower in his farewell speech, when he warned
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of the dangers of the ‘military–industrial complex’. In this
example, it is the Armed Services Committee of Congress (the
members of which will often represent constituencies where
the military is a major employer), the department of defense
(or Pentagon) and groups such as arms manufacturers. All
parts of this triangle have an interest in increasing spending
on defense and have the ability to dominate the policy
process, regardless of the impact of the policy on the economy
or society as a whole.
Since the Republican Party took control of Congress in
1995, there have been accusations that business groups and
others have received unprecedented access to the legislative
process. The accusations were particularly directed at policy
making on environmental and energy issues. Environmental
groups complained that the very companies who were subject
to environmental laws made by Congress were allowed to
work closely with the Republican majority to rewrite legisla-
tion. One Republican Congressional aide admitted there was
some truth to this, but argued that there was no conspiracy at
work,
[Environmental groups] brought that up as an issue and I
think that is a bogus issue. They work with Democrats;
Democrats are their allies and the environmentalists work
very hard to get . . . Democrats elected. It should be no sur-
prise that when the Democrats are writing a bill they would
call in their friends and when the Republicans are writing a
bill they are going to call in their friends. We [Republicans]
talked to the environmentalists, they testified before our
committees in, I think, fairly balanced hearings. But it
shouldn’t surprise anyone, unless they are really naive, that
Republicans would be a little more solicitous of farmers’
concerns or some business concerns. That is what the whole
election is about.5
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The reality of Congressional-interest group relations prob-
ably falls somewhere between the pluralist and elite models.
The idea of iron triangles must be disputed. Hugh Heclo has
argued that such tight ‘subgovernments’ have proved very dif-
ficult to maintain, and instead he suggests that more diverse
issue networks have arisen. He accepts that certain groups
with expert knowledge and shared values will work closely
with committees and bureaucrats, but that the large number
of participants will prevent any permanent consensus being
reached.
While big business will have a major advantage in lobby-
ing Congress through its resources, expertise and relation-
ships in government, this does not mean that public-interest
groups are doomed to failure. Ralph Nader, who ran as a
Green Partry candidate for the presidency in 1996 and 2000,
has shown how a public campaigner can have an effect. In
1965, Nader published a book entitled Unsafe at any speed,
which exposed the poor safety standards which he claimed
existed throughout the American car industry. Nader’s cam-
paign was highly influential in the passage of the 1966
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Nader went
on to lead campaigns on food safety and environmental
issues. However, it can be argued that such success stories are
the exception and that in the day-to-day business of law-
making, small public-interest groups will struggle to make a
major impact.
Summary
Media and interest groups have an impact on Congress. The
media will influence how Congress is perceived by the public.
The growth of television has led to accusations that the media,
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in search of entertainment and viewing figures, has trivialised
politics, focusing on sensation rather than news. Interest
groups try to influence Congress in a number of ways. Their
tactics can be divided into outsider and insider strategies. The
most controversial of strategies is the donation of money to
members’ campaigns. This has led to accusations of corrup-
tion, although the evidence for how far money can ‘buy’ votes
is mixed. What is also of concern is that it can be argued that
only the biggest and richest groups have a significant effect on
the legislative process.
Appendix: top gun
In its bid to quash legislation that would respond to a rash of school
shootings by strengthening the nation’s gun laws, the National Rifle
Association (NRA) outspent gun control advocates nearly 50–1 in
campaign contributions to members of Congress in the first half of
1999. Newly filed records with the Federal Election Commission
show the NRA contributed more than $270,000 from its political
action committee to members of Congress between Jan. 1 and July
31, 1999, 81 percent to Republicans. During the same period,
Handgun Control, a leading advocate for new gun laws, made
$5,500 in PAC contributions, all to Democrats.
Such spending came during a period when Congress was wres-
tling with proposed legislation that included stronger regulations on
gun shows and measures that would determine whether gun manu-
facturers could be held liable for damage caused by guns. The most
contentious debate emerged after a spate of deadly school shoot-
ings, including the April massacre of 14 students and a teacher at
Colorado’s Columbine High School. Lawmakers, propelled by
outrage over Columbine and rising gun violence, introduced several
measures, including amendments to limit the number of handguns
that a household could purchase each month.
Analysis of the NRA’s political giving shows contributions to
lawmakers were made alongside key events during the gun-control
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debate. During May, the NRA PAC contributed $23,550 to law-
makers, almost all of which was given on May 6 – the same day
Senate Democrats unveiled what would be the first of numerous
gun-control policy packages on Capitol Hill. Among the recipients
was Sen. Slate Gorton (R-Wash.), who received $1,000. Gorton is a
longtime critic of proposed gun curbs, who would emerge as a
prominent supporter of the NRA in the recent debate. ‘We all know
that there is no effective legislation we could pass that would comply
with the First Amendment’ Gorton told the Christian Science
Monitor on May 6.
In a major defeat for the NRA just days later, the Senate nar-
rowly rejected, then approved, a juvenile-justice bill that included
controls on the import of gun ammunition as well as a mandatory
three-business day check on the buyers of weapons sold at gun
shows. The bill’s passage marked the first time in more than five
years that lawmakers had approved substantial gun-control legisla-
tion. In June, as the House prepared to take up its own version of
the gun bill, the NRA nearly quadrupled its contributions to law-
makers. The NRA PAC reported giving $88,500 to lawmakers that
month, with more than $80,000 going to House members. Seventy-
four percent of the NRA contributions in June went to House
Republicans.
On June 7, House Democrats and Republicans began crafting
separate versions of a juvenile-justice bill that would be introduced
later in the week. That same day, the NRA contributed $31,700 to
lawmakers, including $1,000 to Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.) and
$2,500 to Rep. Bud Cramer (D-Ala.), two prominent Democrats
who would join the Republicans in defeating the gun bill. Dingell,
during the House debate, sponsored an amendment that would limit
background checks at gun shows to 24 hours, after which the
weapon could be sold to the buyer whether or not the check had
been completed. Later, he urged conservative Democrats to vote
against the entire gun bill, even though his amendment had been
approved. ‘There are sensible ways to ensure law-abiding citizens’
rights to purchase firearms while forever closing the gun-show loop-
hole,’ Dingell told The Washington Times.
Gun control advocates, who viewed the House juvenile justice
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bill as too weak, united on June 17 with gun rights proponents, who
viewed the bill as too strong, to defeat the measure. Within a week,
the NRA gave $52,800 to lawmakers, nearly $16,000 of which
went to House Democrats who voted against new gun curbs.
By Holly Bailey
Reproduced with the permission of The Center for Responsive Politics
(www.opensecrets.org).
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9Assessing the US Congress
I have wondered at times what the Ten Commandments
would have looked like if Moses had run them through the
US Congress. (President Ronald W. Reagan)
At first glance, while the nation of the United States of
America has changed greatly since the Constitution was
written in 1787, the political system has remained remarkably
stable. The United States is still a federal system, with its
government based on the separation of the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial powers. Congress, the legislative branch of
the government, remains a bicameral body, with the differ-
ences between its two chambers based upon the principles laid
down by the Founding Fathers. However, further investiga-
tion of the American political establishment at the beginning
of the twenty-first century reveals some significant changes.
The role of the federal government has been transformed; it
now reaches into every area of American life requiring
Congress to deal with issues as diverse as taxation, space
exploration, gun control and the ethics of cloning. The presi-
dency has claimed for itself a much greater part in the initia-
tion of legislation than the Founding Fathers ever would have
imagined. Congress has been forced to respond to this new
challenge along with other changes such as the increase in
interest-group activity, the importance of money within the
political system, the development of mass communication
and the establishment of primary elections as the first step
towards securing a seat in the House of Representatives or
Senate.
It is possible to argue that the way in which the
Constitution has been able to adapt to such changes without
the need for significant amendment, is a triumph for the
American political structure. However, it could also be argued
that many of the difficulties faced by the United States in the
new century will not be solved easily using eighteenth-century
institutions. Such a view resonates with President Reagan’s
famous assertion that the growth of federal power since 1933
has led to a situation where ‘government is not the solution to
our problem; government is the problem’.
For any student of the US Congress this is a difficult but
important issue. It is also one which the American public has
no consistent view on. Opinion polls in 1990 suggested that
Congress was failing in its task; when the public was asked
whether they approved of the way Congress was doing its job,
the highest positive response rate gained in that year was 28 per
cent, with 65 per cent disapproving and 7 per cent expressing
no opinion.1 It was to take until January 1999 for Congress’s
approval rating to reach over 50 per cent. In recent years,
however, the poll results have been much more encouraging,
with public approval hitting a high of 84 per cent in October
of 2001. While this extraordinary high result can be attributed
to the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington DC (the previous month produced an approval
score of 42 per cent), since early 2000, Congress has been con-
sistently receiving higher approval than disapproval ratings.
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Opinion polls are a good snapshot of the public mood at
one time, but as the results from November 2001 show, they
can be influenced by a variety of factors. The problematic
question of whether Congress ‘works’ is, though, an impor-
tant one. This chapter will examine that question by consid-
ering some of the challenges faced by the modern Congress.
Gridlock
The term gridlock became popular in the 1980s. Originally
used to describe standstill in New York City traffic jams, it
was soon adopted by political journalists to refer to an inabil-
ity by Congress and/or the President to enact new legislation,
even if there was seemingly a majority in favour of action. The
reasons for gridlock occurring in the political system are plen-
tiful. The Founding Fathers must take their fair share of the
blame (or credit, depending on your view). The system of
checks and balances, designed to prevent the rise of a despotic
government, can also make legislating a difficult task. With
the agreement of the House, Senate and the President needed
for a bill to become a law (the exception being when Congress
overrides a presidential veto), any one of those bodies can
prevent a law being enacted. The most extreme example of
this in recent years was the stand-off between Congress and
White House in 1995 over the budget which led to a govern-
ment shutdown. Compromises between the branches of
government are hard fought and often difficult to achieve.
It can be argued that such disagreements between the
President and Congress have increased in recent years because
of the tendency towards divided government – where differ-
ent parties control the executive and legislative branches of
government. Between 1969 and 2001, divided government
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was in place for all but six years. With different policy
agendas being pursued by the White House and Congress, it
is perhaps not surprising that gridlock occurs. However, this
explanation is not enough by itself. Even when the same party
has controlled both branches of government, this has not
meant that the difficulties inherent in passing legislation have
disappeared. Indeed, Democrat Presidents Carter and Clinton
both faced problems with achieving their legislative goals
even when the Democrats were in charge of Congress.
Congress itself can contribute to problems of gridlock. The
gate-keeping function of Congressional committees provides
a large barrier to action at the very beginning of the legislative
process in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Additionally, the lack of sanctions available to the party
leaders to force members to behave or vote in a particular way
make any form of party government near impossible. As Newt
Gingrich discovered while attempting to pass the measures
included in the Contract with America, the bicameral struc-
ture of Congress can cause problems. Even when one chamber
votes in favour of legislation, there is no guarantee that their
colleagues on the other side of Congress will do likewise.
Interest groups have also been blamed for Congressional
inaction. Advocates of healthcare reform regularly point to
the money donated to Congressional candidates by health
insurance companies as a major factor in Congress’s failure to
pass comprehensive healthcare legislation. The same argu-
ments are made by those frustrated by the reluctance of
Congress to pass further restrictions on the ownership of guns.
The contention is that the nature of the legislative process
makes it easy for members to block the progress of new laws,
especially by those on the appropriate committee, without
drawing public attention to their actions. Consequently, while
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interest groups may find it difficult to persuade Congress to
pass new laws, they are far more successful in using their influ-
ence to prevent the passage of legislation.
While gridlock has on occasions been a feature in modern
American Government, the extent of the problem should not
be overstated. In recent periods of divided government, pieces
of major legislation have been successfully passed, often
through compromise between Congress and the presidency.
To characterise gridlock as a constant feature of the US polit-
ical system would be just as erroneous as to deny that it exists
at all. Even when gridlock does prevent Congress from
passing legislation, this does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that it is failing in its job as the federal legislature.
It could be argued that the point of the checks and balances is
to ensure that laws are not made casually; that it is right that
it is easier to block a law than to pass one. This is partly a
subjective matter, as former Senate Republican leader and
Presidential nominee Bob Dole commented, ‘if you’re against
something you’d better hope there is a little gridlock’. It is also
a function of the designs of the Founding Fathers and their
concern to prevent an overpowerful government. There is a
case to be made that the federal system was designed to make
it difficult to pass legislation and that gridlock is evidence that
the government is working as it should.
The making of coherent policy
One further accusation against Congress is that it is unable of
passing a coherent policy programme in the interests of the
national good. This was touched on in chapter 2. This argu-
ment is a function of two features of Congress: the re-election
impulse of members and the power of the committee. With
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members focused throughout their term of office on the need
for re-election, the interests and preferences of their constitu-
ents will be a priority. Representatives and Senators will
behave and take positions in order to benefit their voters and,
if possible, ensure that the benefits of legislation are targeted
at their constituency. The committee system allows members
to specialise in issues of concern or potential benefit to their
constituents and exercise a great deal of influence over those
areas of policy due to the position of the committee in the leg-
islative process. The result of this, critics argue, is a system of
policy making which is directed at parochial concerns rather
than any greater national need.
As argued before, the whole notion of ‘the national good’
is a subjective one. When subsidies for farmers are passed by
the Agriculture Committee or funds for a building project
benefit the constituency of a member of the Public Works
Committee, Congress is accused of legislating in a parochial
manner. Those communities who benefited from such
Congressional action would, no doubt, contend that the leg-
islation was not only necessary but was evidence of Congress
acting in the national interest. It can also be argued that
Congress was established as a representative body, and would
be failing in its task if members did not work for the benefits
of their constituents.
Challenges for the twenty-first century
One further question to be considered is whether the structure
of the legislative process makes Congress able to tackle the
issues that will emerge in the new century. It could be argued
that a system which appears to make inaction easy to achieve
will always be better at sustaining the status quo than
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producing innovative programmes. Congressional policy
making can often be characterised as incremental. Pro-
grammes are introduced and amended over time as feedback is
received about the successes and failures. It is far easier for
Congress as a whole and members individually to look to
amend existing policies than it is to embark on whole new pro-
grammes. This is consistent with the view of Congress as one
where power is decentralised, with many hurdles for legislation
to cross and dominated by members with re-election upper-
most in their minds. However, this can create a problem when
entirely new challenges arise or when it becomes clear that the
existing approach to a problem is fundamentally inadequate.
Budget deficit
At the heart of the budget stand-off between President Clinton
and the Republican-controlled Congress was the issue of the
federal budget deficit. The growth of government spending
throughout the post-war period had led to small budget defi-
cits being reported throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The eco-
nomic picture worsened in the 1970s and the issue of the
deficit became prominent in the 1980 presidential election.
The election in 1980 of Ronald Reagan with a Republican
majority in the Senate, promised for some the opportunity for
a more fiscally conservative approach to spending. However,
if their policy was to bring the budget back into surplus, they
failed completely. By the time Reagan left office in 1989, the
deficit had reached $200 billion. Critics of the President
argued that his policy of cutting taxes while at the same time
pushing for large increases in defence spending caused the
national debt to escalate. Reagan and his supporters aimed
their fire at the inability of the US Congress to relinquish their
attachment to spending on pork barrel projects and inefficient
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programmes. Congressional attempts to pass legislation
which would force spending down (most notably the 1987
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) proved ineffective and by the
time of the 1992 presidential election the budget deficit was
only a little short of $300 billion.
The state of the economy was to dominate the 1992 elec-
tion and although some progress was made, when the
Republicans took over control of Congress in 1995, the deficit
was still in excess of $150 billion. Determined to bring the
budget into surplus, the Republican majority proposed
sweeping cuts in social spending which were to bring
Congress into conflict with the Clinton White House and lead
to the stand-off which saw the government shutdown for a
short period in late 1995. There was even an unsuccessful
attempt by Congress to amend the Constitution to force
future lawmakers to maintain a balanced budget. However,
once again the problem of reducing government outlays and
protecting valuable social programmes prevented the US
Government from finding a solution to the problem.
Compromise was eventually reached between President
Clinton and Congress and in 1998 the Office of Management
and Budget reported a surplus for the first time since 1969.
The problem, though, has not gone away. A combination of
Congress passing the deep tax cuts proposed by President
George W. Bush and increases in defence and other spending
(partially in a response to the terrorist attacks of 2001,
although not exclusively) will lead to budget deficits in 2002,
2003 and 2004.
Social security
The problem of the budget deficit has an impact on another
emerging issue – the future of social security. Through a
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programme established in 1935, all working Americans con-
tribute through payroll taxes to a fund which is used to
support retired and disabled citizens and their dependants.
The problem which is faced by the government is that due to
population growth and longer life expectancy, it is projected
that by 2016, benefits will begin outpacing revenues, and by
2038 the surplus will be exhausted entirely.
The solution to this problem is not clear and has caused a
certain amount of controversy. Democrats in particular argue
that the current system is essentially sound and that only
incremental change is necessary. Others, including President
George W. Bush are pushing for more fundamental reform.
One particular proposal is to create individual social security
accounts in which payroll taxes would be invested to provide
for future payments. Critics of the scheme argue that invest-
ing revenue in stocks could prove risky and that the use of
individual accounts would mean a decrease in the level of pay-
ments to cover transaction charges.
The future of social security is the sort of problem that
Congress must address successfully if it is to be considered an
effective legislature. If a fundamentally new approach is
indeed necessary, then Congress must prove the stereotype of
a legislature dominated by local interests which favours
gradual change wrong. As with any law-making body, it must
ultimately be judged on its success in tackling the problems
which its society faces.
Summary
Assessing whether Congress ‘works’ is no easy task. It is
difficult to decide on the criteria by which it should be
judged. Gridlock is often quoted as evidence of the political
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establishment malfunctioning, however, it could also be
argued that the system was designed to make it difficult for
laws to be passed. On any one issue, it is a matter of opinion
whether the passage of a new law is the desirable course of
action. Similarly, while accusations of parochialism are fre-
quently levelled at Congress, it must also function as a repre-
sentative body and any judgement of what is in the national
interest is bound to be subjective. The appropriate criteria
with which to judge Congress is perhaps how effectively it can
address the challenges which will emerge in the new century.
Notes
1 All figures taken form Gallup polls conducted from October 1990 to
June 2002.
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